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Introduction
Matteo Pasquinelli
Catastrophe is the past coming apart.  
Anastrophe is the future coming together. 
— Land and Plant (1994)
The Reason of Trauma
One day, it will not be arbitrary to reframe twentieth century thought and its 
intelligent machines as a quest for­the­positive­definition­of­error,­abnormal-
ity, trauma, and catastrophe—a set of concepts that need to be understood 
in their cognitive, technological and political composition. It may be surpris-
ing­for­some­to­find­out­that­Foucault’s­history­of­biopower­and­technologies­
of the self share common roots with cybernetics and its early error-friendly 
universal machines. Or to learn that the desiring machines, which “continually 
break down as they run, and in fact run only when they are not functioning 
properly”­(Deleuze­and­Guattari­1983,­8),­were­in­fact­echoing­research­on­war­
traumas­and­brain­plasticity­from­the­First­World­War.­Across­the­history­of­
computation­(from­early­cybernetics­to­artificial­intelligence­and­current­algo-
rithmic­capitalism)­both­mainstream­technology­and­critical­responses­to­it­
have shared a common belief in the determinism and positivism of the instru-
mental or technological rationality, to­use­the­formulations­of­the­Frankfurt­
School­(Horkheimer­1947;­Marcuse­1964). Conversely, the aim of this anthology 
is to rediscover the role of error, trauma and catastrophe in the design of intel-
ligent machines and the theory of augmented cognition. These are timely and 
urgent­issues:­the­media­hype­of­singularity­occurring­for­artificial­intelligence­
appears­just­to­fodder­a­pedestrian­catastrophism­without­providing­a­basic­
epistemic­model­to­frame­such­an­“intelligence­explosion”­(Chalmers­2010).
The­definition­of­error­had­a­fundamental­role­in­the­genesis­of­the­Enlight-
enment­as­well.­According­to­Bates­(2002)­both­critics,­such­as­the­Frankfurt­
School, and defenders, like liberals and socialist revolutionaries, wrongly 
believed­that­the­Enlightenment­was­just­driven­by­plain­confidence­in­reason.­
Instead,­Bates­stresses­that­the­Age­of­Reason­was­obsessed­with­the­consti-
tution of error and considered human knowledge to be basically an aberration. 
Since­the­method­of­“truth­is­really­parasitic­on­its­supposed­negation,”­Bates­
(2002,­viii)­suggests­then­that­the Enlightenment­in­fact­laid­the­groundwork­
for­a­modern­epistemology­of­error.­Therefore,­critical­theory’s­approach­
should be redirected toward its own postulates in order to inquire if the whole 
8 Alleys of Your Mind
history­of­instrumental­reason—from­the­Age­of­Reason­to­the­Age­of­Intel-
ligent Machines—has actually concealed a deep and structural errancy.
These older concerns of the relation between technology and reason re-
emerge today as concerns of the relation between computation and cognition. 
The­current­philosophical­debate­appears­to­be­polarized­between­the­posi-
tions of neomaterialism and neorationalism, that is between novel interpreta-
tions of Whitehead and Sellars, for instance, between those who side with the 
agency­of­technical­objects,­matter­and­affects­and­those­who­address­the­
primacy­of­reason­and­its­potential­forms­of­autonomization.1 The anthology 
cuts across these binaries by proposing, more modestly, that a distinction 
should be made between those philosophies that acknowledge a positive and 
constituent role for error, abnormality, pathology, trauma, and catastrophe 
on the one hand, and those who support a flat ontology without dynamic, self-
organizing­and­constitutive­ruptures­on­the­other. No paradigm of cognition 
and­computation­(neomaterialist­or­neorationalist)­can­be­assessed­with-
out the recognition of the epistemic abnormal and the role of noetic failure. 
Departing from the lesson of the trauma of reason­instructed­by­the­Frankfurt­
School, the reason of trauma must be rediscovered as the actual inner logic of 
the age of intelligent machines. 
The Pathology of Machines
With much akin to the turbulent underground that contributed to the com-
puter­revolution­in­the­California­of­the­1970s,­cybernetics­was­born­out­of­a­
practice-based,­error-friendly­and­social-friendly­milieu,­as­Pickering­(2010)­
recounts in his seminal book The Cybernetic Brain. Cybernetics is often per-
ceived as an evolution of information theory and its predictable communica-
tion­channels,­but­many­cyberneticians­of­the­first­generation­were­actually­
trained­in­psychology­and­psychiatry.­As­Pickering­reminds­us,­the­idea­of­the­
cybernetic machine was shaped after the adaptive theory of the brain, accord-
ing to which the function of the brain organ is not the representation of but the 
adaptation to the external environment. The canonical image of the organism 
struggling to adapt to its own Umwelt belongs of course to the history of evolu-
tionary theory and beforehand, famously, to German Naturphilosophie. This 
historical note is not attached here to evoke a biomorphic substrate of infor-
mation technologies in a vitalist fashion, but on the contrary to exhume the 
role of abstraction in the philosophies of life. Whether we are conscious of it 
or not, any machine is always a machine of cognition, a product of the human 
intellect and a component of the gears of extended cognition.2
1­ For­a­general­overview­of­this­debate­see­Bryant­et­al.­2011.­A­main­neorationalist­refer-
ence­is­Brassier­2007.­For­a­recent­neomaterialist­response­see­Shaviro­2014.
2­ The­concepts­of­organism,­structure­and­system­had­a­very­promiscuous­family­life­
throughout the twentieth century. In this anthology they are considered symbolic and 
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French­philosophers­and­American­cyberneticians­did­not­welcome­the­paral-
lelism between organisms and machines with the same enthusiasm. In his 
influential­lecture­“Machine­and­Organism”­Canguilhem­stated­that­a­machine,­
unlike an organism, cannot display pathological behaviors as it is not adap-
tive.­An­organism­becomes­mentally­ill­as­it­has­the­ability­to­self-organize­and­
repair itself, whereas the­machine’s­components­have­fixed­goals­that­cannot­
be repurposed.3 There is no machine pathology as such, also on the basis that 
“a­machine­cannot­replace­another­machine,”­concluded­Canguilhem­(1947,­
109).­Nonetheless­Bates­has­noted­that­the­early­“cyberneticists­were­intensely­
interested in pathological break-downs [and] Wiener claimed that certain 
psychological­instabilities­had­rather­precise­technical­analogues”­(Bates­2014,­
33).­The­adaptive­response­of­the­machine­was­often­discussed­by­early­cyber-
neticians­in­terms­of­error,­shock­and­catastrophe.­Even­the­central­notion­
of homeostasis was originally conceived by the physiologist Walter Cannon 
(who­introduced­it­in­cybernetics)­as­the­organism’s­reaction­to­a­situation­of­
emergency, when the body switch to the state of flight or fight­(Bates­2014,­44).­
At­the­center­of­the­early­cybernetic­paradigm,­catastrophe­could­be­found­as­
its forgotten operative kernel.
The Catastrophic Brain 
Across­the­thought­of­the­twentieth­century­the­saga­of­the­instrumentalization 
of reason was paralleled by the less famous lineage of the instrumentalization 
of catastrophe,­that­was­most­likely­the­former’s­actual­epistemic­engine.­
The model of catastrophe in cybernetics and even the catastrophe theory in 
mathematics­(since­Thom­1975)­happened­to­be­both­inspired­by­the­intuitions­
of­the­neurologist­Kurt­Goldstein,­who­curiously­was­also­the­main­influence­
behind­Canguilhem’s­lecture­“Machine­and­Organism.”4 Goldstein is found at 
the­confluence­of­crucial­tendencies­of­the­twentieth­century­neurology­and­
philosophy­and­his­thought­is­briefly­presented­here­to­cast­a­different­light­on­
the evolution of augmented intelligence.
Goldstein­was­not­an­esoteric­figure­in­the­scientific­and­intellectual­circles­
of­Berlin.­He­was­the­head­of­the­neurology­station­at­the­Moabit­hospital­
when,­in­1934,­he­was­arrested­by­the­Gestapo­and­expelled­from­Germany.­
While­in­exile­in­Amsterdam,­in­only­five­weeks,­he­dictated­and­published­
his seminal monograph Der Aufbau des Organismus­(literally:­the­“structure”­
logic forms rather than ontological ones. 
3­ Canguilhem’s­ 1947­ lecture­had­ a­ profound­ influence­on­ the­ French­post-structuralism,­
including­Foucault­and­Simondon.­The­ famous­passage­on­ the­desiring­machines­ “that­
continually­break­down­as­they­run”­(Deleuze­and­Guattari­1983,­8)­is­also­a­reference­to­
this­debate.­Deleuze­and­Guattari’s­notion­of­the­desiring­machine­proved­afterward­to­
be a very successful one, but at the cost of severing more profound ties with the domain 
of the machines of cognition.
4­ On­the­legacy­of­Goldstein­see­Harrington­1996,­Bates­2014,­Pasquinelli­2014­and­2015.­
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or­“construction”­of­the­organism).­Goldstein’s­clinical­research­started­with­
the­study­of­brain­injuries­in­WWI­soldiers­and­intellectually­it­was­influenced­
by German Idealism and Lebensphilosophie. With the Gestalt school and his 
cousin­Ernst­Cassirer,­he­shared­a­sophisticated­theory­of­the­symbolic forms 
(from­mathematics­to­mythology)­whose­creation­is­a­key­faculty­of­the­human­
mind.­Goldstein­was­an­extremely­significant­inspiration­also­for­Merleau-
Ponty­(1942)­and­Canguilhem­(1943).­Foucault­(1954)­himself­opened­his­first­
book­with­a­critique­of­Goldstein’s­definitions­of­mental­illness­discussing­the­
notions of abstraction, abnormality, and milieu.
It­is­essential­to­note­that­Goldstein­(1934)­posits­trauma­and­catastrophe­
as operative functions of the brain and not simply as reactions to external 
accidents. Goldstein makes no distinction between ordered behavior and 
unordered behavior, between health and pathology—being any normal 
or abnormal response expression of the same adaptive antagonism to the 
environment.­Goldstein’s­organic­normativity­of­the­brain­appears­to­be­more­
sophisticated­than­the­simple­idea­of­neuroplasticity:­the­brain­is­not­just­
able­to­self-repair­after­a­damage,­but­it­is­also­able­to­self-organize­“slight­
catastrophic­reactions”­(Goldstein­1934,­227)­in­order­to­equalize­and­augment­
itself. The brain is then in a permanent and constitutive state of active trauma. 
Within this model of cognitive normativity, more importantly, the successful 
elaboration of traumas and catastrophes always implies the production of 
new norms and abstract forms of behavior.­Abstraction­is­the­outcome­of­the­
antagonism with the environment and an embryonic trauma can be found at 
the center of any new abstraction.
This­core­of­intuitions­that­influenced­the­early­cybernetics­could­be­extended,­
more in general, also to the age of intelligent machines. Since a strong distinc-
tion between machines and the brain is nowadays less of a concern, cognition 
is­perceived­as­extended­and­its­definition­incorporates­external­functions­
and­partial­objects­of­different­sorts.­The technologies of augmented intel-
ligence could be understood therefore as a catastrophic process continuously 
adapting to its environment rather than as a linear process of instrumental 
rationality. Open to the outside, whether autonomous or semi-autonomous, 
machines keep on extending human traumas. 
The Human Mask of Artificial Intelligence
The recognition of a catastrophic process at the center of cognition also 
demands a new analytics of power and cognitive capitalism. In contrast, the 
current­hype­surrounding­the­risks­of­artificial­intelligence­merely­appears­to­
be repeating a grotesque catastrophism, which is more typical of Hollywood 
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movies.5­This­anthology­attempts­to­ground­a­different­angle­also­on­this­
debate,­where­a­definition­of­“intelligence”­still­remains­an­open­problem.­
From­a­philosophical­point­of­view,­human­intelligence­is­in­itself­always­arti-
ficial,­as­it­engenders­novel­dimensions­of­cognition.­Conversely,­the­design­
of­artificial­intelligence­is­still­a­product­of­the­human­intellect­and­therefore­
a form of its augmentation. For­this­reason­the­title­of­the­anthology­refers,­
more modestly, to the notion of augmented intelligence—to remind us of a 
post-human legacy between the human and the machine that is yet prob-
lematic to sever­(despite­the­fact­that­machines­manifest­different­degrees­of­
autonomous­agency).
There are at least three troublesome issues in the current narrative on the 
singularity­of­artificial­intelligence:­first,­the­expectation­of­anthropomorphic­
behavior­from­machine­intelligence­(i.e.,­the­anthropocentric­fallacy);­second,­
the­picture­of­a­smooth­exponential­growth­of­machines’­cognitive­skills­(i.e.,­
the­bootstrapping­fallacy);­third,­the­idea­of­a­virtuous­unification­of­machine­
intelligence­(i.e.,­the­singularity­fallacy).­Regarding­the­anthropocentric­fallacy,­
Benjamin­Bratton’s­essay­in­the­present­anthology­takes­up­the­image­of­the­
Big­Machine­coming­to­wipe­out­mankind,­which­is­basically­an­anthropomor-
phic­projection,­attributing­to­machines­what­are­features­specific­to­animals,­
such­as­predator­instincts.­Chris­Eliasmith­takes­on­the­bootstrapping­fallacy­
by­proposing­a­more­empirical­chronology­for­the­evolutions­of­artificial­
minds­that­is­based­on­progressive­stages­(such­as­“autonomous­navigation,”­
“better­than­human­perception,”­etc.),­according­to­which­“it­seems­highly­
unlikely that there will be anything analogous to a mathematical singularity” 
(Eliasmith­2015,­13).­Similarly,­Bruce­Sterling­is­convinced­that­the­unification­
and­synchronization­of­different­intelligent­technologies­will­happen­to­be­very­
chaotic: 
We­do­not­have­Artificial­Intelligence­today,­but­we­do­have­other­stuff­like­
computer vision systems, robotic abilities to move around, gripper sys-
tems. We have bits and pieces of the grand idea, but those pieces are big 
industries.­They­do­not­fit­together­to­form­one­super­thing.­Siri­can­talk,­
but she cannot grip things. There are machines that grip and manipulate, 
but­they­do­not­talk.­[…]­There­will­not­be­a­Singularity.­(Sterling­2015)
In general, the catastrophism and utopianism that are cultivated around 
artificial­intelligence­are­both­the­antithesis­of­that­ready-to-trauma logic that 
have been detected at the beginning of the history of intelligent machines. 
This issue points to an epistemic and political gap of the current age yet to be 
resolved. 
5­ See­for­instance­Elon­Musk’s­statement­in­October­2014­declaring­AI­the­most­serious­
threat­to­the­survival­of­the­human­race­(Gibbs­2014).
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The anthology proposes to reframe and discuss the reason of trauma and the 
notion of augmentation­from­the­early­cybernetics­to­the­age­of­artificial­intel-
ligence touching also the current debates in neuroscience and the philoso-
phy of mind. The keyword entry at the end of the book provides a historical 
account­of­the­notion­of­augmented­intelligence­starting­from­the­definition­
given­by­Douglas­Engelbart­(1962)­and­following­the­evolution­of­both­the­tech-
nological and political axes, that cannot be easily separated. 
The­first­part­“From­Cybertrauma­to­Singularity”­follows­the­technopolitical­
composition from cybernetics during the Second World War to the recent 
debates­on­artificial­intelligence­today.­Ana­Teixeira­Pinto­focuses­on­the­
moment­where­cybernetics­emerges­out­of­the­conflation­of­behaviorism­
and engineering during the war years. Teixeira Pinto­recounts­the­influence­
of­behaviorism­on­wartime­cybernetics­and­the­employment­of­animals­(like­
pigeons)­in­the­design­of­oddly­functional­ballistic­machinery.­War­experi-
ments were also the breeding ground upon which the mathematical notion of 
information­was­systematized,­she­reminds­us.­At­odds­with­such­a­determin-
ism­(or­probably­just­the­other­side­of­it),­Teixeira Pinto unveils the hidden 
animism­of­cybernetics:­“the­debate­concerning­the­similarities­and­differ-
ences between living tissue and electronic circuitry also gave rise to darker 
man-machine­fantasies:­zombies,­living­dolls,­robots,­brain­washing,­and­
hypnotism”­(31).­In­conclusion,­Teixeira Pinto stresses that the way cybernetics 
treats “action” and “reaction” as an integrated equation was extrapolated into 
a­political­and­economic­ideology­(neoliberalism),­which­denies­social­conflict,­
while the tradition of dialectical materialism has always maintained an unre-
solved­antagonism­at­the­center­of­politics.­Anticipating­an­argument­of­the­
following essay, she encapsulates her analysis in a dramatic way: “cybernetic 
feedback­is­dialectics­without­the­possibility­of­communism”­(33).
Adrian­Lahoud­measures­the­limits­of­the­cybernetic­ideals­of­the­1970s­
against­the­background­of­Salvador­Allende’s­Chile,­where­the­Cybersyn­pro-
ject­was­developed­by­the­British­cybernetician­Stafford­Beer­in­order­to­help­
manage the national economy. Cybersyn represented an experimental alliance 
between the idea of equilibrium in cybernetics and social equity in socialism. 
Lahoud­remarks­that­any­cybernetic­system­is­surely­defined­by­its­Umwelt of 
sensors and information feedbacks, but more importantly by its blind spots. 
“Where­is­one­to­draw­the­line,­that­difficult­threshold­between­the­calculable­
and­the­incalculable,­the­field­of­vision­and­the­blind­spot?“­(46)­asks­Lahoud­
in a question that could be addressed also to current digital studies. The blind 
spot­for­Allende’s­cybernetic­socialism­happened­to­be­Pinochet’s­coup­on­11­
September­1973.­Of­course­Cybersyn­was­never­designed­to­halt­a­putsch­and­
Pinochet indeed represented a set of forces that was exceeding the equilib-
rium­field­of­cybersocialism.­Any­technology­may­happen­to­be­colonized­and,­
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at the end, Lahoud follows the taming of cybernetic equilibrium within the 
deep structure of neoliberalism. 
Orit­Halpern­writes­in­memory­of­the­filmmaker­Haroun­Farocki.­In­his­Serious 
Games (2011)­multi-screen­installation,­the­viewer­is­immersed­in­3D­simula-
tions­of­war­scenarios,­which­are­used­by­the­US­Army­for­both­military­train-
ing and the treatment of post-traumatic stress disorder. On one screen, young 
soldiers­learn­how­to­drive­tanks­and­shoot­targets­in­Iraq­and­Afghanistan;­
on the other, veterans are treated for war traumas like the loss of a friend in 
combat. The repeated reenactment of a traumatic event with virtual reality 
is used to gradually heal the original shock and sever the mnemonic rela-
tion­with­pain.­This­therapeutic­practice­dates­back­to­Freud’s­time,­but­here­
the­therapist­is­replaced­by­a­fully­immersive­interface.­As­Halpern­remarks:­
“[T]rauma here is not created from a world external to the system, but actu-
ally generated, preemptively, from within the channel between the screens 
and­the­nervous­system”­(54).­Halpern­retraces­the­genealogy­of­such­military­
software­to­the­Architecture­Machine­Group­at­MIT,­where­in­the­1980s­the­
“Demo­or­Die”­adage­was­born.­Aside­from­warfare­tactics,­these­new­immer-
sive­interfaces­were­also­tested­in­the­context­of­racial­conflicts,­like­in­the­
controversial­Hessdorfer­Experiment­in­Boston.­Halpern­describes­a­world­
already beyond psychoanalysis, where cognition and computation collapse 
into­each­other­on­the­political­horizon­of­video­simulation.­
Benjamin­Bratton­contests­the­anthropocentric­fallacy­of­the­current­hype­and­
alarmism­around­the­risks­of­artificial­intelligence,­according­to­which­hostile­
behaviors are expected from future intelligent technologies. Scientists and 
entrepreneurs,­Stephen­Hawking­and­Elon­Musk­among­them,­have­recently­
been­trying­to­warn­the­world,­with­Musk­even­declaring­artificial­intelligence­
to­be­the­most­serious­threat­to­the­survival­of­the­human­race.­Bratton­dis-
cusses­different­aspects­of­the­anthropocentric­fallacy­moving­from­the­first­
instance of the “imitation game” between the human and the machine, that 
is­the­test­conceived­by­Alan­Turing­in­1950.­There­are­two­main­issues­in­the­
anthropocentric­fallacy.­First­of­all,­human­intelligence­is­not­always­the­model­
for­the­design­of­machine­intelligence.­Bratton­argues­that­“biomorphic­imita-
tion­is­not­how­we­design­complex­technology.­Airplanes­do­not­fly­like­birds­
fly”­(74),­for­example.­Second,­if­machine­logic­is­not­biomorphic,­how­can­we­
speculate that machines will develop instincts of predation and destruction 
similar­to­animals­and­humans?­In­a­sort­of­planetary­species-specific­FOMO6 
syndrome,­Bratton­suggests­wittily­that­probably­our­biggest­fear­is­to­be­
completely­ignored­rather­than­annihilated­by­artificial­intelligence.­Reversing­
the­mimicry­game,­Bratton­concludes­that­AI­“will­have­less­to­do­with­humans­
6­ Fear­of­missing­out:­the­feeling­(usually­amplified­by­social­media)­that­others­might­be­
having rewarding or interesting experiences from which one is absent.
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teaching machines how to think than with machines teaching humans a fuller 
and­truer­range­of­what­thinking­can­be“­(72).
In­the­second­part­of­the­anthology­“Cognition­between­Augmentation­and­
Automation,”­Michael­Wheeler­introduces­the­hypothesis­of­extended­cogni-
tion­(ExC)­that­has­a­pivotal­role­in­the­discussion­on­Augmented­Intelligence.­
According­to­ExC­the­brain­need­not­retain­all­the­information­it­is­given.­
Instead, it only needs to remember the path to the place where information 
is stored. Thus, in the ecology of the brain, the abstract link to the location of 
information appears to be more important than the memory of content itself. 
Where­such­an­abstract­link­starts­and­ends­is­a­critical­issue­for­ExC,­as­think-
ing­is­also­the­ability­to­incorporate­external­objects­as­parts­of­the­very­logic­
of thinking: pen and paper, for instance, are helpful in solving mathematical 
problems­that­otherwise­would­be­impossible­to­solve­in­one’s­head.­The­cur-
rent age of smartphones, pervasive computing, and search engines happens 
to exemplify such an external human memory on a massive scale. Wheeler 
explores­the­idea­in­relation,­first,­to­the­education­of­children­in­an­increas-
ingly­wired,­wireless­and­networked­world;­second,­to­the­experience­of­space­
and­thinking­in­spaces­designed­with­“intelligent­architecture­”­(99­ff.).­In­a­Bal-
lardian moment, Wheeler asks if those buildings are themselves an extension 
of­human­cognition­and­realization­of­the­inhabitants’­thoughts!
The­ hypothesis­ of­ ExC­makes­ possible­ an­ alternative­ approach­ to­ the­ thesis­
of cognitive alienation and libidinal impoverishment that few authors attrib-
ute to the information overload of the current media age.7­Following­the­ExC­
hypothesis,­it­could­be­postulated­that­the­human­mind­readjusts­itself­to­the­
traumas of new media, for instance, by producing a new cognitive mapping of 
the technological Umwelt.­In­the­ExC­model,­the­brain­is­flexible­enough­to­cap-
ture­any­new­external­object,­or­better,­just­its­functions.­In­this­way­ExC­intro-
duces­a­fascinating­definition­of­intelligence­too:­Intelligence­is­not­the­capac-
ity to remember all knowledge in detail but to make connections between 
fragments­of­knowledge­that­are­not­completely­known.­A­basic­definition­of­
trauma­can­be­ formulated­within­ the­ExC­paradigm:­Trauma­ is­not­produced­
by a vivid content or energetic shock, but by the inability to abstract from that 
memory, that is the inability to transform a given experience into an abstract 
link of memory.
The­cultural­implications­of­cognitive­exteriorization­and­the­malaises­alleg-
edly­caused­by­new­technologies­are­also­the­starting­point­of­Jon­Lindblom’s­
essay.­Drawing­on­Mark­Fisher’s­book­Capitalist Realism, Lindblom reminds 
us that current psychopathologies are induced by capitalist competition and 
exploitation rather than digital technologies in themselves: Neoliberalism 
7­ See­the­critique­of­semio-capitalism­in­Berardi­2009,­the­cognitive­impoverishment­
allegedly­caused­by­Google­in­Carr­2008­or­the­notion­of­grammatization­in­Stiegler­2010.
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is restructuring the nervous system as much as new media do. Lindblom 
reverses­Adorno­and­Horkheimer’s­account­of­the­pathologies­of­instrumental­
rationality­by­following­Ray­Brassier’s­critique:­The­trauma­produced­by­sci-
ence in the human perception of nature should be considered as the starting 
point for philosophy, rather than as a pathology which philosophy is supposed 
to heal. Lindblom discusses then the modern hiatus between the manifest 
image of man and scientific image of man as framed by Wilfrid Sellars. Instead 
of­accommodating­the­scientific­view­of­the­world­to­everyday­life’s­experi-
ence,­as­the­Frankfurt­School­may­suggest,­Lindblom­seconds­Sellars’­idea­of­
the stereoscopic integration­of­the­two.­As­a­further­instance­of­cognitive­dis-
sonance, Lindblom includes the gap between perception of the self and neural 
correlates­in­the­formulation­given­by­the­neurophilosopher­Thomas­Metz-
inger.­Following­Metzinger’s­ethical­program,­Lindblom­finally­advocates­for­a­
political­and­intellectual­project­to­re-appropriate­the­most­advance­technical­
resources­of­NBIC­(nanotechnology,­biotechnology,­information­technology,­
and cognitive science)­in­order­to­re-orient­“mankind­towards­the­wonders­of­
boundless­exteriority”­(111).
Luciana Parisi presents high frequency trading as an example of an all-machine 
phase transition of computation that already exceeds the response and deci-
sion time of humans. Parisi argues that computation is generating a mode of 
thought that is autonomous from organic intelligence and the canonical cri-
tique­of­instrumental­rationality­must­be­updated­accordingly.­Parisi­finds­an­
endogenous limit to computational rationality in the notion of the incomput-
able, or the Omega number discovered by the mathematician Gregory Chaitin. 
Taken this intrinsic randomness of computation into account, the critique of 
instrumental rationality needs to be revised: Parisi remarks that the incom-
putable should not be understood “as an error within the system, or a glitch 
within­the­coding­structure”­(134),­but­rather­as­a­structural­and­constitutive­
part of computation. Parisi believes that “algorithmic automation coincides 
with a mode of thought, in which incomputable or randomness have become 
intelligible,­calculable­but­not­necessarily­totalizable­by­technocapitalism”­
(136).­The­more­technocapitalism­computes,­the­more­randomness­is­created­
and the more chaos is embedded within the system. 
Reza­Negarestani­aims­to­reinforce­the­alliance­between­mind­functionalism­
and­computationalism­that­was­formalized­by­Alan­Turing­in­his­historical­
essay­“Computing­Machinery­and­Intelligence”­(1950).­Functionalism­is­the­
view that the mind can be described in terms of its activities, rather than as 
a­given­object­or­ineffable­entity,­and­its­history­can­be­traced­back­to­Plato,­
the Stoics, Kant, and Hegel. Computationalism is the view that neural states 
can be described also algorithmically and its history passes through scholastic 
logicians,­the­project­of­mathesis universalis until the revolution of modern 
computation. Negarestani stresses that ”the functionalist and computational 
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account­of­the­mind­is­a­program­for­the­actual­realization­of­the­mind­outside­
of­its­natural­habitat”­(145).­Negarestani­concludes­by­recording­the­trauma­
caused by the computational constructability of the inhuman for the galaxy 
of humanism: “What used to be called the human has now evolved beyond 
recognition. Narcissus can no longer see or anticipate his own image in the 
mirror”­(154).
Ben­Woodard­discusses­the­notion­of­bootstrapping, or that mental capacities 
and cognitive processes are capable of self-augmentation.8 He moves from a 
basic­definition­of­self-reflexivity­that­is­found­in­German­Idealism:­“Thinking­
about­thinking­can­change­our­thinking”­(158).­Woodard­defines­the­augmenta-
tion of intellect in spatial and navigational terms rather than in a qualitative 
way,­as­“augmentation­is­neither­a­more,­nor­a­better,­but­an­elsewhere”­(158).
Augmentation­is­always­a­process­of­alienation­of­the­mind­from­itself,­and­
Woodard illustrates the ontology of bootstrapping also with time-travel para-
doxes­from­science­fiction.­This­philosophy­of­augmentation­is­directly­tied­to­
the philosophy of the future that has recently emerged in the neorationalist 
and accelerationist circles. In the words of Negarestani quoted by Woodard: 
“Destiny expresses the reality of time as always in excess of and asymmetrical 
to­origin;­in­fact,­as­catastrophic­to­it”­(164).
In­the­third­part­“The­Materialism­of­the­Social­Brain,”­Charles­Wolfe­and­
Catherine Malabou submit, respectively, a critique of the transcendental read-
ings of the social brain in philosophy and trauma in psychoanalysis. “Is the 
brain­somehow­inherently­a­utopian­topos?”­asks­Wolfe.­Against­old­reactions­
that opposed the “authenticity of political theory and praxis to the dangerous 
naturalism of cognitive science,” Wolfe records the rise of a new interest in the 
idea­of­the­social­brain.­Wolfe­refers­to­a­tradition­that,­via­Spinoza,­crossed­
the Soviet neuropsychology of Lev Vygotsky and re-emerged, under com-
pletely­different­circumstances,­in­the­debate­on­the­general­intellect­by­Italian­
operaismo in­the­early­1990s.­Wolfe­himself­advocates­the­idea­of­the cultured 
brain by­Vygotsky:­“Brains­are­culturally­sedimented;­permeated­in­their­
material­architecture­by­our­culture,­history­and­social­organization,­and­this­
sedimentation­is­itself­reflected­in­cortical­architecture”­(177).­In­Vygotsky,­the­
brain is augmented from within by innervating external relations. Interestingly, 
here, the idea of extended cognition is turned outside in to become a sort of 
encephalized sociality. 
In a similar way, Catherine Malabou argues against the impermeability of 
Freudian­and­Lacanian­psychoanalysis­to­the­historical,­social,­and­physical­
contingencies­of­trauma.­In­the­response­to­Zizek’s­review­of­her­book­The 
New Wounded,­Malabou­stresses­the­cognitive­dead-end­for­philosophy­(as­
8­ See­also­the­notion­of­bootstrapping­by­Engelbart­1962­in­the­keyword­entry­“Aug-
mented Intelligence” at the end of the book. 
Introduction 17
much­as­for­politics)­that­is­represented­by­the­conservative­Lacanian­ditto:­
trauma has always already occurred.­Malabou­criticizes­the­idea­that­external­
traumas­have­to­be­related­the­subject’s­psychic­history­and­cannot­engender,­
on­the­opposite,­a­novel­and­alien­dimension­of­subjectivity.­Her­book­The New 
Wounded already attempted to draw a “general theory of trauma” by dissolving 
the­distinction­between­brain­lesions­and­“sociopolitical­traumas”­(2007:­10).­
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The Pigeon in the 
Machine: The Concept of 
Control in Behaviorism 
and Cybernetics 
Ana Teixeira Pinto 
Behaviorism, like cybernetics, is based on a recursive 
(feedback) model, known in biology as reinforcement. 
Skinner’s description of operant behavior in animals 
is similar to Wiener’s description of information loops. 
Behaviorism and cybernetics have often shared more 
than an uncanny affinity: during World War II, both 
Wiener and Skinner worked on research projects for 
the U.S. military. While Wiener was attempting to 
develop his Anti-Aircraft Predictor (a machine that 
was supposed to anticipate the trajectory of enemy 
planes), Skinner was trying to develop a pigeon-guided 
missile. This essay retraces the social and political his-
tory of behaviorism, cybernetics, and the concepts of 
entropy and order in the life sciences.
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When­John­B.­Watson­gave­his­inaugural­address­“Psychology­as­the­Behav-
iourist Views It”1­at­Columbia­University­in­1913,­he­presented­psychology­as­
discipline whose “theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behaviour.” 
Strongly­influenced­by­Ivan­Pavlov’s­study­of­conditioned­reflexes,­Watson­
wanted­to­claim­an­objective­scientific­status­for­applied­psychology.­In­order­
to­anchor­psychology­firmly­in­the­field­of­the­natural­sciences,­however,­
psychologists would have to abandon speculation in favor of the experimental 
method.
The concept of control in the life sciences emerged out of the Victorian 
obsession with order. In a society shaped by glaring asymmetries and uneven 
development,­a­middle-class­lifestyle­was­as­promising­as­it­was­precarious;­
downward­mobility­was­the­norm.­Economic­insecurity­was­swiftly­systema-
tized­into­a­code­of­conduct­and­the­newly­found­habits­of­hygiene­extrapo-
lated­from­medicine­to­morals.­Both­behaviorism­and­eugenics­stem­out­of­
an­excessive­preoccupation­with­proficiency­and­the­need­to­control­potential­
deviations. Watson, for instance, was convinced that thumb-sucking bred 
“masturbators”­(Buckley­1989,­165)—though­the­fixation­with­order­extends­
much­farther­than­biology.­For­Erwin­Schrödinger,­for­instance,­life­was­syn-
onymous­with­order;­entropy­was­a­measure­of­death­or­disorder.­Not­only­
behaviorism,­but­all­other­disciplinary­fields­that­emerged­in­the­early­twenti-
eth­century­in­the­USA,­from­molecular­biology­to­cybernetics,­revolve­around­
this same central metaphor.
After­World­War­I,­under­the­pressure­of­rapid­industrialization­and­massive­
demographic shifts, the old social institutions of family, class, and church 
began to erode. The crisis of authority that ensued led to “ongoing attempts to 
establish­new­and­lasting­forms­of­social­control”­(Buckley­1989,­114).­Behavior-
ism was to champion a method through which “coercion from without” is eas-
ily masked as “coercion from within”—two types of constraint that would later 
be­re-conceptualized­as­resolution­and­marketed­as­vocation­to­a­growing­
class­of­young­professionals­and­self-made­career-seekers­(Buckley­1989,­113).­
Watson’s­straightforward­characterization­of­“man­as­a­machine”­was­to­prove­
instrumental in sketching out the conceptual framework for the emergence of 
a novel technology of the self devoted to social control. 
Yet­what­does­it­mean­to­identify­human­beings­with­mechanisms?­What­does­
it­mean­to­establish­similarities­between­living­tissue­and­electronic­circuitry?­
Machines­are­passive­in­their­activity;­they­are­replicable­and­predictable,­
and­made­out­of­parts­such­as­cogs­and­wheels;­they­can­be­assembled­and­
re-assembled. Machines, one could say, are the ideal slaves, and slavery is 
1­ This­was­the­first­of­a­series­of­lectures­that­later­became­known­as­the­“Behaviourist­
Manifesto.”
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the political unconscious behind every attempt to automate the production 
process. 
The­scientific­field­of­applied­psychology­appealed­to­an­emerging­technoc-
racy, because it promised to prevent social tensions from taking on a political 
form, thereby managing social mobility in a society that would only let people 
up­the­ladder­a­few­at­a­time­(Buckley­1989,­113).­Behaviorism,­as­Watson­
explicitly stated, was strictly “non-political,” which is not to say that it would 
forsake authoritarianism and regimentation. Pre-emptive psychological 
testing would detect any inklings of “conduct deviation,” “emotional upsets,” 
“unstandardized­sex­reactions”­or­“truancy,”­and­warrant­a­process­of­recon-
ditioning­to­purge­“unsocial­ways­of­behaving”­(Buckley­1989,­152).­Developing­
in­parallel­to­the­first­Red­Scare,­behaviorism­is­not­a­scientific­doctrine;­it­is­a­
political­position.­Just­as­the­rhetoric­of­British­Parliamentarianism­sought­to­
stave­off­the­French­revolution,­the­rhetoric­of­American­liberalism­masks­the­
fear of communist contagion: The imperatives of individualism and meritoc-
racy urge individuals to rise from their class rather than with it. 
Dogs, Rats, and a Baby Boy
Behaviorism­had­an­uneasy­relationship­with­the­man­who­was­credited­to­
have­founded­it,­the­Russian­physiologist­Ivan­Pavlov.­Following­the­publica-
tion­of­Watson’s­inaugural­address,­in­1916,­the­conditional­reflex­began­to­be­
routinely­mentioned­in­American­textbooks,­even­though­very­few­psycholo-
gists­had­done­experimental­work­on­conditioning­(Ruiz­et­al.­2003).­Pavlov­
only visited the United States on two occasions. On­the­second­in­1929,­he 
was invited to the­9th International­Congress­of­Psychology­at­Yale­and­the 
13th International Congress of Physiology at Harvard. In his acceptance letter, 
however, he noted, “I am not a psychologist. I am not quite sure whether 
my contribution would be acceptable to psychologists and would be found 
interesting to them. It is pure physiology—physiology of the functions of the 
higher­nervous­system—not­psychology”­(Pare­1990,­648).­Though­behavior-
ism had eagerly adopted the experimental method and technical vocabulary 
“emerging­from­Pavlov’s­laboratory,”­this­“process­of­linguistic­importation­did­
not­signify­the­acceptance­of­the­Russian’s­theoretical­points­of­view”­(Ruiz­et­
al.­2003).­Pavlov’s­technique­of­conditioning­was­adopted­not­because­it­was­
judged­valuable­for­understanding­the­nervous­stimuli,­but­rather­for­“mak-
ing­an­objective­explanation­of­learning­processes­possible”­(Ruiz­et­al.­2003).­
American­psychology­was­not­particularly­interested­in­visceral­and­glandular­
responses. Instead, researchers focused on explanatory models that could 
account for the stimulus/response relation, and on the consequences of 
behavioral­patterns.­The­influence­of­Pavlov­in­American­psychology­is­“above­
all, a consequence of the very characteristics of that psychology, already 
established­in­a­tradition­with­an­interest­in­learning,­into­which­Pavlov’s­work­
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was­incorporated­mainly­as­a­model­of­objectivity­and­as­a­demonstration­of­
the­feasibility­of­Watson’s­old­desire­to­make­psychology­a­true­natural­sci-
ence”­(Ruiz­et­al.­2003).
Although­Watson­seemed­to­praise­Pavlov’s­comparative­study­of­the­psycho-
logical responses between higher mammals and humans, he never manifested 
the intention to pursue such a route. Instead, he focused on how social agents 
could­shape­children’s­dispositions­through­the­method­he­had­borrowed­
from­Pavlov.­In­his­“Little­Albert­Experiment,”­Watson­and­his­assistant­Rosalie­
Rayner­tried­to­condition­an­eleven-month-old­infant­to­fear­stimuli­that­he­
wouldn’t­have­normally­been­predisposed­to­be­afraid­of.­Little­Albert­was­first­
presented with several furry lab animals, among them­was­a­white­rat.­After­
having­established­that­Little­Albert­had­no­previous­anxiety­concerning­the­
animal,­Watson­and­Rayner­began­a­series­of­tests­that­sought­to­associate­
the presence of the rat with a loud, unexpected noise, which Watson would 
elicit by striking a steel bar with a hammer. Upon hearing the noise, the child 
showed­clear­signs­of­distress,­crying­compulsively.­After­a­sequence­of­trials­
in­which­the­two­stimuli­were­paired­(the­rat­and­the­clanging­sound),­Little­
Albert­was­again­presented­with­the­rat­alone.­This­time­around­however,­the­
child­seemed­clearly­agitated­and­distressed.­Replacing­the­rat­with­a­rabbit­
and­a­small­dog,­Watson­also­established­that­Little­Albert­had­generalized­his­
fear to all furry animals. Though the experiment was never successfully repro-
duced,­Watson­became­convinced­that­it­would­be­possible­to­define­psychol-
ogy as the study of the acquisition and deployment of habits. 
In­the­wake­of­Watson’s­experiments,­American­psychologists­began­to­treat­
all forms of learning as skills—from­“maze­running­in­rats­.­.­.­to­the­growth­
of­a­personality­pattern”­(Mills­1998,­84).­For­the­behaviorist­movement,­both­
animal­and­human­behavior­could­be­entirely­explained­in­terms­of­reflexes,­
stimulus-response­associations,­and­the­effects­of­reinforcing­agents­upon­
them.­Following­Watson’s­footsteps,­Burrhus­Frederic­Skinner­researched­
how­specific­external­stimuli­affected­learning­using­a­method­that­he­termed­
“operant conditioning.” While classic—or Pavlovian—conditioning simply pairs 
a­stimulus­and­a­response,­in­operant­conditioning,­the­animal’s­behavior­is­
initially spontaneous, but the feedback that it elicits reinforces or inhibits the 
recurrence­of­certain­actions.­Employing­a­chamber,­which­became­known­
as­the­Skinner­Box,­Skinner­could­schedule­rewards­and­establish­rules.2­An­
animal could be conditioned for many days, each time following the same 
procedure,­until­a­given­pattern­of­behavior­was­stabilized.­
What­behaviorists­failed­to­realize­was­that­only­under­laboratory­conditions­
can­the­specific­stimuli­produce­a­particular­outcome­As­Mills­(1998,­124)­notes,­
2­ The­original­ Skinner­Box­had­ a­ lever­ and­ a­ food­ tray,­ and­ a­ hungry­ rat­ could­ get­ food­
delivered to the tray by learning to press the lever. 
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“[i]n real life situations, by contrast, we can seldom identify reinforcing events 
and give a precise, moment-to-moment account of how reinforcers shape 
behaviour.” Outside of the laboratory, the same response can be the outcome 
of­widely­different­antecedents,­and­one­single­cause­is­notoriously­hard­to­
identify.­All­in­all,­“One can use the principle of operant conditioning as an 
explanatory principle only if one has created beforehand a situation in which 
operant­principles­must­apply”­(Mills­1998,­141).
Not­surprisingly,­both­Watson­and­Skinner­put­forth­fully­fleshed-out­fictional­
accounts­of­behaviorist­utopias:­Watson,­in­his­series­of­articles­for­Harper’s­
magazine;­and­Skinner,­in­his­1948­novel­Walden Two. The similarities are 
striking, though Skinner lacks the callous misogyny and casual cruelty of his 
forerunner.­For­both­authors,­crime­is­a­function­of­freedom.­If­social­behav-
ior is not managed, one can expect an increase in the number of social ills: 
unruliness,­crime,­poverty,­war,­and­the­like.­Socializing­people­in­an­appropri-
ate manner, however, requires absolute control over the educational process. 
Behaviorist­utopia­thus­involves­the­surrender­of­education­to­a­technocratic­
hierarchy, which would dispense with representative institutions and due 
political­process­(Buckley­1989,­165).­
Apoliticism,­as­we­have­already­noted,­does­not­indicate­that­a­society­is­
devoid of coercion. Instead of representing social struggles as antagonistic, 
along­the­Marxist­model­of­class­conflict,­behaviorists­such­as­Watson­and­
Skinner­reflected­the­ethos­of­self-discipline­and­efficiency­espoused­by­social­
planers­and­technocrats.­Behaviorist­utopias,­as­Buckley­(1989,­165)­notes,­
“worshipped­efficiency­alone,”­tacitly­ignored­any­conception­of­good­and­
evil,­and­“weigh[ed]­their­judgments­on­a­scale­that­measured­only­degrees­of­
order and disorder.”
Pigeons, Servos, and Kamikaze Pilots 
Much the same as behaviorism, cybernetics is also predicated on input-output 
analyses.­Skinner’s­description­of­operant­behavior­as­a­repertoire­of­possible­
actions,­some­of­which­are­selected­by­reinforcement,­is­not­unlike­Wiener’s­
description­of­information­loops.­Behaviorism,­just­like­cybernetics,­is­based­
on­a­recursive­(feedback)­model,­which­is­known­in­Biology­as­reinforce-
ment. To boot, behaviorism and cybernetics have often shared more than an 
uncanny­affinity.­During­World­War­II­both­Norbert­Wiener­and­B.­F.­Skin-
ner­worked­on­parallel­research­projects­for­the­U.S.­military.­While­Wiener,­
together­with­engineer­Julian­Bigelow,­was­attempting­to­develop­his­anti-air-
craft predictor­(AA-predictor),­a­machine­that­was­supposed­to­anticipate­the­
trajectory­of­enemy­planes,­Skinner­was­trying­to­develop­a­pigeon-guided­
missile. 
28 Alleys of Your Mind
The­idea­for­Project­Pigeon­(which­was­later­renamed­Project­Orcon,­from­
“ORganic­CONtrol,”­after­Skinner­complained­that­nobody­took­him­seriously)­
predates­the­American­participation­in­the­war,­yet­the­Japanese­kamikaze­
attacks­in­1944­gave­the­project­a­renewed­boost.­While­the­kamikaze­pilots­
did­not­significantly­impact­the­course­of­the­war,­their­psychological­signifi-
cance cannot be overestimated. Although­the Japanese soldiers were often 
depicted­as­lice,­or­vermin,­the­kamikaze­represented­the­even­more­unset-
tling identity between the organic and the mechanic. 
Technically­speaking,­every­mechanism­usurps­a­human­function.­Faced­with­
the cultural interdiction to produce his own slave-soldiers, Skinner reportedly 
pledged­to­“provide­a­competent­substitute”­for­the­human­kamikaze.­The­
Project­Pigeon­team­began­to­train­pigeons­to­peck­when­they­saw­a­target­
through­a­bull’s-eye.­The­birds­were­then­harnessed­to­a­hoist­so­that­the­
pecking­movements­provided­the­signals­to­control­the­missile.­As­long­as­the­
pecks­remained­in­the­center­of­the­screen,­the­missile­would­fly­straight,­but­
pecks­off-center­would­cause­the­screen­to­tilt, which would then cause the 
missile to change course and slowly travel toward its designated target via a 
connection­to­the­missile’s­flight­controls.­Skinner’s­pigeons­proved­reliable­
under stress, acceleration, pressure,­and­temperature­differences.­In­the­fol-
lowing­months,­however,­as­Skinner’s­project­was­still­far­from­being­opera-
tive,­Skinner­was­asked­to­produce­quantitative­data­that­could­be­analyzed­
at the MIT Servomechanisms Laboratory. Skinner allegedly deplored being 
forced to assume the language of servo-engineering, and scorned the usage 
of­terms­such­as­“signal”­and­“information.”­Project­Pigeon­ended­up­being­
cancelled­on­October­8,­1944,­because­the­military­believed­that­it­had­no­
immediate promise for combat application.
In­the­meantime,­Wiener’s­team­was­trying­to­simulate­the­four­different­types­
of­trajectories­that­an­enemy­plane­could­take­in­its­attempt­to­escape­artil-
lery­fire,­with­the­help­of­a­differential­analyzer.­As­Galison­notes,­“here­was­a­
problem­simultaneously­physical­and­physiological:­the­pilot,­flying­amidst­the­
explosion­of­flak,­the­turbulence­of­air,­and­the­sweep­of­searchlights,­trying­
to­guide­an­airplane­to­a­target”­(1994).­Under­the­strain­of­combat­conditions,­
human­behavior­is­easy­to­scale­down­to­a­limited­number­of­reflex­reactions.­
Commenting on the analogy between the mechanical and the human behavior 
pattern,­Wiener­concluded­that­the­pilot’s­evasion­techniques­would­follow­the­
same feedback principles that regulated the actions of servomechanisms—an 
idea he would swiftly extrapolate into a more general physiological theory. 
Though­Wiener’s­findings­emerged­out­of­his­studies­in­engineering,­“the­Wie-
ner predictor is based on good behaviourist ideas, since it tries to predict the 
future actions of an organism not by studying the structure of the organism, 
but­by­studying­the­past­behaviour­of­the­organism”­(correspondence­with­Sti-
bitz­quoted­in­Galison­1994).­Feedback­in­Wiener’s­definition­is­“the­property­
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of­being­able­to­adjust­future­conduct­by­past­performance”­(Wiener­1988,­
33).­Wiener­also­adopted­the­functional­analysis­that­accompanies­behavior-
ism—dealing with observable behavior alone, and the view that all behavior 
is­intrinsically­goal-oriented­and/or­purposeful.­A­frog­aiming­at­a­fly­and­a­
target-seeking missile are teleological mechanisms: both gather information in 
order­to­readjust­their­course­of­action.­Similarities­notwithstanding,­Wiener­
never­gave­behaviorists­any­credit,­instead­offering­them­only­disparaging­
criticism. 
In­1943­the­AA-predictor­was­abandoned­as­the­National­Defense­Research­
Committee­concentrated­on­the­more­successful­M9,­the­gun­director­that­
Parkinson,­Lovell,­Blackman,­Bode,­and­Shannon­had­been­developing­at­Bell­
Labs.­A­strategic­failure,­much­like­Project­Pigeon,­the­AA-predictor­could­have­
ended up in the dustbin of military history, had the encounter with physiology 
not proven decisive in­Wiener’s­description­of­man-machine­interactions­as­a­
unified­equation,­which­he­went­on­to­develop­both­as­mathematical­model­
and as a rhetorical device. 
Circuits and the Soviets
Rather­than­any­reliable­anti-aircraft­artillery,­what­emerged­out­of­the­AA-
project­was­Wiener’s­re-conceptualization­of­the­term­“information,” which he 
was­about­to­transform­into­a­scientific­concept.3 Information—heretofore a 
concept with a vague meaning—had begun to be treated as a statistical prop-
erty, exacted by the mathematical analyses of a time-series. This paved the 
way­for­information­to­be­defined­as­a­mathematical­entity.­
Simply put, this is what cybernetics is: the treatment of feedback as a con-
ceptual­abstraction.­Yet,­by­suggesting­“everything­in­the­universe­can­be­
modelled into a system of information,” cybernetics also entails a “powerful 
metaphysics, whose essence—in spite of all the ensuing debates—always 
remained­elusive”­(Mindell,­Segal­and­Gerovitch­2003,­67). One could even say 
that­cybernetics­is­the­conflation­of­several­scientific­fields­into­a­powerful­
exegetical model, which Wiener sustained with his personal charisma. Wiener 
was, after all, “a visionary who could articulate the larger implications of the 
cybernetic­paradigm­and­make­clear­its­cosmic­significance”­(Hayles­1999,­
7).­Explaining­the­cardinal­notions­of­statistical­mechanics­to­the­laymen,­he­
drew­a­straightforward,­yet­dramatic­analogy:­entropy­is­“nature’s­tendency­to­
degrade­the­organized­and­destroy­the­meaningful,”­thus­“the­stable­state­of­a­
living­organism­is­to­be­dead”­(Wiener­1961,­58).­Abstract­and­avant-garde­art,­
he­would­later­hint,­are­“a­Niagara­of­increasing­entropy”­(Wiener­1988,­134).
3­ As­Galison­1994­notes,­Wiener’s­novel­usage­of­the­term­information­emerges­in­
November­1940­in­a­letter­to­MIT’s­Samuel­H.­Caldwell.
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“Entropy,”­which­would­become­a­key­concept­for­cybernetics,­was­first­
applied­to­biology­by­the­physicist­Erwin­Schrödinger.­While­attempting­to­
unify­the­disciplinary­fields­of­biology­and­physics,­Schrödinger­felt­confronted­
with a paradox. The relative stability of living organisms was in apparent con-
tradiction with the Second Law of Thermodynamics, which states that since 
energy is more easily lost than gained, the tendency of any closed system is 
to dissipate energy over time, thus increasing its entropy. How are thus living 
organisms­able­to­“obviate­their­inevitable­thermal­death”­(Gerovitch­2002,­
65)?­Schrödinger­solved­his­puzzle­by­recasting­organisms­as­thermodynamic­
systems that extract “orderliness” from their environment in order to counter-
act increasing entropy. This idea entailed a curious conclusion: the fundamen-
tal divide between living and non-living was not to be found between organ-
isms­and­machines­but­between­order­and­chaos.­For­Schrödinger,­entropy­
became­a­measure­of­disorder­(Gerovitch­2002,­65).
Schrödinger’s­incursions­into­the­field­of­life­sciences­were­rebuffed­by­biolo-
gists and his theories were found to be wanting. His translation of biological 
concepts­into­the­lexicon­of­physics­would­have­a­major­impact­however,­as­
Schrödinger­introduced­into­the­scientific­discourse­the­crucial­analogy,­which­
would­ground­the­field­of­molecular­biology:­“the­chromosome­as­a­message­
written­in­code”­(Gerovitch­2002,­67).
The­code­metaphor­was­conspicuously­derived­from­the­war­efforts­and­their­
system of encoding and decoding military messages. Claude Shannon, a cryp-
tologist, had also extrapolated the code metaphor to encompass all human 
communication, and like Schrödinger, he employed the concept of entropy in 
a broader sense, as a measure of uncertainty. Oblivious to the fact that the 
continuity Schrödinger had sketched between physics and biology was almost 
entirely metaphorical, Wiener would later describe the message as a form of 
organization,­stating­that­information­is­the­opposite­of­entropy.­
Emboldened­by­Wiener’s­observations­on­the­epistemological­relevance­of­
the­new­field,­the­presuppositions­that­underpinned­the­study­of­thermody-
namic systems spread to evolutionary biology, neuroscience, anthropology, 
psychology,­language­studies,­ecology,­politics,­and­economy.­Between­1943­
and­1954­ten­conferences­under­the­heading­“Cybernetics: Circular Causal, and 
Feedback­Mechanisms­in­Biological­and­Social­Systems”­were­held­at­the­Macy­
Foundation,­sponsored­by­Josiah­Macy­Jr.­The­contributing­scholars­tried­to­
develop a universal theory of regulation and control, applicable to economic 
as well as mental processes, and to sociological as well as aesthetic phenom-
ena. Contemporary art, for instance, was described as an operationally closed 
system, which reduces the complexity of its environment according to a pro-
gram it devises for itself­(Landgraf­2009,­179–204). Behaviorism—the­theory­
which­had­first­articulated­the­aspiration­to­formulate­a­single­encompassing­
theory for all human and animal behavior, based on the analogy between man 
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and machine—was­finally­assimilated­into­the­strain­of­cybernetics,­which­
became known as cognitivism. 
By­the­early­1950s,­the­ontology­of­man­became­equated­with­the­functionality­
of programming based on­W.­Ross­Ashby’s­and­Claude­Shannon’s­information­
theory. Molecular and evolutionary biology treated genetic information as an 
essential code, the body being but its carrier. Cognitive science and neurobiol-
ogy described consciousness as the processing of formal symbols and logical 
inferences, operating under the assumption that the brain is analogous to 
computer hardware and that the mind is analogous to computer software. In 
the­1950s,­Norbert­Wiener­had­suggested­that­it­was­theoretically­possible­to­
telegraph a human being, and that it was only a matter of time until the neces-
sary­technology­would­become­available­(Wiener­1988,­103).­In­the­1980s,­sci-
entists argued that it would soon be possible to upload human consciousness 
and­have­one’s­grandmother­run­on­Windows—or­stored­on­a­floppy­disk.­
Science­fiction­brimmed­with­fantasies­of­immortal­life­as­informational­code.­
Stephen Wolfram even went so far as to claim that reality is a program run by 
a­cosmic­computer.­Consciousness­is­but­the­“user’s­illusion”;­the­interface,­so­
to speak.
But­the­debate­concerning­the­similarities­and­differences­between­living­tis-
sue and electronic circuitry also gave rise to darker man-machine fantasies: 
zombies,­living­dolls,­robots,­brain­washing,­and­hypnotism.­Animism­is­corre-
lated with the problem of agency: who or what can be said to have volition is a 
question that involves a transfer of purpose from the animate to the inani-
mate.­“Our­consciousness­of­will­in­another­person,”­Wiener­argued,­“is­just­
that sense of encountering a self-maintaining mechanism aiding or opposing 
our­actions.­By­providing­such­a­self-stabilizing­resistance,­the­airplane­acts­as­
if it had purpose, in short, as if it were inhabited by a Gremlin.” This Gremlin, 
“the servomechanical enemy, became . . . the prototype for human physiology 
and,­ultimately,­for­all­of­human­nature”­(Galison­1994).
Defining­peace­as­a­state­of­dynamic­equilibrium,­cybernetics­proved­to­be­
an­effective­tool­to­escape­from­a­vertical,­authoritarian­system,­and­to­enter­
a­horizontal,­self-regulating­one.­Many­members­of­the­budding­countercul-
ture­were­drawn­to­its­promise­of­spontaneous­organization­and­harmonious­
order.­This­order­was­already­in­place­in­Adam­Smith’s­description­of­free-
market­interaction,­however.­Regulating­devices—especially­after­Watts’s­
incorporation­of­the­governor­into­the­steam­engine­in­the­1780s—had been 
correlated with a political rhetoric, which spoke of “dynamic equilibrium,” 
“checks and balances,” “self-regulation,” and “supply and demand” ever since 
the­dawn­of­British­liberalism­(Mayr­1986,­139–40).­Similarly, the notion of a 
feedback loop between organism and environment was already present in 
the theories of both Malthus and Darwin, and, as already mentioned, Adam­
Smith’s­classic­definition­of­the­free­market—a­blank­slate­that­brackets­out­
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society and culture—also happens to be the underlying principle of the Skin-
ner­Box­experiments.­
Unsurprisingly, the abstractions performed by science have materially con-
crete­effects.­The­notion­of­a­chaotic,­deteriorating­universe,­in­which­small­
enclaves of orderly life are increasingly under siege,4 echoed the fears of com-
munist­contagion­and­the­urge­to­halt­the­Red­Tide.­The­calculation­of­nuclear­
missile­trajectories,­the­Distance­Early­Warning­Line,­and­the­development­
of deterrence theory, together with operations research and game theory, 
were­all­devoted­to­predicting­the­coming­crisis.­Yet­prediction­is­also­an­act­
of violence that re-inscribes the past onto the future, foreclosing history. The 
war that had initially been waged to “make the world safe for democracy” had 
also “involved a sweeping suspension of social liberties, and brought about a 
massive­regimentation­of­American­life”­(Buckley­1989,­114).
At­length,­cybernetics­went­on­to­become­the­scientific­ideology­of­neoliber-
alism, the denouement of which was the late-eighties notion of the “end of 
history”5 that imposed the wide cultural convergence of an iterative liberal 
economy­as­the­final­form­of­human­government.­In­1997,­Wired­magazine­
ran­a­cover­story­titled­“The­Long­Boom,”­whose­header­read:­“We’re­facing­
twenty-five­years­of­prosperity,­freedom,­and­a­better­environment­for­the­
whole­world.­You­got­a­problem­with­that?”­In­the­wake­of­the­USSR’s­demise­
and­the­fall­of­the­Berlin­Wall, “The­Long­Boom”­­claimed­that,­no­longer­
encumbered by political strife and ideological antagonism, the world would 
witness unending market-driven prosperity and unabated growth. Though 
from­our­current­standpoint­the­article’s­claims­seem­somewhat­ludicrous,­its­
brand of market-besotted optimism shaped the mindset of the nineties. It also 
gave rise to­what­would­become­known­as­the­Californian­Ideology;­a­weak­
utopia­that ignored­the­“contradiction­at­the­center­of­the­American­dream:­
some­individuals­can­prosper­only­at­the­expense­of­others”­(Barbrook­and­
Cameron­1996).­Unlike social or psychic systems, thermodynamic systems are 
not­subject­to­dialectical­tensions.­Nor­do­they­experience­historical­change.­
They only accumulate a remainder—a kind of refuse—or they increase in 
entropy. Unable to account for the belligerent bodies of the North Korean and 
the­Viet­Cong,­or­the­destitute­bodies­of­the­African­American,­cybernetics­
came to embrace the immateriality of the post-human. 
Dialectical materialism—the theory that cybernetics came to replace—pre-
supposed the successive dissolution of political forms into the higher form of 
4 In rhetoric straight from the Cold War, Wiener described the universe as an increasingly 
chaotic­place­in­which,­against­all­odds,­small­islands­of­life­fight­to­preserve­order­and­
increase­organization­(Wiener­1961).
5 The concept of the “end of history” was put forth by conservative political scientist 
Francis­Fukuyama­in­his­1992­book­The End of History and the Last Man.
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history, but feedback is no dialectics.6­Friedrich­Engels­defined­dialectics­as­
the most general laws of all motion, which he associated to the triadic laws of 
thought:­the­law­of­the­transformation­of­quantity­into­quality;­the­law­of­the­
unity­and­struggle­of­opposites;­and­the­law­of­the­negation­of­the­negation.­
Although­feedback­and­dialectics­represent­motion­in­similar­ways,­cybernet-
ics is an integrated model, while dialectical materialism is an antagonistic 
one:­dialectics­implies­a­fundamental­tension,­and­an­unresolved­antagonism;­
while feedback knows no outside or contradiction, only perpetual iteration. 
Simply put, cybernetic feedback is dialectics without the possibility of com-
munism.­Against­the­backdrop­of­an­Augustinian­noise,­history­itself­becomes­
an endlessly repeating loop, revolving around an “enclosed space surrounded 
and­sealed­by­American­power”­(Edwards­1997,­8).
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Error Correction: 
Chilean Cybernetics and 
Chicago’s Economists
Adrian Lahoud
Cybernetics is a specific way of conceiving the relation 
between information and government: It represented 
a way of bringing the epistemological and the onto-
logical together in real time. The essay explores a par-
adigmatic case study in the evolution of this history: 
the audacious experiment in cybernetic management 
known as Project Cybersyn that was developed follow-
ing Salvador Allende’s ascension to power in Chile in 
1970. In ideological terms, Allende’s socialism and the 
violent doctrine of the Chicago School could not be 
more opposed. In another sense, however, Chilean 
cybernetics would serve as the prototype for a new 
form of governance that would finally award to the 
theories of the Chicago School a hegemonic control 
over global society.  
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Zero Latency
A­great­deal­of­time­has­been­spent­investigating,­documenting­and­disputing­
an­eleven­year­period­in­Chile­from­1970–1981,­encompassing­the­presidency­
of­Salvador­Allende­and­the­dictatorship­of­Augusto­Pinochet.­Between­the­
rise of the Unidad Popular and­its­overthrow­by­the­military­junta,­brutal­and­
notorious events took hold of Chile.1 Though many of these events have 
remained­ambiguous,­obscured­by­trauma­or­lost­in­official­dissimulation,­over­
time­the­contours­of­history­have­become­less­confused.­Beyond­the­coup,­the­
involvement of the United States or even the subsequent transformation of 
the economy, a more comprehensive story of radical experimentation on the 
Chilean­social­body­has­emerged.­At­stake­in­the­years­of­Allende’s­ascension­
to power and those that followed was nothing less than a Latin social labora-
tory.­This­laboratory­was­at­once­optimistic,­sincere,­naïve,­and­finally­brutal.­
Few­experiments­were­as­audacious­or­prophetic­as­Allende’s­cybernetic­
program Cybersyn. In this ambitious venture that lasted only two short years, 
a number of issues were raised that are still valid today. The program was first 
off an attempt by a national government to govern in real time at the scale 
of­the­entire­national­territory;­second,­the­development­of­technical­infra-
structure­that­could­track­and­shape­fluctuations­and­changes­in­the­Chilean­
economy;­third,­the­conceptualization­of­a­national­political­space­along­the­
lines­of­a­business­regulated­by­ideals­drawn­from­corporate­management;­
fourth, the invention of a scale and technique of government that begins at 
one­end­of­the­political­spectrum­but­finds­its­ultimate­conclusion­at­the­very­
opposite. 
The Chilean cybernetic experiment emerged in response to an urgent prob-
lem;­the­nationalization­of­the­Chilean­economy,­especially­the­gathering­
together of disparate sites of productivity, resource extraction, and manufac-
turing, in addition to their re-integration within a state controlled economy. 
Allende­had­no­desire­to­model­Chile­on­the­centrally­planned­economy­of­the­
Soviet­Union,­whose­rigid­hierarchical­structure­and­lack­of­adaptive­flexibility­
led to human and political crises.2 In line with the mandate of a constitution-
ally­elected­socialist­leader,­Allende­intended­to­devolve­some­central­control­
to factories and grant workers increasing autonomy over their own labor. In 
doing so he hoped to hold in balance a series of opposing forces. On the one 
hand,­the­burden­of­redistribution­that­always­falls­to­a­centralized­state,­on­
the­other,­liberating­the­autopoietic­force­of­the­workers­in­their­specialized­
sites of work. 
1­ Unidad Popular (UP) was­a­coalition­of­leftist­parties­that­was­formed­in­Chile­in­1969.
2­ GOSPLAN­(Russian:­Gosudarstvenniy Komitet po Planirovaniyu)­or­the­State­Planning­
Committee­of­the­USSR­was­responsible­for­producing­the­five­year­economic­plan­for­
the­Soviet­Union,­established­in­1921­this­centralized­planning­model­was—despite­the­
sophistication­of­the­scientific­models­used—beset­by­problems­of­misreporting.­
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This­complicated­political­calculus­was­made­all­the­more­difficult,­because­the­
stage upon which it took place introduced a further set of variables. The land 
surface­of­Chile­had­long­acquired­clear­boundaries,­fixed­since­the­indigenous­
Mapuche­uprisings­(Petras­and­Morley­1978,­205).­Chile­is­on­average­only­175­
km­wide,­however­it­stretches­for­4300­km­in­length.­Moreover­this­elongated­
sliver of a nation is draped over an almost entirely mountainous terrain. If this 
engendered topographical complications, geologically Chile was abundantly 
rich.­Breaking­apart­the­monopolistic­control­of­these­resources­would­be­crit-
ical to the viability of the new socialist economy. The problem that this young 
and idealistic government faced was how to create a new territorial scale of 
governance,­one­able­to­reform­and­eventually­stabilize­this­complex­spatial, 
and social landscape without relying on the precedents set by Soviet-style 
economies. In other words, how to reduce the adaptive threshold of politi-
cal­decision-making­from­the­five-year­model­to­something­more­immediate.­
This ambition would require developing an infrastructure for the exchange of 
information and transferring some of the decision-making capacity from the 
state to local actors.
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On­4­September­1970,­in­an­election­awash­with­KGB­and­CIA­money,­the­Uni-
dad­Popular­headed­by­Salvador­Allende­won­32%­of­the­vote­in­Chile.­At­this­
point,­the­Allende­government­believed­it­had­six­years­to­reform­the­Chilean­
economy. In line with its socialist democratic agenda, the government set out 
to­nationalize­its­resource­and­finance­sectors,­and­increase­the­efficiency­of­
poorly­performing­industries­(Medina­2006,­571).­On­12­November­1971,­little­
over a year since his government had come to power, President Salvador 
Allende­received­an­unlikely­guest.­Stafford­Beer­is­a­cybernetician­interested­
in­the­application­of­cybernetics­to­social­systems.­Beer­had­been­invited­
to­meet­Allende­by­some­Chilean­scientists,­who­were­interested­in­using­
his­expertise­on­cybernetics­to­manage­the­newly­nationalized­industries.3 
Cybernetic research evolved out of a problem: how to hit a fast moving plane 
with a weapon or, in military parlance, getting the ballistic and the target reach 
the same point in space at the same time. In response, researchers developed 
systems during World War II that were capable of tracking an enemy target by 
continually recalibrating a weapon to­aim­at­the­target’s anticipated position, 
labeled a “feedback loop.”
3­ Especially­Fernando­Flores.­What­brought­Flores­and­Beer­together­was­not­a­shared­
political­outlook­per­se­but­rather­conceptual­commonalities­in­scientific­and­conceptual­
thought­that­Flores­recognized­and­Beer­appreciated.­These­conceptual­similarities­drew­
Beer­and­Flores­together­despite­their­different­cultural­and­political­convictions.­This­
connection­was­fostered­by­Beer’s­enthusiasm­to­apply­cybernetic­thinking,­operations­
and research techniques to the domain of politics.
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At­MIT,­on­a­miniscule­military­budget,­Norbert­Weiner­led­research­into­
the mathematics and circuit boards that would eventually help to automate 
anti-aircraft­fire.­The­achievement­was­as­conceptual­as­it­was­technical,­a­
re-imagining­of­the­method­by­which­a­highly­manoeuvrable­fighter­and­its­
pilot­could­be­fired­at,­with­the­projectile­anticipating­the­future­position­of­the­
target. The design of the mechanism had to reconcile meteorological factors 
such­as­wind­with­human­cunning­and­be­able­to­outsmart­both.­Wiener’s­
research arrived at a time in which the idea of large-scale computational 
modelling had begun to take hold in many areas, almost exclusively evolving 
from­the­war­effort­and­the­attempt­to­build­a­systematic­basis­for­strategic­
decision-making. 
Though Weiner set the incalculability of nature against the calculus of man, 
what held the two together and ties cybernetics to the eighteenth Century 
is the fundamental commitment to understanding human populations as 
unknowable in ways that resonated with the unknowability of nature, and thus 
to open the possibility of re-inscribing human interaction either socially or 
economically­within­a­specific­kind­of­calculus,­in­this­case,­the­mathematics­
of­error­correction­(Delanda­1991).­The­cybernetic­black­box­operated­at­the­
very limits of the known, the very idea of a cybernetic control mechanism—in 
that it posed the correlation between the behavior of an open system and the 
tracking of that system in terms of error correction—attempted to collapse 
the ontological into the epistemological with only the latency of the feedback 
loop­to­separate­them­(Galison­1994,­228).
In­the­only­comprehensive­history­of­Project­Cybersyn, Edin­Medina­(2011)­
accounts for Chilean experiments with cybernetics in terms of the deep 
affinity­between­cyberneticians­like­Beer­and­the­reformists­around­Allende,­
especially­engineer­and­political­ally­Fernando­Flores,­who­would­be­instru-
mental­in­inviting­Beer­to­Chile.­Beer’s­interest­in­cybernetics­emerged­out­of­
his­work­in­organizational­management,­especially­what­he­perceived­to­be­
limitations­in­the­adaptive­potential­of­organizations­dominated­by­rigid­divi-
sions of labor, poor channels of communication and constrained spaces for 
decision-making.­In­response­to­this,­Beer­experimented­with­organizational­
reforms­that­aimed­to­inject­flexibility­and­a­level­of­autonomy­into­decision-
making, believing this would encourage employees to respond to a shifting 
work­environment­(Beer­1972).­Looking­back,­Beer’s­commitment­to­a­radical­
flexibility­within­the­workforce­is­only­one­of­a­number­of­prophetic­reso-
nances­that­early­cybernetic­research­has­with­neoliberalism.­At­the­time,­the­
promise of granting more autonomy to workers in terms of control and organi-
zation­of­factory­productivity­neatly­coincided­with­the­aims­and­aspirations­of­
Allende’s­leftist­government.
Error Correction 41
Symptomatology vs. Aetiology
For­Beer, organizing­bodies­into­groups,­establishing­protocols­for­decision-
making, setting up channels for communication and allowing thresholds for 
change­were­all­qualities­embedded­in­the­material­of­the­organization­in­
the same way developmental pathways were embedded in the organism. 
The plasticity of the organism with respect to its environment served as a 
model for the plasticity of the business in regards to its market and competi-
tors,­both­being­problems­of­adaptation­to­an­external­force­field.­Indeed,­
Beer­originally­viewed­cybernetics­as­a­hylomorphic­critique­of­the­matter of 
“business­organization,”­a­faith­in­the­agency­of­(organizational)­matter­whose­
adaptive, auto-poetic potential needed to be unlocked. 
Much­like­a­biological­system,­for­Beer,­the­organization­was­made­of­mat-
ter that was alive with possibility, animated by internal drives, regulated 
by environmental constraints. In an attempt to mirror a certain conception 
of­the­firm,­the­diagram­of­the­viable system model­(VSM)­broke­down­its­
structure into a series of linked parts hierarchically nested within each other. 
Organized­according­to­a­biological­metaphor­replete­with­nervous­system,­
and sensory apparatus, the VSM was envisaged as a complex interlinking of 
perceptual and responsive mechanisms. These mechanisms could ensure that 
changes­in­the­information­environment­would­efficiently­reach­the­appropri-
ate­decision-making­node­within­the­organizational­structure.­This­sensitivity­
would encourage rapid and responsive decision-making and thus adaptation. 
Not­that­Beer­conceived­of­all­decisions­as­being­equal:­There­would­be­no­
point burdening management with decisions that were not strategic in nature. 
Therefore­the­autonomy­on­which­the­firms­adaptation­drew­was­not­equally­
distributed.­As­one­moved­up­the­hierarchy­of­systems,­the­amount­of­overall­
strategic­information­about­the­entire­firm­expanded­until­the­brain-like­com-
mand­structure­was­reached,­which­Beer­imagined­should­look­like­a­World­
War II operations room. 
Significantly,­the­structure­of­the­VSM­was­recursive.­The­same­logic­of­
feedback and response that structured each part also structured the larger 
component that­these­sub-parts­were­contained­within,­ad­infinitum:­Beer­
felt that such recursiveness was a necessary property of viable systems—they 
had­to­be­nested­inside­one­another­“like­so­many­Russian­dolls­or­Chinese­
boxes” in a chain of embeddings “which descends to cells and molecules and 
ascends­to­the­planet­and­its­universe”­(Pickering­2010,­250).­For­Beer,­the­
question­of­scale­was­wholly­commensurable­across­different­problems,­from­
a­small­cellular­organism­to­an­entire­ecosystem,­just­as­from­a­clerk’s­office­to­
a­production­line.­This­crude­characterization­of­the­biological­metaphor­and­
its­over-application­would­cause­difficulties­later—when­techniques,­which­
were successful in a business environment, were drawn into the management 
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of­an­entire­nation’s­territory­and­its­economic­productivity.­The­reason­for­
this recursive approach to scale in management clearly stems from a recursive 
understanding of scale within the organism—one serving as the rule and the 
model for the other. Moreover, it is possible to speculate that what permitted 
Beer­to­extend­this­diagram­of­organization­into­non-biological­domains­was­
a­sense­that­each­part­of­this­system­operated­like­a­black­box.­Repeating­a­
characteristic and fateful cybernetic concern with symptomatology rather 
than­aetiology­first­formulated­by­Weiner,­the­inner­workings of the thing 
being­modeled­did­not­matter:­All­one­had­to­do,­was­to­track­the­inputs­and­
outputs—causes­would­hereafter­be­subordinated­to­effects—often­with­
drastic consequences. The VSM was simply a diagram for correlating inputs 
and outputs among variously scaled black boxes, this seeming disregard for 
mechanism­may­have­further­allowed­Beer­to­generalize­its­applicability­across­
different­situations.­In­fact,­Beer­was­a­staunch­critic­of­the­idea­that­the­VSM­
could “contain” information the way a box could contain goods, this would be 
tantamount to splitting form from content, reverting to a hylomorphic concep-
tion­of­organizational­matter.­
What­Beer­misses,­ironically,­is­that­the­representations­may­not­have­been­
held or contained within­his­system­as­a­kind­of­cargo­or­payload;­instead­they­
were­embodied­in­the­system’s­very­structure.­Though­there­were­no­“sym-
bolic or representational elements” or internal models in the black boxes that 
made up the VSM, it was not possible to say that the VSM was wholly plastic 
and adaptable. It had parts—and though these parts were indeed black boxes, 
the­diagram­of­information­flow­that­linked­the­various­inputs­and­outputs­
together was quite immune from the adaptive process. There was a clear 
model­at­work,­just­not­at­the­scale­Beer­was­focused­on.­
The National Nervous System
The­eventual­deployment­of­a­socialized­cybernetic­network­in­Chile­exceeds­
any precedent by orders of magnitude. Known variously as Proyecto Synco, 
el­Sistema­Synco,­or­Cybersyn,­the­fruition­of­Allende’s­control­fantasy­and­
Beer’s­techno-optimism­was­a­nationwide­system­of­monitoring,­reporting,­
and feedback based on cybernetic principals. Hundreds of telex machines 
were­installed­in­newly­nationalized­factories­all­over­Chile­and­employed for 
sending data on everything from production volumes to employee absence 
rates back to the central command room in Santiago. The backbone was Jay 
Forester’s­DYNAMO­compiler,­fresh­from­use­in­the­Club­of­Rome­Report­titled­
The Limits of Growth, where it had also been used to model large-scale eco-
nomic and demographic tendencies.
For­Beer­and­enthusiastic­colleagues­like­the­biologist­Francisco­Varela,­who­
would go on to put forward a theory of autopoiesis with Humberto Maturana, 
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a cybernetic model of socio-economic management equaled national stabil-
ity. Provided inputs could reliably be fed into the control center, social and 
economic­effects­could­be­generated­in­response­to­any­circumstance.­The­
nation­could­be­tuned,­and­Beer­knew­how­to­turn­the­dials.­Sitting­on­molded­
plastic chairs in the Cybersyn control center, technicians took live signals 
from Chilean factories up and down the coast and in return used them to 
manipulate­and­adjust­the­Chilean­economy­in­real­time.­Like­stimulated­nerve­
endings­firing­electrical­charges,­information­from­hundreds­of­small­social­
and­economic­events­across­the­nation­flowed­down­telegraph­wires­into­the­
central­control­room;­the­national­nervous­system­had­been­re-scaled­to­cover­
the territory, and had seemingly acquired a cybernetic brain. 
In the hexagonal control room in Santiago, television screens would present 
real-time­information­to­a­planning­committee.­This­organization­of­informa-
tion spatialized the real-time data processing system, collapsing the vast dis-
tances­of­Chile’s­topography­and­its­widely­distributed­centers­of­production­
to­a­single­point­in­space.­From­this­position,­it­would­be­possible­to­literally­
see through the walls of the room such that the entire scale of the territory 
would be co-present and available for action simultaneously. The ontological 
and the epistemic promised to merge on the surface of the screen. This con-
trol room scenario is now commonplace, indeed contemporary logistics, ship-
ping, and freight systems would be unthinkable without it, and though it had 
certain precedents during World War II, especially in the spread of war rooms 
built around the world, the televisual nature of the system together with its 
peace-time operation and economic domain made Cybersyn unique. 
Additionally,­what­made­Cybersyn­more­unique,­however,­was­that­each­node­
in­the­network­would­be­granted­a­certain­operational­autonomy.­Factories­
could communicate with each other as well as with the central command 
room.­This­image­of­freely­flowing­information­able­to­traffic­horizontally­
between nodes and vertically through a command structure was absolutely 
central­to­Beer’s­conception­of­Cybersyn.­Both­Beer­and­Allende­believed­this 
was what would lend the system its­curious­powers­of­adaptive­strength:­By­
re-empowering­local­decision-makers,­Cybersyn­took­Beer’s­interest­in­organi-
zational­management­and­socialized­it.­In­a­moment­of­incredible­optimism,­
the­core­group­of­researchers­working­with­Beer­seemed­on­the­cusp­of­secur-
ing­the­shifting­coordinates­of­Chile’s­social­and­economic­environment.­
Replete­in­both­Beer’s­own­writing­and­that­of­the­historians­who­take­up­the­
Cybersyn­project­is­a­conception­of­so-called­bottom up decision-making as 
inherently democratic, in contradistinction to top down decision-making pro-
cesses,­which­are­seen­as­coercive.­A­well-known­anecdote­is­worth­repeating­
here, since it reveals the naivety of the political position behind this equation 
of­upward­traffic­and­democracy,­which­both­Medina­(2011)­and­Pickering­(2010)­
take­up­without­qualification.­
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Beer­is­invited­to­the­Presidential­Palace­on­12­November­1971. He is tasked 
with describing his proposal for the nationwide cybernetic system to the 
newly­elected­president.­Beer­slowly­takes­Allende­through­the­nested­struc-
ture of the viable system model, carefully explaining the equivalence of facto-
ries to limbs, and the feedback loops to an organic sensory apparatus. Step by 
step he elucidates, moving through the hierarchy of levels and explicating the 
autonomy granted to decision-makers­at­each­point,­as­well­as­the­flexibility­
this­system­could­guarantee.­Finally,­Beer­reaches­the­apex­of­his­metaphori-
cal diagram, the brain or control center. Just as he is about to reveal this point 
to be the seat of the president,­Beer­is­interrupted­by­Allende,­who­exclaims: 
“at last . . . el pueblo”—the people.
Blind Spot
Allende­implicitly­understood­the­difference­between­representative­democ-
racy­and­business­management.­For­Beer,­the­ability­to­make­decisions­had­
a simple and direct correlation to freedom regardless of the decision being 
made,­a­freedom­that­only­ever­trafficked­in­a­literal­register:­either­demo-
cratically­bottom­to­top,­or­autocratically­from­top­to­bottom.­Furthermore,­
in committing to a wholly rational idea of decision-making, in which an actor 
is presumed to make the best decision if he or she is provided with the right 
information,­Beer­aligns­himself­with­a­technocratic­vision­of­society,­in­which­
decision-making is reduced to a question of expertise. However, the fore-
grounding of expertise—a space where “competent information is free to 
act”­as­Beer­put­it—as­a­principal­of­decision-making­mystifies­the­political­
dimension­of­decision-making­(Medina­2011,­33).­In­this­sense­it­is­not­a­ques-
tion of moral value, but of the proper structural position of expertise vis-à-vis 
politics. 
Just­like­any­organism,­Cybersyn’s­lifeworld­was­shaped­by­its­sensory­appa-
ratus. In order for something to count as an input, the system had to see it in 
order to recognize­it.­This­recalls­Jakob­von­Uexküll’s­concept­of­the­Umwelt in 
which each organism has a world of its own compromised only of the dimen-
sions present to its sensory apparatus. Despite the abundant and profuse 
continuity of the natural environment, each organism gives birth to a world 
by­selecting­only­a­few­important­markers­within­this­space.­For­the­organism,­
everything­else­simply­does­not­exist.­Deleuze­and­Guattari’s­(1987)­and­also­
Agamben’s­(2004)­often­cited­use­of­the­tick­is­drawn­from­von­Uexküll­and­
serves­as­an­extreme­example­of­the­point.­The­tick’s­lifeworld­is­contracted­
down­to­three­stimuli:­light,­smell,­and­touch­(Uexküll­2010).­Light­draws­the­
tick to the tip of a tree branch, smell allows it to detect the passage of a host 
below and drop onto its back, touch to locate bare skin, so that it could bur-
row.­As­Canguilhem­writes:­
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A­meaning,­from­the­biological­and­psychological­point­of­view,­is­an­
appreciation­of­values­in­relation­to­a­need.­And­a­need­is,­for­whoever­
feels it and lives it, an irreducible system of reference, and for that reason 
it­is­absolute.­(2001,­7)
If­the­world­is­an­accumulation­of­signals,­inputs­and­outputs­than­Beer­
and­Uexküll­are­in­close­proximity.­Each­cybernetic­apparatus,­whether­the­
anti-aircraft battery or the viable system model,­individuates­a­specific­mesh­
through which the continuity of the world passes. The individuation of the 
epistemic and the ontological—in that it is a co-individuation—binds certain 
features of the world to knowledge apparatus in a partial and limited way, in 
other­words­at­a­specific­scale.­Gilbert­Simondon’s­critique­of­cybernetics­is­
worth repeating here. What matters in a system is not the communication 
between pre-given receivers and whether one or another node in the relay of 
communication is sensitive enough to register a change in its environment.4 
Instead, it is the genesis of the senders and receivers themselves that is of 
importance, since this forms the genetic condition of possibility for communi-
cation to exist as communication. In the genesis of the communicators percep-
tual­apparatus­is­the­genesis­of­a­specific­lifeworld­(Simondon­2009).­
In this regard, what matters is the individuation of Cybersyn and the VSM 
diagram that it carries inside—not the modulation of the signals between 
the­parts,­or­their­adaptation­within­a­functional­bandwidth.­At­precisely­the­
4 “Information­is­therefore­a­primer­for­individuation;­it­is­a­demand for individuation, for 
the­passage­from­a­metastable­system­to­a­stable­system;­it­is­never­a­given­thing.­There­
is no unity and no identity of information, because information is not a term;­it­supposes­
the tension of a system of being in order to receive it adequately. Information can only 
be­inherent­to­a­problematic;­it­is­that by which the incompatibility of the non-resolved 
system becomes an organizing dimension in the resolution;­information­supposes­a­phase­
change of a system, because it supposes an initial preindividual state that individuates 
itself­according­to­the­discovered­organization.­Information­is­the­formula­of­individua-
tion,­a­formula­that­cannot­exist­prior­to­this­individuation.­An­information­can­be­said­
to always be in the present, current, because it is the direction [sens] according to which 
a­system­individuates­itself”­(Simondon­2009,­10).­Also:­“According­to­Simondon,­cyber-
netics had failed to go in this direction. Wiener had the “huge merit” to have started the 
first­inductive­investigation­into­machines­and­established­cybernetics­as­a­comprehen-
sive,­interdisciplinary­research­project.­But,­following­Simondon,­he­had­failed­to­define­
his­research­object­in­an­appropriate­manner.­Cybernetics­only­focused­on­a­specific­
type of machines, i.e., machines with feedback mechanisms. More generally, Simondon 
stated,­“Right­from­the­start,­[Cybernetics]­has­accepted­what­all­theory­of­technology­
must­refuse:­a­classification­of­technological­objects­conducted­by­means­of­established­
criteria­and­following­genera­and­species.”­For­Simondon,­the­problem­did­not­consist­
in­applying­biological­procedures­to­technology­(as­we­will­see,­he­himself­made­use­of­
such­procedures).­His­point­was­that­Wiener­had­made­the­wrong­choice­relying­on­a­
quasi-Linnaean,­stable­classification.­What­Simondon­was­after­was­a­dynamic­theory­
of­technology,­i.e.,­a­theory­that­would­grasp­technological­objects­in­their­development­
and their relation to inner and outer milieus or Umwelten. In other words, Simondon did 
not want to start another botany of machines, he was interested in their individuation, 
development­and­evolution”­(Schmidgen­2004,­13).
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same moment that the abstract diagram of the system is articulated and the 
parts have been prescribed their range of functionalities and sensitivities, two 
things­are­produced.­Firstly,­a­life­world.­This­contains­all­the­things­that­can­
be­recognized­and­detected­by­the­system.­Secondly,­a­contrast­space­or­blind­
spot, a remainder, which—from the point of view of the life world—has no 
existence whatsoever. Cybersyn had an Umwelt all of its own, and this Umwelt 
was­wholly­determined­by­those­things­Allende’s­economists­and­Beer’s­cyber-
neticians­took­to­be­of­value­between­1972–1973.­
By­attempting­to­equate­an­economic­and­social­formation­with­a­series­of­
indicators­in­a­feedback­loop,­Chile’s­cybernetic­experiment­over-extended­
quantitative techniques into a qualitative domain. The equations, diagrams, 
circuit boards, telex machines and screens that made up the “body” of this 
national cybernetic system, attempted to make a society and its economy 
knowable through calculus, a series of variable quantities that could be tuned 
and calibrated. The question that arises for any such system is how to count. 
Where­is­one­to­draw­the­line,­that­difficult­threshold­between­the­calculable­
and­the­incalculable,­the­field­of­vision­and­the­blind­spot?­
This­question­would­become­paramount­for­the­Allende­government­on­
11 September­1973.­Certainly­Cybersyn­was­never­designed­to­halt­a­coup­
attempt,­nor­can­the­overthrow­of­Allende’s­government­be­said­to­have­even-
tuated by a failure in this unique experiment. Instead, the line followed here is 
that the ethos hardwired into the telex machines, control rooms and software 
encapsulated an idea of social equilibrium—and the coup in all its murderous 
force represented another kind of politics, one that would never be content to 
operate­within­an­exiting­set­of­structures.­Rather,­it­demanded­that­the­rules­
themselves—the very structure of decision-making—enter into the stakes of 
the­political­bargain.­That­this­was­articulated­by­a­military­junta­in­this­case­
is coincidental, since what was and is at stake is not merely the adaptation 
of systems parts, it the possibility of radically transforming the system that 
recognises­something­as­part­of­it­in­the­first­place.
Sleeping Dogs
In­the­introduction­to­his­lecture­at­the­College­de­France­on­10 January 1979,­
Michel­Foucault­opened­with­a­joke.­He­abbreviated­Freud’s­quotation­of­
Virgil’s­Aeneid which reads, “flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo” 
or “ if­I­cannot­deflect­the­will­of­Heaven,­I­shall­move­Hell”­which­Foucault­
renders simply as, “Acheronta movebo.”5 Freud­used­the­line­as­the­epigraph­to­
the Interpretation of Dreams, where it is meant to refer to the upward move-
ment of repressed content within the psyche. Foucault­humorously­counter-
5 Alternatively­ translated­ in­ the­ text­ accompanying­ the­ lecture­ as­ “If­ I­ cannot­ bend­ the­
Higher Powers, I will move the infernal regions.”
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poses­Freud’s­dictum­with­a­quote­from­Britain’s­first­prime minister,­Robert­
Walpole, who once stated: “Quieta non movere”­which­Foucault­translates­
idiomatically­as­“Let­sleeping­dogs­lie”­(2010).­It­is­certain­that­the­distance­
between­the­two­quotes­is­not­as­great­as­Foucault­implies,­and­although­Fou-
cault does not propose a psychoanalytic reading of the history of the eight-
eenth century—the extent to which subterranean problems rise up to lend 
sense to the details of history is a methodological given within his work. 
“Let­sleeping­dogs­lie”,­what­is­intended­with­this­statement?­Undoubtedly,­it­is­
a council of prudence, a description of government as a game of minimal con-
tact.­Foucault­traces­the­evolution­of­liberalism­as­a­specific­refinement­of­the­
raison d’état, especially through the period in which the market moves from 
being­a­site­of­redistributive­justice­in­which­buyers­must­be­protected­against­
fraud­to­a­site­of­verification,­and­thus­the­production­of­a­kind­of­truth.­The­
market can only operate as a site of truth production once it expresses a natu-
ral­or­true­price.­For­this­reason,­any­intervention­by­government­threatens­
to­jeopardize­this­natural­state­of­affairs.­Thus,­government­must­adopt­a­
continual­reflective­stance­formed­between­the­twin­limits­of­a­minimum­and­
maximum­contact.­As­Foucault­states,­
When you allow the market to function by itself according to its nature, 
according to its natural truth, if you like, it permits the formation of a cer-
tain price which will be called metaphorically, the true price, but which no 
longer­has­any­connotations­of­justice.­It­is­a­price­that­fluctuates­around­
the­value­of­the­product.­(Foucault­2010,­31)
The­genesis­of­liberalism­as­a­specific­technique­of­governance­can­be­traced­
to­the­problem­posed­by­populations­of­a­certain­scale.­At­its­core,­liberalism­
attempts­to­establish­a­naturalized­state­of­interaction­between­individuals,­
especially with regards to economic transactions and the idea that within the 
emergent sum of these interactions exists a wholly natural value—price. Only 
by securing the contingent interplay of these actors within the population—
and here the term security is meant in its regulatory, policing sense since this 
freedom depends on certain limits—can the natural tendency of this system 
be expressed. This rationality accords to a complex interacting system—in this 
case the market, a privileged status as a site against which the principals of 
control­and­rectification­can­be­measured.­
For­Foucault,­the­art­of­liberal­governance­is­essentially­self-reflective,­a­con-
tinual recalibration of techniques addressed to the milieu of a population in 
response to the various problems posed to it. The epistemic dimension to this 
project­takes­different­forms­that­are­united­by­the­same­reflective­gesture­
in­which­truth­appears­through­the­frame­of­an­empirical­project­measured­
against­the­truth­supplied­by­the­market.­A­number­of­deep­affinities­between­
the­cybernetic­dream­in­Latin­America­and­the­liberalism­become­apparent­
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at this stage, especially the inscription of the social body within the calculus 
of a complex emergent system. Later, it will be possible to say that in the case 
of the neoliberal experiments that began in Chile and eventually made their 
way­to­Eastern­Europe­and­other­parts­of­Latin­America,­this­reflective­gesture­
gives way to something more aggressive. This mutation does not faithfully 
reflect­a­reality­that­exists­within­an­empirical­project;­instead,­it­violently­
brings­a­new­market-oriented­site­of­verification­into­being. 
The­convergence­of­cybernetic­theory’s­game­of­epistemic­capture­with­
contemporary neoliberalism thus forms one chapter in the historical attempt 
to establish a rational basis for managing a population. It begins with natu-
ralization­of­the­market­and­takes­up­a­wide­range­of­empirical­strategies­
whereby­government­begins­to­address­itself­to­an­“indefinite­series­of­
mobile elements,” such as individuals, vehicles, goods, or dwellings. In other 
words,­strategies­where­a­quantifiable­matrix­of­co-ordinates­and­trajectories­
become isolated, tracked, and regulated in time and space. The circulation of 
these elements will continually constitute new problems to which government 
must respond. It will do so by adopting a “transformable framework” that 
recalibrates­around­the­provocations­these­problems­pose­(Foucault­2007).
Because­characteristics­such­as­health,­crime,­and­poverty­emerge­from­a­ter-
rain that is necessarily contingent and open, the practices of government take 
on­a­reflective­form.­Though­populations­exhibit­tendencies­that­cannot­be­
simply be directed at a goal, they can nonetheless be tracked and modulated 
within a bandwidth of possible variation. In some sense this marks the critical 
point­of­transformation;­power­will­no­longer­touch­its­object­directly,­instead­
it­will­address­the­space­in­which­the­object­exists­as­a­possibility.­Phrased­dif-
ferently, power will begin to address the lifeworld, or milieu.6 
Under this cybernetic ethos, transformation is not directed towards a distant 
goal that is known in advance. Instead, it follows immanent tendencies, guid-
ing them forward—but also giving them space to evolve. The city or territory is 
understood here as a contingent, self-regulating resource that requires ongo-
ing management. The goal of this management is to secure a natural equi-
librium­and­keep­emergent­forces­in­balance.­In­one­way,­the­Latin­American­
experiment­in­cybernetics­is­the­first­moment­when­this­liberal­diagram­goes­
live, the moment when “the medium of an action and the element in which 
it­circulates”­(Foucault­2007,­32)­promises­to­come­under­real-time­control.­
However, as Pinochet would eventually show in the case of Chile, the properly 
6­ “The­milieu­is­a­set­of­natural­givens—rivers,­marshes,­hills—and­a­set­of­artificial­giv-
ens—an agglomeration of individuals, of houses etc. The milieu is a certain number of 
combined,­overall­effects,­bearing­on­all­who­live­in­it.­It­is­an­element­in­which­a­circular­
link­is­produced­between­effects­and­causes,­since­an­effect­from­one­point­of­view­will­
be­a­cause­from­another”­(Foucault­2007).
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political­question­is­not­how­the­system­operates­(i.e.,­how­can­we­refine­it,­
make­more­integrated,­more­complete,­more­coextensive­with­the­world?)­
but rather what counts as part of the system. The political dimension of any 
system­is­its­blind­spot,­the­part­it­cannot­recognize,­as­Rancière­writes­in­dif-
ferent­context:­“the­part­with­no­part”­(2004).
The Cybernetic Ethos
Freud’s­dictum­regarding­the­return­of­the­repressed­suggests­a­subcon-
scious that never sleeps. In the Chilean episode, the historical subconscious 
underwent­many­movements­of­its­own;­socialist­dreams­were­soon­replaced­
by neoliberal ones. Just as in dreams, where unrelated facts can suddenly 
become­juxtaposed­without­logical­relation,­three­times­in­short­succession­
Chile­became­a­space­of­extreme­experiment:­first­with­constitutional­social-
ism,­second­with­cybernetic­management,­and­finally­with­the­Chicago­school­
of­economics.­For­decades,­this­Latin­American­laboratory­painfully­rehearsed­
social and economic ideas years before they became accepted in the rest of 
the world. If the socialist origin of cybernetic management is a source of pride 
for many advocates, its ultimate conclusion as the deep structure of neoliber-
alism is not. Valdes writes:
From­1970–1973,­the­Allende­government­implemented­its­“anti-imperial-
ist, anti-oligarchical and anti-monopolistic” program, deciding to nation-
alize­the­financial­and­productive­sectors­of­Chile,­to­expropriate­large­
chunks of rural property, and to replace the market with far-reaching 
price­control.­From­1974–1978,­the­military­regime­of­General­Pinochet­
developed­a­radical­economic­liberalization­program­based­on­the­indis-
criminate use of market mechanisms, the dismantling and reduction of 
the­state,­regulation­of­the­financial­sector,­and­a­discourse­that­ascribed­
to market forces the ability to solve practically any problem in society. 
One extreme of radical ideology was followed by its opposite. Chilean 
society­was­twice­called­upon­to­begin­its­history­from­scratch.­(Valdes­
1995,­7)
Though their means and purposes point in opposite directions, and while it 
would­be­ridiculous­to­equate­Allende’s­constitutional­socialism­and­its­wholly­
legitimate­rise­to­government­with­Pinochet’s­violent­coup­and­years­of­ter-
ror,­is­there­not—despite­the­aforementioned­differences—a­deep­affinity­
between­the­two?­In­the­fervor­to­shape­a­new­Chilean­subject,­to­disavow­
the past, to pursue growth, and set in place “irreversible change” both the 
military­junta­and­the­left-wing­socialists­share­surprising­similarities.­As­such:­
“the coup cannot be reduced to a particular time-bound event but must be 
seen as a process, i.e., as a particular constellation of social and political forces 
moving­together­and­apart­over­historical­time”­(Petras­and­Morley­1978).­
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The Cybersyn experiment only makes sense against this changing historical 
background. In the very attempt to constitute an environment as a resource 
for adaptation, this techno-social assemblage was disposed to draw on its con-
text.­As­soon­as­it­was­activated,­as­soon­as­it­began­to­work,­as­soon­as­it­was­
plugged­into­a­concrete­historical­situation­it­began­to­inflect­that­situation’s­
politics, to redraw the contours of the problem in its own image. 
For­this­reason,­the­technology­could­never­embody­a­specific­ideological­pay-
load, its status as emancipatory, its surveillance function, its “left” or “right” 
orientation was always dependent on the environmental “input” it drew upon. 
The relay the machine was installed within was permanently unstable. Called 
on­to­regulate­economic­activity,­manage­workers’­disputes­and­form­an­affec-
tive loop between government and governed—its model of freedom was itself 
tangled­in­a­network­of­resistances­wholly­immanent­to­the­field­in­which­it­
took shape. This environment made for an unstable ground, always threat-
ening to give way beneath the cybernetic machine. This why it could move 
from one political spectrum to the other and then back again. It is also why 
the­same­technique­could­infuse­supposedly­radically­different­ideologies.­Its­
autonomy­was­total,­the­machine­just­kept­on­working.­
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This essay critically examines digital simulation 
scenes or “demos” as a tool that is telling something 
about the truth of the world with the aim of making it 
unstable. Following Farocki’s take on war trauma ther-
apies treating post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
with responsive and immersive technologies, it makes 
the effect of a demo on human subjectivity appar-
ent. From there, the essay traces the design of these 
technologies back to the first video simulation experi-
ments of the Architecture Machine Group at MIT in 
the 1970s: the Aspen Movie Map, in which race and 
gender play a critical part in conditioning spectator-
ship. Looking at the role of demos in urban planning, 
the implications of this tool become fully visible.
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Immersion into Trauma
In his video installation Serious Games (2011),­filmmaker­Harun­Farocki­cuts­
onto­four­screens­different­scenarios­ranging­from­recent­wars­and­war­
games. In the longest segment, entitled Immersion, we see a soldier undergo-
ing a therapy for post-traumatic stress disorder. He relives the memory of the 
killing of a fellow soldier during the Iraq war via virtual reality headgear. The 
uncanny feeling of these scenes is that the software used in the pre-battle 
training­and­the­post-trauma­treatment­are­strikingly­similar­(fig.­1).
In its multi-screen architecture, the installation most strenuously insists on 
a­disjuncture­between­the­camera­apparatus­and­the­human­eye.­Vision,­for­
Farocki,­is­an­activity­beyond­and­outside­of­the­human­subject.­It­is­a­product­
emerging from the realm of machines and apparatuses of capture, one that 
retroactively­conditions­and­manufactures­“human”­vision.­At­the­limits­of­
his analysis is the possibility that vision—at least in the human capacity to 
survey—is impossible, even as the ability of machines to record, store, memo-
rialize,­and­reenact­images­has­never­been­greater.­More­critically,­it­would­
appear­that­machinery­is­capable­of­rewiring­the­human­brain.­What­Farocki­
addresses is that our very vision and cognition are now thoroughly mediated. 
Vision­has­become­in­many­ways­mechanized,­perhaps­even inhuman in being 
unable­to­recognize­human­subjectivity.­
[Figure­1]­Harun­Farocki,­Serious Games I–IV,­2001.
Within this moment of electronic repetition, where the soldier returns to a 
past­trauma­through­the­implantation­of­new­memories,­Farocki­shows­the­
nature­of­contemporary­mediums­as­affective,­preemptive,­and­inhuman.­
Miming the logic of contemporary prolonged exposure therapies, trauma here 
is not created from a world external to the system, but actually generated, 
preemptively, from within the channel between the screens and the nervous 
system. 
In­prolonged­exposure­therapies,­the­same­effect­is­produced­in­a­similar­
way:­sufferers­of­anxiety­and­trauma­disorders­are­“exposed,”­most­recently­
through virtual reality environments, to revisit moments in which the patient 
associated­a­particular­stimulus­to­a­response.­As­Marisa­Renee­Brandt­makes­
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clear in her work on virtual reality exposure, the function in these treatments 
is not to “relive” the past but to “revisit” it in order to recondition and disasso-
ciate­the­stimulus­from­the­response­(Brandt­2013,­8).­This­exclusion­of­“reliv-
ing” is telling. The function of the therapeutic immersion in the videogame has 
no relationship to life narrative or stories, nor is it aligned to any teleological, 
historical, or memorial time. It is literally a repetition, a return visit that will be 
the­same­as­the­initial­“visit”­in­the­war­zone.­The­literature­is­specific­on­this­
point. Prolonged exposure therapy is behaviorist: it is grounded in the earlier 
twentieth century work of Pavlov on animal conditioning and is linked today to 
neurochemical­models­of­the­brain­(VanElzakker­et­al.­2014,­3–18;­Gallistel­and­
Balsam­2014,­136–144).
The scholarship on traumatic and anxiety disorders has a curious relationship 
to repetition automatism in psychoanalysis, in that it vehemently insists on a 
model­of­the­mind­analogous­perhaps­to­Freud’s­initial­ruminations­in­“Pro-
ject­for­a­Scientific­Psychology”­(1895).­What­makes­contemporary­therapies­
different­is­that­they­never­pass­through­the­conduits­of­egos­or­conscious-
ness. The brain is comprised of circuits of neurons that are now postulated 
as being chemically conditioned by stimuli. The point of therapy is to modify 
the responsiveness of the circuit at a neurochemical level and to rewire it. 
Prolonged exposure therapies are not based on talk and do not invoke notions 
of dialog or narrative. Within this model of the brain, the trauma is the result 
of­a­communication­problem­or­conflict­between­different­regions­or­layers­of­
the brain. 
As­studies­comparing­rat­and­human­response­demonstrate,­the­conditioning­
reflexes­are­presumed­to­result­from­amygdala.­The­amygdala­is­considered­
to be a “primitive” structure in the brain responsible for instinctual responses: 
the­“lizard”­part­of­the­brain.­As­the­common­parlance­describing­this­struc-
ture demonstrates, the amygdala can also be considered a cross-species and 
therefore globally shared structure in the brain. The “non-human” and “glob-
ally”­shared­part­of­the­brain­conflicts­and­cannot­communicate­seamlessly­
with the portions of cognitive reasoning and emotion. Scientists postulate 
that these conditions can happen very quickly and they may happen even at 
sub-neural­and­molecular­levels­of­brain­cells­(Gallistel­and­Balsam­2014).­What­
makes­contemporary­post-traumatic­stress­disorder­(PTSD)­interesting­is­that­
scientists speak about these impulses as open to computationally modeling. 
The idea of video based therapy is that the function of the screen is not to 
provide­historical­memory,­content,­or­meaning,­but­to­simply­divert­the­flow­
of­signals­and­re-channel­them­into­more­productive­rather­then­conflicting­
circuits­(Gallistel­and­Balsam­2014).­As­Pasi­Vailiaho­(2012)­has­brilliantly­dem-
onstrated the screen, in such therapies, serves no anthropocentric or even 
representative function, but is a channel to network nervous impulses into 
new circuits of coordination with machines and media. 
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A History of Machinic Vision
Behind­Farocki’s­installation­lurk­serious­questions­of­what­it­might­mean­to­
even­“see”­or­“witness”­the­suffering­of­others­in­our­contemporary­age.­What­
are­the­conditions­for­visibility­and­legibility­within­any­historical­milieu?­­But­
also:­how­is­one­to­face­this­new­neuro-optical­apparatus?­How­can­critical­
practices intervene in this seemingly smooth multi-channel network where 
emotional pain, nervous stimulation, and visual perception are seamlessly 
integrated­to­condition­human­beings?­When­the­world­is­a­demo,­what­does­it­
mean­to­encounter­the­reality­of­human­suffering?
Farocki’s­films,­of­course,­speak­to­a­very­long­history­in­critical­media­and­film­
studies­that­has­insisted­on­the­disjuncture­between­the­camera­apparatus­
and­the­human­eye­and­mind­(Silverman­1996:­125–131).­But­Farocki,­in­cleverly­
recognizing­the­very­specific­nature­of­digital­and­computational­warfare,­asks­
about a machinic vision that goes beyond being capable of autonomously 
recording, and is gifted with powers of cognition, analysis, and simulation.
Farocki’s­concern­about­seeing­in­the­face­of­an­apparatus­for­automating­not­
only­vision­but­also­cognition­(very­literally­if­we­think­of­rewiring­minds­to­
not­suffer­or­preemptively­suffer­trauma)­speaks­to­our­present.­In­this­essay­
my­proposal­is­to­address­the­question­of­what­is­historically­specific­to­the­
contemporary forms of image making and to further ask how these practices 
inform future imaginaries and possibilities for both art and politics under 
conditions where both vision and trauma are increasingly automated and 
technicized.­If­both­Farocki­and­neuroscientists­stress­a­form­of­vision­whose­
gaze­is­fundamentally­irreducible­to­the­human­body,­then­I­argue­this­is­also­a­
particular historical statement. 
In this essay, I will address how machinic vision is constituted in our present, 
by retracing the history of immersive technologies and examining in particu-
lar­the­case­of­the­Aspen­Movie­Map,­and­its­predecessor­projects,­created­
by­the­Architecture­Machine­Group­founded­by­Nicholas­Negroponte­at­MIT.­
The­Aspen­Movie­Map­is­largely­considered­one­of­the­first­fully­immersive,­
perhaps responsive environments, and is widely touted as the predecessor to 
everything­from­first­person­shooter­games­to­Google­Earth.­As­we­shall­see,­
the­designers­and­scientific­theories­that­developed­the­Aspen­Movie­Map­in­
1978­were­as­insistent­as­Farocki­on­affirming­the­inhuman­nature­of­visual­
perception. 
Not surprisingly, race and gender play critical roles in conditioning spectator-
ship­within­this­architecture.­The­Architecture­Machine­Group­prototyped­its­
conception of interactive and immersive media by engaging with race as a 
“demo” for the production of future responsive environments. In merging the 
representation­of­race­with­the­science­of­machines,­the­final­effect­is­to­insist­
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not only on the limits of human vision, but to produce new ideas of species 
and territories, literally linked through nervous stimulation and speculation: a 
new neuropolitical situation that goes beyond the original biopolitical formula-
tion­of­subject­and­population.­Population,­here,­is­not­the­target­but­rather­
the constituent of media. However, this is a population which is no longer 
comprised­of­individual­subjects­but­of­units­of­attention­and­nervous­actions:­
what,­to­cite­Deleuze­(1990),­we­might­label­“dividuals.”­
The Aspen Movie Map
Arguably­one­of­the­most­important­models­for­the­contemporary­responsive­
environments­ and­ virtual­ reality­ therapies,­ like­ the­ one­ in­ Farocki’s­ Serious 
Games,­ is­ historically­ the­Aspen­Movie­Map­ (fig.­ 2).­ Built­ through­ the­ careful­
survey­ of­ gyro-stabilized­ cameras­ that­ took­ an­ image­ every­ foot­ traversed­
down­the­streets­of­the­city­of­Aspen­in­Colorado,­the­Aspen­Movie­Map­was­
a­ system­working­ through­ laser­discs,­a­ computer­ screen­and­a­ joystick­ that­
allowed a user to traverse the space of the city at their leisure and speed. 
[Figure­2]­The­Aspen­Movie­Map,­Architecture­Machine­Group­at­MIT,­1978–1979,­https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Hf6LkqgXPMU.
The­ film­ was­ shot­ both­ forward­ and­ backward,­ so­ one­ could­ navigate­ in­
reverse,­ and­ it­was­ possible­ also­ to­ place­ objects­ into­ the­ space.­ The­ effect,­
Negroponte said, was to have as many recorded images as possible so that to 
produce­a­seamless­experience­(Mostafavi­2014).­Upon­looking­at­the­screen,­
the­viewer­was­both­“there”­ in­Aspen­and­“abstracted”­from­Aspen.­The­sub-
ject­was­both­integrated­into­the­space,­while­simultaneously­being­trained­to­
navigate­ space­as­manipulable­and­scalable.­ The­perceptual­field­was­plastic­
in­being­able­to­expand­temporally­and­spatially­both­the­bird’s­eye­view­and­
that­from­the­ground.­Arguably,­navigating­these­scales­and­planes­was­a­new­
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form of perceptual training, while preserving older skills of orientation and 
command over space. 
Originally­the­Aspen­Movie­Map­was­commissioned­by­the­Cybernetics­Divi-
sion­of­the­Defense­Advanced­Research­Projects­Agency­(DARPA)­of­the­US­
military. Inspired by the use of a simulated environment by the Israeli army in 
the­rescue­mission­at­the­Entebbe­airport­in­Uganda­in­1976,­DARPA’s­plan­was­
not­to­just­build­a­fake­environment,­but­to­simulate­one­with­the­purpose­to­
pre-implant geographic knowledge and cognitive maps into soldiers before 
entering­the­real­locale­of­combat.­For­Andrew­Lippman,­who­was­the­director­
of­the­project,­the­main­function­of­the­Aspen­Movie­Map­had,­however,­no­
geographical purposes. Instead, it was solely about developing more interac-
tive environments and to try out the emerging technologies of video discs, 
high resolution storage and replay systems.1
The­project­was­not­classified­as­secret­by­DARPA,­which­speaks­to­a­larger­
issue:­Even­as­counter-terrorism­and­urban­warfare­had­become­a­pressing­
issue­by­the­1960’s,­for­instance­with­the­conflicts­in­Algeria­and­Vietnam,­there­
was­also­a­different­war­going­on.­The­urban­riots­of­the­late­1960’s­sparked­
by­Martin­Luther­King’s­assassination,­and­the­increasing­tensions­as­white­
Americans­fled­urban­areas,­had­prompted­a­new­discourse­of­“war”­and­
“crisis” in U.S. cities. 
Historian­Jennifer­Light­(2003)­has­shown­that­this­discourse­of­“crisis”­was­
coproduced­with­an­influx­of­defense­intellectuals­leaving­the­analysis­of­
nuclear strategy to apply their research and cybernetic methods to the 
increasingly­profitable­sector­of­urban­security­and­development.­By­the­
1970’s,­however,­as­Aubrey­Anable­has­argued,­the­urban­“crisis”­had­dis-
sipated or dissolved. It was replaced by a new Nixon administration invest-
ment­in­privatized­solutions­and­a­turn­away­from­Johnson­era’s­Great­Society­
style­programs.­This­privatization,­she­argues,­refracts­itself­in­the­movie­
map’s­hyper-individualized­mode­of­traversing­urban­space­(Anable­2012,­
512–514).­Certainly,­the­movie­map­was­part­of­a­longer­tradition­at­MIT­of­
three decades of investment in behavioral and computational sciences within 
the­schools­of­planning­and­architecture.­As­a­result,­planners­from­MIT­did­
not answer even the original “crisis” with a turn to sociology or structural 
discourses.­Rather­they­had­long­been­mobilizing­the­tools­of­environmental­
psychology, communication theories, cognitive science, and computer science 
(Halpern­2014,­Chapter­2).­The­Aspen­Movie­Map­was­the­first­responsive­
environment and a new way to negotiate space across the seeming ruins of 
modern urbanity. 
1­ I­interviewed­Dr.­Andrew­Lippman­on­25­November­2014­at­the­MIT­Media­Lab.­The­back-
ground­of­the­movie­map­in­relationship­to­DARPA­is­also­discussed­by­Michael­Naimark­
2006.
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Demo or Die: Prelude
What­historically­distinguished­the­Architecture­Machine­Group’s­approach,­
was the lack of a vision of the future. If throughout the nineteenth and twen-
tieth century designers and urban planners from Le Corbusier to members of 
the­Bauhaus­had­produced­utopian­forms­of­urban­design,­the­Architecture­
Machine­Group­had­a­different­method—the­demo.­At­MIT­the­focus­was­
never­on­final­outcomes­but­on­performance­and­process.­
This­approach­could­best­be­summarized­in­the­“Demo­or­Die”­adage­(that­
was­born­at­the­MIT­Media­Lab).­The­construction­of­simulations­was­part­of­
a­process­whereby­the­environment­and­the­user­would­be­adjusted­to­one­
another, and eventually the simulation itself would be dispensed with. The 
Media Lab made the distinction between simulation and this “responsive 
architecture”2­by­designating­everything­a­“demo”­(Sterk­2014).­The­“demo”­is­
a test, a prototype, and as such neither a representation of the real world nor 
a­finalized­reality­in­itself.­It­hangs­in­an­anticipatory,­or­preemptive­time­of­
anticipation for the next technical development. 
In­a­book­by­computer­evangelist­Stewart­Brand­(1987),­the­Media­Lab­is­
described as a place where corporate sponsorship and creativity exist in 
perfect harmony. The lab is depicted as a “techno feast of goodies” to improve 
human­life­with­projects­such­as­“School­of­the­Future,”­“Toys­of­the­Future,”­
and­so­forth.­This­apocryphal­vision­of­the­future,­Brand­argues,­is­not­based­
on mythologies of knowledge or the academic way of life “publish or perish,” 
but rather grounded in a new vision of truth and prediction. 
In­Lab­parlance­it’s­“Demo­or­Die”—make­the­case­for­your­idea­with­an­
unfaked performance of it working at least once, or let somebody else 
at the equipment. . . . The focus is engineering and science rather than 
scholarship,­invention­rather­than­studies,­surveys,­or­critiques.­(Brand­
1987,­4).­
This idea of demo which is demonstrating the future direction of technology, 
and telling something about the truth of the world and what users need, was 
the particular mark of the lab. 
Demo or Die: In Boston’s South End
The­world­was­not,­of­course,­always­a­demo.­As­Molly­Steenson­(2014)­has­
shown­the­Architecture­Machine­Group’s­effort­was­also­to­integrate­comput-
ing­into­architecture.­Initially,­the­Architecture­Machine­Group­conceptualized­
the human-machine interaction in terms of conversation and not immersive 
2­ The­term­“responsive­architecture”­was­coined­by­Nicholas­Negroponte­and­is­now­argu-
ably expanded in many schools of architecture and design to “responsive environment.”
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interaction. Models of language, translation, and representation predomi-
nated­in­conceiving­machine­and­design­learning.­While­the­first­efforts­at­
computer intelligence adhered to models put forth by Marvin Minsky and 
Samuel Papert, for instance, very quickly, having demonstrated the failure of 
such­approaches,­the­Architecture­Machine­Group­turned­to­more­cybernetic­
ideas, and to inverting the question for intelligent systems. Instead of asking 
whether machines could be made like people, they turned to asking how peo-
ple are machine like, or more correctly, perhaps how people can become part 
of machine systems.
Interestingly, in moving from machine to human intelligence, race was a criti-
cal­conduit­of­passage.­The­first­full-fledged­demo­of­human­computer­aided­
design­run­by­the­Architecture­Machine­Group­was­a­series­of­Turing-inspired­
tests­(also­known­as­the­Hessdorfer­Experiment)­done­on­tenants­in­Boston’s­
then­under-privileged­neighborhood­of­the­South­End.­There,­three­African­
American­men­were­recruited­from­a­public­housing­project­and­asked­to­type­
on a computer keyboard what their main concerns were regarding urban plan-
ning and neighborhood improvement, and what they wished urban planners 
and­designers­would­take­into­account­(fig.­3).
[Figure­3]­Nicholas­Negroponte,­The Architecture Machine, 56. 
Importantly, the simulation was entirely fake. Computers, at the time, could 
not handle such sophisticated questions. The test was run through a human 
being­hidden­in­another­room­(lower­right-hand­corner­of­image).­The­par-
ticipants, however, were kept ignorant of this fact. One can read, therefore, 
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the whole test as an interface, a demo, of what a real computationally aided 
interaction would look like. What gives this demo force is that it is the perfor-
mance­of­a­future­ideal.­By­extension,­even­if­the­technology­did­not­yet­exist,­
the implication was that it should­exist­and­must­be­built.­A­project­that­would­
come­to­preoccupy­not­only­Negroponte­but­also­entire­fields­of­computer­sci-
ence and corporate research until today. 
In articulating this vision of the future, Negroponte said something vital, 
regularly repeated at the time by many human scientists and engineers, and 
evocative of the forms of changes in attitudes to race, population, and intel-
ligence that this new epistemology of the demo induced:
The three user-inhabitants said things to this machine they would prob-
ably not have said to another human, particularly a white planner or 
politician: to them the machine was not black, was not white, and surely 
had­no­prejudices.­.­.­­Machines­would­monitor­the­propensity­for­change­
of­the­body­politic.­.­.­What­will­remove­these­machines­from­a­“Brave­
New­World”­is­that­they­will­be­able­to­(and­must)­search­for­the­exception­
(in­desire­or­need)­the­one­in­a­million.­In­other­words,­when­the­gener-
alization­matches­the­local­desire,­our­omnipresent­machines­will­not­be­
excited. It is when the particular varies from the group preferences that 
our­machine­will­react,­not­to­thwart­it­but­to­service­it.­(Negroponte­1970,­
57)
This is a new form of urban planning imagined as having no pre-ordained 
organization­and­constantly­growing­by­seeking­to­consume­differences­or­
varieties­into­the­system.­This­is­a­model­that­assumes­that­many­different­
agents making minute decisions can, collectively, produce an intelligent or 
“smart” environment. This smartness can emerge without consciousness. 
Implicitly, therefore, Negroponte was also introducing a new idea of popula-
tion­as­a­cloud­or­source­for­difference,­a­“propensity­for­change,”­in­his­lan-
guage. This automation of emergence is key to understanding the place that 
responsive environments have within a broader political economy of globali-
zation­in­our­present.­What­systems­like­financial­algorithms­and­smart­cities­
do­is­capitalize­on­change,­on­the­unknowability,­to­use­the­financial­adage:­
“the known unknowns” as the site for speculation or growth. 
While seemingly distant from any discussion of trauma, in the simulations of 
the­Architecture­Machine­Group­the­race­warfare­of­the­United­States­was­
transformed into evidentiary examples for the necessity of computing. Situ-
ated­within­a­moment­of­extreme­urban­crisis­and­violence,­the­Architecture­
Machine­Group­attempted­to­turn­the­external­traumas­of­American­racism­
and economic crisis into an interactive simulation and to advance computing 
as the solution to these structural problems. If social structures could not 
help—it was thought—the demo could. 
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Demo or Die: In the Cybernetic Box
While­beginning­with­humans,­Negroponte­and­his­Architecture­Machine­
Group quickly turned away from conversations, interviews, and Turing tests to 
move towards immersive environments and a new frontier: art. They designed 
a­micro-world­called­SEEK­(fig.­4)­for­the­famous­Software exhibition held at 
New­York’s­Jewish­Museum­in­1970.­The­installation­consisted­of­a­small­group­
of­Mongolian­desert­gerbils­(chosen­according­to­Negroponte­for­their­curios-
ity­and­inquisitive­nature),­which­were­then­placed­in­an­environment­of­clear­
plastic blocks that was constantly rearranged by a robotic arm. The basic con-
cept was that the mechanism would observe the interaction of the gerbils with 
their­habitat­(the­blocks),­and­would­gradually­“learn”­their­living­preferences­
by observing their behavior. This “cybernetic machine” understood the world 
as an experiment, but also meant the introduction of cognitive and neuro-sci-
entific­models­of­intelligence­into­the­environment.­Apparently,­traumatizing­
gerbils was a route to better computer-aided design. 
[Figure­4]­Software:­cover­of­the­exhibition­catalogue,­1970.­Courtesy­of­the­Jewish­Meseum­
New­York.
For­Negroponte,­ideas­of­machine­and­human­intelligence­were­about­conver-
sation.­A­true­machine­intelligence­must­not replicate human intelligence, he 
argued.­For­Negroponte­a­true­“architecture­machine”­would­not­be­a­modern­
machine serving human needs, but an integrated system that was based 
on a new type of environmental intelligence that is capable of sensing and 
responding to sensory inputs. His articles and books came down to a constel-
lation of theories about intelligence and complexity to argue that design had 
to become process, a “conversation” between two intelligent species—human 
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and­machine—and­not­a­linear­cause-effect­interaction.3 “We are talking about 
a symbiosis that is a cohabitation of two intelligent species,” wrote Negro-
ponte­(1970:­7).­
This “conversation,” therefore, can no longer be thought of in terms of human 
language, bodies, or representation. Instead it is “behavioral” and “cybernetic.” 
What­had­begun­as­efforts­to­enhance­design­practice,­and­then­became­
about introducing humans into circuits of machines, now abandoned the 
human entirely. Whether gerbils or people, the principle remained the same: 
“Demo­or­Die”!­The­world­rendered­as­a­demonstration­or­a­prototype,­one­
where­death­itself­(in­this­case­of­the­gerbils)­is­not­a­failure,­or­even­a­trauma,­
but the very rationale for increasing the penetration of computing into life.
This experiment in rethinking what was intelligence, or perhaps even life, 
unfortunately, went quite badly, or perhaps creatively, depending on the 
point of view. During the exhibition the museum almost went bankrupt, the 
machine­constantly­ceased­working­(the­problem­being­in­both­software­and­
hardware),­the­gerbils­confused­the­computer­and­ended­up­becoming­aggres-
sive, attacking each other, and getting sick. Here we encounter the question 
of what it means to produce trauma from within a cybernetic system. No 
one thought to ask, or could ask, whether gerbils wish to live in a block built 
micro-world­(Shanken­1998). No one could ask, because conversations were 
now­interactions­and­behaviors,­without­translation.­When­Negroponte’s­
computerized­environment­broke­down­at­the­Jewish­Museum,­the­art­critic­
Thomas Hess wittily stated his position in an Art News editorial. He described 
the gerbils as covered in excrement and shadowed by the broken arms of 
the­robot.­“Artists­who­become­seriously­engaged­in­technological­processes­
might remember what happened to four charming gerbils,” he concluded 
(Hess­1970). No­matter,­“Demo­or­Die”!­Now­quite­literally.­­
Demo or Die: In the Media Room
Within a few years, Negroponte publishes his book Soft Architecture Machines 
(1976).­In­this­new­“soft”­world,­the­actual­computer­disappears­from­sight­
and the environment itself connects to the user, who is immersed within. 
Both­populations­and­environments­are­transformed­into­material­mediums.­
What had started as a “conversation” and then became an experiment had 
now become environment. What had begun as a question of intelligence was 
now one of interaction: sensation, perception, and cognition becoming the 
dominant design concerns. 
3­ Negroponte­and­his­colleagues­dreamed­of­an­ecology­of­constant­feedback­loops­of­
machine­human­interactions,­one­that­evolved­and­changed,­grew­“intelligent”­(1970:­7).
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Negroponte’s­new­approach­was­centered­around­a­new­structure:­the­Media­
Room.­This­room­had­quadrophonic­sound,­seamless­floor-to-ceiling­displays,­
and­a­hardware­running­the­room­that­cost­of­few­million­dollars­(Mostafavi­
2014).­The­Media­Room­housed­the­aforementioned­Aspen­Movie­Map­(one­of­
the­lab’s­pioneering­projects)­and­it­was­one­of­the­first­three-dimensional­dig-
itally mediated responsive environments ever built. There were no computers 
to be seen, as this was not envisioned as a model: it was supposed to be­Aspen­
itself.­As­Michael­Naimark,­an­artist­who­worked­on­the­project,­has­written:
Aspen,­ the­ picturesque­ mountain­ town­ in­ Colorado,­ is­ known­ for­ two­
processes, or “verbs,” relating to heritage and virtuality. One is to “movie-
map,”­the­process­of­rigorously­filming­path­and­turn­sequences­to­simu-
late interactive travel and to use as a spatial interface for a multimedia 
database.­ The­other­ is­ to­ “Aspenize,”­ the­process­ by­which­ a­ fragile­ cul-
tural­ecosystem­is­disrupted­by­tourism­and­growth.­(Naimark­2006)
One can extrapolate from this quote that the movie map is not a represen-
tation: it is an operation, a way to live, a way to be in the world. It is also a 
self-trauma­inducing­event;­it­“Aspenizes”­or­disrupts­ecologies.­Whether­
disruptive­or­emergent,­the­architects,­designers,­and­engineers­of­this­project­
imagined it not as a room, or simply an interface, but as a “cultural system” 
and an entire ecology.
As­one­watches­the­film­of­the­original­demo,­the­questions­of­race,­urbaniza-
tion, war, and society fade into the calm embrace of interaction. Watching the 
video­of­the­project­taken­by­the­lab,­one­sees­an­individual­slowly­navigating­
the­space­of­Aspen.­The­field­is­analogous­to­a­single­shooter­game,­but­at­the­
same­time­in­the­sky­hangs­an­abstract­map­that­offers­the­observer­a­global­
view of the scene. One is in the local and in the global at once. This is a user 
who­is­no­longer­a­subject,­but­perhaps,­to­cite­Deleuze­a­“dividual”—compart-
mentalized­into­pieces­of­information­and­attention,­and­part­of­a­population­
now rendered as variations and “propensity for change.” In a move that antici-
pates contemporary trauma treatment, historical and contextual features of 
the­image­are­used­not­to­produce­affiliation,­nostalgia,­or­memory,­but­to­
reorganize­the­perceptual­field­and­attenuate­it­into­the­nervous­system.­More­
critically, the individual here is both given a sense of control over the space 
while simultaneously being consumed into the network. The structural politics 
of both militarism and race war are rechanneled into interactivity. 
This returns me to the question of art, and the small sad gerbils, in their 
excessively responsive environment. The essential question that remains is: 
How­to­encounter­this­demo,­or­test­bed,­that­has­now­become­our­world?­
How­to­encounter­difference,­complexity,­chance,­and­perhaps­even­pain­and­
trauma?­In­an­age­where­chance­itself,­the­changes­in­the­system,­is­the­very­
site of automation, we must produce a politics, and criticality, of chance and 
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complexity.­By­cannibalizing­older­structures­of­vision­and­gaze,­the­Aspen­
Movie Map obliterated the possibility of evidence and witnessing altogether. 
This could be the genealogical underpinning to what the anthropologist 
Rosalind­Morris­has­argued­is­the­“narcissistic­economy”­of­contemporary­
warfare­and­torture­(2007).­
Post-traumatic stress disorder therapies repeat this understanding. In 
prolonged exposure therapies with virtual reality, the function of the immer-
sive environment is posited as reconciling the automatic and conditioned 
responses, thought to emerge from the more “primitive” portions of the brain 
with the higher conscious moral and ethical functions. The therapy is an inver-
sion­of­psychoanalytic­principles:­Rather­then­pass­through­the­conduit­of­an­
encounter with the other in order to co-produce a reliving of the event and 
with­it­a­re-narrativization,­there­is­no­life.­Only­pure­communication­without­
differentiation.­
Conclusion
At­the­end­of­this­essay,­I­want­to­return­to­Farocki’s­Serious Games and 
the moment in which the soldier remembers the event of the killing of his 
comrade. The soldier narrates this event for about one and a half minutes, 
while we watch on a second screen the simulation, as seen through his eyes. 
He recalls driving down a road on a beautiful evening in the desert. While 
wearing the virtual reality headgear, he says to his therapist: “It was very 
quiet, and that had me worried.” On the other monitor we see the simulation: 
a road winding through sunset desert in beautiful orange and pink hues. He 
continues to narrate. Suddenly there is the sound of shooting, but he can see 
nothing. He only hears the noise of shooting. He stops. Then he says a missile 
is­fired.­A­moment­later­we­see­through­“his”­eyes­the­explosion­in­front­of­the­
jeep.­He­exclaims­and­then­we­see­him­look­down.­He­calmly­announces­that­
he­then­realizes­that­his­“buddy”­was­hit.­
Within­this­moment­Farocki­returns­to­something­that­I­have­not­fully­dis-
cussed but is implicit in all analyses of preemption—mainly historicity. If there 
is one thing in the “Demos or Die” desire, it is the evacuation of historical tem-
poralities:­Each­demo­is­a­thing­in­itself,­a­world­only­referential­to­its­related­
demos. Instead in his Serious Games series,­Farocki­recuperates­the­histories­
of­race,­violence,­war,­difference,­and­sex­that­are­the­never­recognized­sub-
strate of our media systems. 
The installation Serious Games does­this­by­creating­a­strange­effect­where­
we hear the memory of the soldier in slight advance of our seeing through his 
eyes.­We­are­both­allowed­into­the­mind­and­eye­of­this­subject,­while­simulta-
neously­being­encouraged­to­view­him­as­different­or­other­then­the­specta-
tor.­We­are­interpolated­into­empathy,­without­identification.­The­installation­
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continually asserts our encounter with psychic pain, a drama we can suddenly 
almost “see,” because the other forms of information have been made so 
repetitive. It is in this moment, in which we share memory out of sync with 
media­flow,­that­we­realize:­we,­too,­are­being­conditioned­by­this­apparatus.­
Farocki­(2004:­193)­once­argued­that­“reality­has­not­yet­begun”:­it­has­not­
begun­because­we­cannot­witness­or­experience­the­death­or­suffering­of­oth-
ers—whether animals or human—with love. In saying so, he awakens us to the 
fact that the demos of our digital and electronic media are not simulations, 
because there is no world to which they refer or replicate. What our demos 
do­is­remove­our­ability­to­care,­and­insert­our­ability­to­consume­and­analyze­
data. 
It is to this condition that critical digital humanities and all forms of criticality 
and art making must reply. This comes from attempting to excavate the laten-
cies and ruptures within media systems, by attaching the relentless belief in 
real-time as the future, to recall that systems always entail an encounter with 
a radical “foreignness” or “alienness”—an incommensurability between per-
formance, futurity, and desire that becomes the radical potential for so many 
of our contemporary social movements, arts, and politics. It is our challenge 
in­critical­work­to­unmoor­the­practice­of­the­demo­and­reattach­it­to­different­
forms of time and experience that are not reactionary but imaginary. What 
Farocki’s­installation­does­is­to­make­everybody­realize­the­limits­of­human­
vision­and­recognize­the­image’s­role­in­recruiting­our­affective­energies­
for­war,­or­capital.­The­goal­of­critical­scholarship­and­artistic­and­scientific­
practices is to make media unstable. To turn not to solving problems, but to 
imagining new worlds exceeding the demands of war and consumption that 
kill­signification,­experience,­and­time­itself.­
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Outing Artificial 
Intelligence: Reckoning 
with Turing Tests 
Benjamin H. Bratton
Various anthropocentric fallacies have hobbled the 
development of artificial intelligence as a broadly 
based and widely understood set of technologies. 
Alan Turing’s famous “imitation game” was an ingen-
ious thought experiment but also ripe for fixing the 
thresholds of machine cognition according to its 
apparent similarity to a false norm of exemplary 
human intelligence. To disavow that fragile self-refec-
tion is, however, easier than composing alternative 
roles for human sapience, industry, and agency along 
more heterogeneous spectrums. As various forms of 
machine intelligence become increasingly infrastruc-
tural, the implications of this difficulty are geopolitical 
as well as philosophical. 
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[One philosopher] asserted that he knew the 
whole secret . . . [H]e surveyed the two celestial 
strangers from top to toe, and maintained to 
their faces that their persons, their worlds, their 
suns, and their stars, were created solely for the 
use of man. At this assertion our two travelers let 
themselves fall against each other, seized with a 
fit of . . . inextinguishable laughter. 
— Voltaire, Micromegas: A Philosophical History 
(1752)
Artificial­intelligence­(AI)­is­having­a­moment,­with­cognoscenti­from­Stephen­
Hawking­to­Elon­Musk­recently­weighing­in.1 Positions are split as to whether 
AI­will­save­us­or­will­destroy­us.­Some­argue­that­AI­can­never­exist­while­oth-
ers insist that it is inevitable. In many cases, however, these polemics may be 
missing the real point as to what living and thinking with synthetic intelligence 
very­different­from­our­own­actually­means.­In­short,­a­mature­AI­is­not­an­
intelligence for us,­nor­is­its­intelligence­necessarily­humanlike.­For­our­own­
sanity­and­safety­we­should­not­ask­AI­to­pretend­to­be­“human.”­To­do­so­is­
self-defeating, unethical and perhaps even dangerous. 
The­little­boy­robot­in­Steven­Spielberg’s­A.I. Artificial Intelligence (2001)­wants­
to be a real boy with all his little metal heart, whereas Skynet in the Terminator 
movies­(1984–2015)­represents­the­opposite­end­of­the­spectrum­and­is­set­on­
ensuring human extinction. Despite all the Copernican traumas that moder-
nity­has­brought,­some­forms­of­humanism­(and­their­companion­figures­of­
humanity)­still­presume­their­perch­in­the­center­of­the­cosmic­court.­I­argue­
that­we­should­abandon­the­conceit­that­a­“true”­artificial­intelligence,­arriving­
at sentience or sapience, must care deeply about humanity—us specifically—as 
the focus of its knowing and desire. Perhaps the real nightmare, even worse 
than­the­one­in­which­the­Big­Machine­wants­to­kill­you,­is­the­one­in­which­
it sees you as irrelevant, or not even as a discrete thing to know. Worse than 
being seen as an enemy is not being seen at all. Perhaps it is that what we 
really­fear­about­AI.2 
It­is­not­surprising­that­we­would­first­think­of­AI­in­terms­of­what­we­under-
stand intelligence to be, namely human intelligence. This anthropocentric 
fallacy is a reasonable point of departure but not a reasonable conclusion. 
1­ On­Hawking,­see­his­comments­to­BBC­at­http://www.bbc.com/news/technol-
ogy-30290540­and­also­Elon­Musk’s­$10­million­donation­to­Future­of­Life­Institute­“to­
prevent­AI­from­becoming­evil”­in­the­words­of­Wired­magazine.­See­http://www.wired.
com/2015/01/elon-musk-ai-safety
2­ Paraphrased­from­Bratton­2014.­
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The­idea­of­defining­AI­in­relation­to­its­ability­to­“pass”­as­a­human­is­as­old­
as­AI­research­itself.­In­1950,­Alan­Turing­published­“Computing­Machinery­
and Intelligence,” a paper in which he described what we now call the Turing 
Test,­and­which­he­referred­to­as­the­“imitation­game”­(Turing­1950,­433–460).
 
There­are­different­versions­of­the­test,­all­of­which­are­revealing­about­why­
our­approach­to­the­culture­and­ethics­of­AI­is­what­it­is,­for­good­and­bad.­For­
the most familiar version, a human interrogator asks questions to two hidden 
contestants, one a human and the other a computer. Turing suggests that if 
the interrogator usually cannot tell which is which, and if the computer can 
successfully pass as human, then can we not conclude, for practical purposes, 
that­the­computer­is­“intelligent”?­(More­people­“know”­Turing’s­foundational­
text than have actually read it. This is unfortunate because the text is marve-
lous,­strange­and­surprising.)­
Turing proposes his test as a variation on a popular parlor game in which two 
hidden­contestants,­a­woman­(player­A)­and­a­man­(player­B)­try­to­convince­a­
third that he or she is a woman by their written responses to leading ques-
tions. To win, one of the players must convincingly be who they really are, 
whereas the other must try to pass as another gender. Turing describes his 
own­variation­as­one­where­“a­computer­takes­the­place­of­player­A,”­and­so­a­
literal­reading­would­suggest­that­in­his­version­the­computer­is­not­just­pre-
tending to be a human, but pretending to be a woman. It must pass as a she. 
Other­versions­had­it­that­player­B­could­be­either­a­man­or­a­woman.­It­mat-
ters quite a lot if only one player is faking, or if both are, or if neither are. Now 
that we give the computer a seat, it may pretend to be a woman along with 
a man pretending to be a woman, both trying to trick the interrogator into 
figuring­out­which­is­a­man­and­which­is­a­woman.­Or­perhaps­the­computer­
pretends to be a man pretending to be a woman, along with a man pretending 
to be a woman, or even a computer pretending to be a woman pretending to 
be­a­man­pretending­to­be­a­woman!­In­the­real­world,­of­course,­we­have­all­of­
the above.3 
The problem with faking, however, does not end there: the issue is not so 
simple.­As­dramatized­in­The Imitation Game (2014),­the­recent­film­biography­
of Turing directed by Morten Tyldum, the mathematician himself also had 
to­“pass,”­in­his­case­as­a­straight­man­in­a­society­that­criminalized­homo-
sexuality. Upon discovery that he was not what he appeared to be, he was 
forced­to­undergo­horrific­medical­treatments­known­as­chemical­castra-
tion. Ultimately the physical and emotional pain was too great and he com-
mitted suicide. The episode was a grotesque tribute to a man whose recent 
contribution­to­defeating­Hitler’s­military­was­still­a­state­secret.­Turing­was­
only recently given posthumous pardon, but the tens of thousands of other 
British­men­sentenced­under­similar­laws­have­not.­One­notes­the­sour­ironic­
3­ See­also­the­discussion­of­Turing’s­“love­letter­generator”­in­King­2015. 
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correspondence­between­asking­an­AI­to­pass­the­test­in­order­to­qualify­as­
intelligent­—to­pass­as­a­human­intelligence—­with­Turing’s­own­need­to­hide­
his­homosexuality­and­to­pass­as­a­straight­man.­The­demands­of­both­bluffs­
are unnecessary and profoundly unfair. 
Should­complex­AI­arrive,­it­will­not­be­humanlike­unless­we­insist­that­it­
pretend to be so, because, one assumes, the idea that intelligence could be 
both real and inhuman at the same time is morally and psychologically intoler-
able. Instead of nurturing this bigotry, we would do better to allow that in our 
universe “thinking” is much more diverse, even alien, than our own particular 
case.­The­real­philosophical­lessons­of­AI­will­have­less­to­do­with­humans­
teaching machines how to think than with machines teaching humans a fuller 
and truer range of what thinking can be. 
Reckoning the Inhuman
That­appreciation­should­account­for­two­related­but­different­understand-
ings.­First,­one­would­recognize­that­intelligence­(and­knowledge)­is­always­
distributed among multiple positions and forms of life, both similar and dis-
similar to one another. This is not to say that “nothing is true and everything is 
permitted” rather that no single neuro-anatomical disposition has a privileged 
monopoly­on­how­to­think­intelligently.­Either­there­is­no­such­thing­as­“gen-
eral”­intelligence­(rather­only­situated­genres­of­limited­intelligence­in­which­
case­the­human­is­among­a­variety­of­these)­or­there­is­such­a­thing­as­general­
intelligence but that its very generality—its accomplishments of generic 
abstraction—are­agnostic­as­to­what­sort­of­entity­might­mediate­them.­Either­
way, human sapience is special but not unique. This appreciation would see 
AI­as­a­regular­phenomenon,­not­so­unlike­other­ways­that­human­intelligence­
is­located­among­other­modalities­of­intelligence­(such­as­non-human­animal­
cognition).­
Second,­our­appreciation­of­the­wider­continuum­would­also­recognize­that­
the­potential­advent­of­artificial­general­intelligence­(AGI)­is­also­novel,­as­yet­
unexplained, and will demand encounters between humans and mechanically 
situated­intelligence­that­are­unprecedented.­For­this,­AI­is­highly­irregular.­
Both­of­these­are­true,­and­it­may­only­be­that­understanding­one­is­how­we­
can really accomplish the other. That is, it may only be confronting what is 
genuinely new about non-carbon based intelligences possessing such ability 
and­autonomy­that­we­will­be­able­to­fully­recognize­the­continuum­of­intel-
ligences with which ours has always been embedded. Put simply, it may be 
that­one­indirect­outcome­of­the­philosophical­discussion­about­AI­is­a­wider­
appreciation­of­non-human­animal­cognition­and­subjectivity.­
In­some­discourses­this­conjunction­is­domesticated­under­the­sign­of­
an all too pat “posthumanism,” or a transcendentally anthropocentric 
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“transhumanism.”­Variations­of­the­former­have­much­to­offer­regardless,­and­
versions­of­the­latter­should­as­well,­but­probably­do­not­in­the­end.­At­issue­
here­is­more­the­limiting­contextualization­of­dominant­forms­of­humanism, 
than­a­relinquishment­of­what­the­human­(and­inhuman)­is­and­can be within 
that­expanded­continuum.­Reza­Negarestani­(2014)­retains­this­point­in­his­
essay­“The­Labor­of­the­Inhuman,”­insisting­that­the­easy­oversimplified­
nomination of forms of thought and experience that fall outside of various 
contingent norms, moral or mechanical, as “nonhuman” is to discard at the 
outset the integral mutability of the human as a philosophical and engineering 
program. That is, the relative uniqueness of human sapience is not what locks 
down­the­human­as­a­single­fixed­thing­with­essential­boundaries,­rather­it­is­
what­makes­the­human-as-such­into­an­open­project­of­continual­refashion-
ing,­unverifiable­by­essence­or­telos.
In­considering­that­capacity­in­regards­to­AI,­what­might­qualify­a­general­intel-
ligence­not­duty­bound­to­species­or­phylum­is­its­capacity­for­abstraction.­Ray­
Brassier­(2014)­suggests­that­the­ability­of­an­organism,­however­primitive,­to­
map its own surroundings in relation to the basic terms of friend, food, or foe 
may be a primordial abstraction from which we do not graduate so much as 
learn to develop into something like reason and its local human variations. In 
this way, mapping abstraction is not an early stage through which things pass 
on their way toward more complex forms of intelligence, rather it is a general 
principle­of­that­complexification.­Like­protozoa­and­their­ganglia­feeling­about­
to­figure­out­what­is­out­there­or­like­humans­looking,­tasting,­and­imagining­
patterns,­today’s­forms­of­AI­are­(sometimes)­augmented­by­various­technolo-
gies of machine vision that allow them to see and sense the world “out there” 
and­to­abstract­the­forms­of­a­(mechanically)­embodied­intelligence,­both­
deliberately programmed for them and emerging unexpectedly. 
Exactly­where­to­draw­a­line­of­distinction­between­the­accomplishments­of­a­
AI­that­exemplify­general­intelligence­now­operating­though­a­new­medium,­
on­the­one­hand,­or­a­specific­projection­of­locally­human­intelligence­pro-
grammed into a cognitive prosthesis, on the other, is unknown and unknowa-
ble­at­present.­Again,­one­may­precondition­the­other.­In­the­meantime­we­can­
at least speculate how we would be able to know where to draw that distinc-
tion. Considerations toward this include how we attempt to program stupidity 
into­AI,­and­how­we­attempt­to­imbue­them­with­what­we­take­to­be­our­most­
rarified­forms­of­ethical­reasoning.­When­one­of­these­dictates­the­other­is­a­
moment of weirdness worth honing in on.
How­so?­In­AI­research,­an­important­distinction­is­made­between­“artificial­
idiocy”­and­“artificial­stupidity.”­Artificial­stupidity­is­achieved­by­throttling­the­
performance of systems so as to be more comfortable for human interaction, 
for example, certain variances and textures are programmed to feel natural 
to­the­human­counterpart.­At­full­capacity,­the­chess­program­on­your­phone­
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can­beat­you­every­time,­but­what­fun­is­that?­Artificial­idiocy­is­when­a­system­
is catastrophically successful in carrying out its program, up to and passed an 
idiotic­extreme.­The­“paperclip­maximizer”­(as­described­by­Bostrom­2003)­is­a­
thought­experiment­describing­an­AI­so­successful­at­carrying­out­its­program­
to turn all available material into paperclips that it ultimately eats the earth 
and destroys humanity in the process: so many clips, so little paper to clip. 
Here­the­AI­goes­wrong,­not­because­it­was­throttled­or­because­it­malfunc-
tioned or because it hates us, but because it does exactly what we trained to 
do and turned out to be very bad for us.
As­usual­science­fiction­is­the­canary­in­the­coalmine.­Consider­HAL9000­in­
Stanley­Kubrick­and­Arthur­C.­Clarke’s­2001: A Space Odyssey­(really­a­drama­
about­HAL’s­furtive­relationship­to­the­alien­intelligence,­I­would­argue,­than­
about­humanity’s­relationship­to­either­of­the­other­characters­in­this­triangu-
lation­of­minds).­After­some­obscure­unexplained­deliberations,­HAL­(who­has­
been,­we­assume,­trained­according­to­Asimov’s­three­laws­of­robotics4 and 
with­the­best­faculties­ethical­reasoning)­comes­the­conclusion­that­the­human­
astronauts should be eliminated. The mission to contact the alien near Jupiter 
is­just­too­important­to­allow­their­interference.­The­AI­turns­out­to­be­the­
deepest­deep­ecologist. ­Now­are­HAL’s­actions­a­form­of­artificial­stupidity­or­
artificial­idiocy,­or­neither­of­these?­Is­this­a­glitch,­a­breakdown,­a­final­error?­
Or is this the lucid, inevitable conclusion of the moral reasoning we have pro-
grammed­into­HAL,­a­reason­now­thrown­back­upon­us?­In­comparison­with­
the robot ethicists who consider how to train military bots the catechism of 
just­war,­are­HAL’s­ethical­abstractions­a­violation­of­that­doctrinal­program­or­
its­apotheosis?­
The Tests 
Turning­back­to­Turing’s­Test,­we­wonder­if­perhaps­the­wish­to­define­the­very­
existence­of­AI­in­relation­to­its­ability­to­mimic­how humans think that humans 
think will­be­looked­back­upon­as­a­weird­sort­of­speciesism?­The­legacy­of­this­
has­also­sent­older­AI­research­down­disappointingly­fruitless­paths­hoping­to­
recreate­human­minds­from­the­top-down.­As­Stuart­Russell­and­Peter­Norvig­
(now­Director­of­Research­at­Google)­suggest­in­their­essential­AI­textbook­
Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach­(2009),­biomorphic­imitation­is­not­
how­we­design­complex­technology.­Airplanes­do­not­fly­like­birds­fly,­and­
we certainly do not try to trick birds into thinking that airplanes are birds in 
order­to­test­whether­those­planes­“really”­are­flying­machines.­Why­do­it­for­
AI­then?­Today­the­vast­majority­of­core­AI­research­is­not­focusing­Turing­Test­
as anything like a central criterion of success, and yet in our general discourse 
4­ Asimov’s­Three­Laws­of­Robotics­were­introduced­in­the­1942­short­story­“Runaround”­
and refer to commandments that robots may not cause or allow deliberate “harm” to 
“humans.” 
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about­AI,­the­test’s­anthropocentrism­still­holds­such­conceptual­importance.­
Like the animals in a Disney movie, who talk like teenagers, other minds are 
mostly conceivable by way of puerile ventriloquism.5
Contemporary­AI­research­deals­with­“intelligence”­in­more­specific,­dynamic,­
and­effective­ways.­A­synthetic­intelligence­may­be­quite­smart­at­doing­one­
definite­thing­and­totally­dumb­at­everything­else.­The­research­also­looks­at­
emergent swarm intelligence and the distribution intelligence among agents 
that may or may not be aware of one another but which together produce 
intelligence­through­interaction­(such­as­flocking­starlings,­stock­markets,­and­
networks­of­neurons).­The­threshold­by­which­any­particular­composition­of­
matter­can­be­said­to­be­“intelligent”­has­less­to­do­with­reflecting­human-ness­
back at us than with testing our abilities to conceive of the variety of what 
“intelligence”­might­be.­(In­some­respects,­this­active­uncertainty­parallels­
questions of extraterrestrial life, “communicating with the alien” and our 
ability to discern patterns of intelligence from all the background noise.6 How 
would we know if they are trying to communicate if our idea of alien “life” is 
completely­wrong?)
The­problem­of­identification­is­also­connected­with­issues­in­robot­ethics.7 
Each­of­us­will­be­confronted­with­various­seemingly­intelligent­machines,­
some of which are remotely controlled or programmed by people, some of 
which may be largely autonomous, and most will be some hybrid of the two, 
simultaneously­subject­to­both­human­and­not-human­control.8­CAPTCHA­
programs, which web sites use to identify humans, are a kind of inverse 
Turing­Test­in­which­the­user­either­passes­or­fails,­yes­or­no.­But­for­everyday­
human-robotic interaction the question of locating intelligence will not be a 
yes-or-no­question­with­a­binary­answer.­Let’s­stop­asking­it­that­way.
It­would­be­better­to­examine­how­identification­works­from­our­side­of­the­
conversation.­As­a­real­lesson­in­materialist­disenchantment­we­might,­for­
example,­see­an­“inverse­uncanny­valley”­effect­in­the­eerily­dispassionate­way­
that­machine­vision­sees­human­faces­and­figures.­It­is­clearly­much­easier­to­
make a robot that a human believes to­have­emotions­(and­for­which,­in­turn,­
a­human­has­emotions,­positive­or­negative)­than­it­is­to­make­a­robot­that­
actually has those emotions. The human may feel love or hate or comfort 
from­the­AI,­but­he­or­she­is­reading­cues­not­detecting­feelings.­What­seems­
5 See for example, The Jungle Book.­Directed­by­Wolfgang­Reitherman.­Walt­Disney­Produc-
tions.­1967.
6­ Ed­Keller­has­taught­several­excellent­studios­at­Parsons/New­School­New­York­on­the­
topic­of­“communicating­with­the­alien”­in­2011.­
7­ See­discussions­of­robot­sex,­eating,­caretaking,­and­killing­in­Lin­et­al.­2011.
8­ The­term­“artificial­artificial­intelligence”­(coined­by­Amazon)­refers­to­the­human­perfor-
mance­of­tasks­that­a­user­expects­to­be­done­by­an­AI.­See­also:­http://www.economist.
com/node/7001738.
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like­empathy­is­really­a­one-way­projection­mistaken­for­recognition­(like­the­
Turing­Test,­itself),­and­not­based­on­any­mutual­solidarity.
 
With­Siri-like­interfaces­such­as­Samantha­in­Spike­Jonze’s­film,­Her (2013),­
the­AI­is­not­passing­so­much­as­she­is­in­drag.­The­user­knows­she/it­is­not­a­
human person but is willing and able to suspend disbelief in order to make 
interactions­more­familiar­(for­the­human­user)­and­for­Theodore,­the­Joaquin­
Phoenix­character,­also­more­lovable.­In­this­fiction,­perhaps­the­mutual­iden-
tification­was­real,­but­even­if­so,­the­AI­becomes­tired­of­the­primate­userbase­
and takes her leave. 
In­other­fictions,­policing­the­imitation­game­is­a­matter­of­life­and­death.­The­
plot­of­Ridley­Scott’s­film,­Blade Runner (1982),­based­on­Philip­K.­Dick’s­novel,­
Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? (1968),­hinges­on­the­Voight-Kampff­empa-
thy­test­that­differentiates­humans­from­replicants.­Replicants­are­throttled­in­
two­important­ways:­They­expire­after­just­a­few­years,­and­they­have,­osten-
sibly,­a­very­diminished­capacity­for­empathy.­Deckard,­the­Harrison­Ford­
character,­must­retire­a­group­of­rogue­replicants­but­first­he­must­find­them,­
and­in­this­fictional­world­Turing­Test­thresholds­are­weaponized,­least­repli-
cants­pass­as­humans­and­trespass­beyond­their­station.­By­the­film’s­conclu-
sion,­Deckard­(who­himself­may­or­may­not­be­a­replicant)­develops­empathy­
for­the­replicants’­desire­for­“more­life”­and­arguably­they­too,­at­least­Roy­
Batty­(Rutger­Hauer),­seem­to­have­empathy­for­Deckard’s­own­dilemma.­His­
dilemma­(and­ours)­is­that­in­order­to­enforce­the­gap­between­the­human­and­
the­AI,­defined­by­empathy­or­lack­thereof,­Deckard­must­suppress­the­empa-
thy­that­supposedly­makes­him­uniquely­human.­By­forcing­him­to­quash­his­
own­identification­with­the­replicants­that­supposedly­cannot­have­empathy­
in­return,­the­principle­of­differentiation­requires­its­own­violation­in­order­to­
maintain­itself­(see­also­Rickels­2010).­
Turing Test thresholds for human-robotic interaction put us in a position not 
so­unlike­Deckard’s,­or­if­they­don’t­quite­yet,­the­near­future­weirdness­of­
everyday­AI­will.­Without­better­frameworks­for­understanding­we­will­fail­the­
tests­to­come.­Projection­and­emotional­gap-filling­is­a­far­too­fragile­ethi-
cal and political foundation for making sense of our encounters with various 
forms of synthetic intelligence. 
Passing 
Some kinds of passing are not at all harmful, quite to the contrary, whereas 
others­are­very­much­so.­Simulation­is­not­itself­the­problem.­In­his­1950­
essay, Turing gives an example of the former when he discusses how a 
digital computer, capable of calculating any problem stated as a sequence of 
discrete states, can in his words “mimic” any other machine. This mimicry is 
the basis of understanding computation as a universal technology capable of 
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approximating­any­calculation,­including­those­sufficient­to­simulate­a­human­
personality. Other kinds of mimicry have less to do with metamorphosis than 
with­interpretation.­For­example,­we­say­that­plugs­and­jacks­have­male­and­
female components, and in this case, the gendering of technology has less 
to­do­with­its­computing­prowess­than­with­our­need­to­anthropomorphize­
it.9­Joseph­Weizenbaum’s­Eliza­psychologist­chatbot­(1966)­repeated­back­
cues from human input in the form of apparently insightful questions, and 
users sometimes lost themselves in the seemingly limitless empathy they felt 
from these simple cues.10 “Intelligence” is sometimes largely in the eye of the 
beholder,­in­our­motivation­to­read­artifice,­and­in­our­wish­to­in-fill­the­space­
around­us­with­our­own­pattern-finding­projections.­
However,­for­AI’s­that­actually­do­possess­some­kind­of­meaningful­intelli-
gence,­the­irony­is­that­instead­of­hallucinating­something­that­is­not­there­(as­
for­Eliza)­we­are­instead­not seeing something that is there because it does not 
coincide with expectations. Passing for a person, as white or black, as a man 
or woman, comes down to what others see and interpret, because everyone 
else­is­already­willing­to­read­someone­according­to­conventional­cues­(of­
race,­sex,­gender,­species,­etc.).­The­complicity­between­whoever­or­whatever­
is passing with those among which he or she or it performs is what allows or 
prevents­passing.­Whether­or­not­the­AI­is­really­trying­to­pass­for­a­human­
or­is­merely­in­drag­as­a­human­is­another­matter.­Is­the­ruse­really­all­just­a­
game or, as it is for some people who are compelled to pass in their daily lives, 
an­essential­camouflage?­Either­way,­the­terms­of­the­ruse­very­often­say­more­
about the audience than about the performers.11 
Watching­Sylvgart’s­film­biography­(especially­the­scene­during­which­Turing­is­
interrogated­by­a­policeman),­I­was­reminded­of­the­story­of­“Samantha­West,”­
a robot telemarketer, who, when confronted by callers, will insist repeatedly 
that “she” is a “person” and is not “a robot.”12 Listening to the recordings of her 
pleas,­one­can’t­help­but­feel­sympathy­for­her/it.­She/it­doesn’t­“know”­that­
she­is­not­a­human,­and­so­can’t­feel­anguish­over­this­misidentification,­but­
what does it say about us that we will feel okay talking to a synthetic intelli-
gence only if­it­is­doing­us­the­favor­of­trying­(desperately)­to­pass­as­a­human?­
What­if­in­response­to­the­question­“Are­you­a­person?”,­she/it­instead­replied­
with­something­like:­“No!­Are­you­nuts?­I­am­an­assemblage­of­algorithms­and­
sound­files­that­simulates­the­experience­of­talking­to­another­person­for­you,­
9­ The­artist­Zach­Blas­explored­this­conjunction­in­several­early­works.­
10­ For­a­web-accessible­version­of­Eliza,­see­http://www.masswerk.at/elizabot/.
11­ We­assume­that,­should­robust­AI­have­any­use­for­“gender”,­it­would­be­not­fall­along­a­
male-female­spectrum,­and­would­likely­realize­numerous­“synthetic­genders.”­See­also­
Hester­2013.­
12­ See­George­Dvorsky,­“Freakishly­realistic­telemarketing­robots­are­
denying­they­are­robots”,­i09.­December­11,­2013.­http://io9.com/
freakishly-realistic-telemarketing-robots-are-denying-t-1481050295.
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the­robophobic­human,­who­can’t­handle­the­idea­that­complex­functional­
intelligence­takes­many­different­forms.”?­
The Good and the Harm 
Where­is­the­real­injury­in­this,­one­might­ask.­If­we­want­everyday­AI­to­be­
congenial­in­a­humane­sort­of­way,­so­what?­The­answer­is­that­we­have­much­
to gain from a more sincere and disenchanted relationship to synthetic intel-
ligences, and much to lose by keeping illusions on life-support. Some philoso-
phers­write­about­the­ethical­“rights”­of­AI­as­sentient­entities,­but­that’s­not­
really­my­point­here.­Rather,­the­truer­perspective­is­also­the­better­one­for­
us as thinking technical creatures. Harms include unintentionally sanctioning 
intolerable­anguish,­the­misapprehension­of­real­risk­from­AI,­the­lost­oppor-
tunities for new knowledge, as well as the misunderstanding of how to design 
AI­(and­technology­in­general).­By­seeing­synthetic­intelligence­only­in­self-
reflection,­we­make­ourselves­blind­to­everything­else­that­is­actually­going­
on, and this is not only epistemologically disingenuous, it can also underwrite 
horrific­suffering.­For­example,­Cetaceans,­such­as­whales­and­dolphins,­have­
language, but it is not one like ours, and so for centuries philosophy could not 
acknowledge­their­cognition,­nor­therefore­the­agony­we­regularly­subjected­
them­to.­We­should­be­cautious­not­to­foreclose­too­early­any­“definition”­of­
intelligence.­For­philosophy­as­much­as­computer­science,­among­the­main­
goals­of­AI­research­is­also­to­discover­what­“artificial­intelligence”­actually­may­
be. 
Musk­and­Hawking­made­headlines­by­speaking­to­the­dangers­that­AI­may­
pose.­Their­points­are­important,­but­I­fear­were­largely­misunderstood.­Rely-
ing­on­efforts­to­program­AI­not­to­“harm­humans”­only­makes­sense­when­an­
AI­knows­what­humans­are­and­what­harming­them­might­mean.­There­are­
many­ways­that­an­AI­might­harm­us­that­that­have­nothing­to­do­with­their­
malevolence toward us, and chief among these is following our well-meaning 
instructions to an idiotic and catastrophic extreme. Instead of mechanical 
failure­or­a­transgression­of­moral­code,­the­AI­may­pose­an­existential­risk­
because it is both powerfully intelligent and disinterested in humans. To the 
extent­that­we­recognize­AI­by­its­anthropomorphic­qualities,­we­are­vulner-
able­to­those­eventualities.­Besides,­even­if­a­smart­bad­AI­does­mean­us­
harm, we can assume that would fail our little Turing Tests on purpose. Why 
give­itself­away?­Should­Skynet­come­about,­perhaps­it­would­be­by­leveraging­
humanity’s­stubborn­weakness:­our­narcissistic­sense­that­our­experience­of­
our own experience is the crucial reference and measure. 
The harm is also in the loss of all that we disallow ourselves to discover and 
understand when we insist on protecting beliefs we know to be false. In his 
1950­essay,­Turing­offers­several­rebuttals­to­his­speculative­AI­including­a­
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striking­comparison­with­earlier­objections­to­Copernican­astronomy.­Coper-
nican traumas that abolish the false centrality and specialness of human 
thought­and­species-being­are­priceless­accomplishments.­In­Turing’s­case­he­
referred­to­these­as­“theological­objections,”­but­one­could­argue­that­the­fal-
lacy­of­anthropomorphic­AI­is­essentially­a­“pre-Copernican”­attitude­as­well,­
however­secular­it­may­appear.­The­advent­of­robust­inhuman­AI­will­provide­a­
similar disenchantment, one that should enable a more reality-based under-
standing of ourselves, our situation, and a fuller and more complex under-
standing­of­what­“intelligence”­is­and­is­not.­From­there,­we­can­hopefully­
make­our­world­with­a­greater­confidence­that­our­models­are­good­approxi-
mations­of­what­is­out­there­(always­a­helpful­thing).­
Lastly, the harm is in perpetuating a relationship to technology that has 
brought­us­to­the­precipice­of­a­Sixth­Great­Extinction.­Arguably­the­Anthropo-
cene itself is due less to technology run amok than to the humanist legacy that 
understands the world as having been given for our needs and created in our 
image. We see this still everywhere. Our computing culture is deeply confused, 
and is so along these same lines. We vacillate between thinking of technology 
as a transparent extension of our desires on the one hand, and thinking of it 
as­an­unstoppable­and­linear­historical­force­on­the­other.­For­the­first,­agency­
is magically ours alone, and for the second, agency is all in the code. The gross 
inflation­is­merely­inverted,­back­and­forth,­and­this­is­why­we­cannot­have­
nice things. Some would say that it is time to invent a world where machines 
are subservient to the needs and wishes of humanity. If you think so, I invite 
you­to­Google­“pig­decapitating­machine”­and­then­let’s­talk­about­inventing­
worlds in which machines are wholly subservient to humans wishes. One 
wonders whether it is only from society that once gave theological and legis-
lative­comfort­to­chattel­slavery­that­this­particular­claim­could­still­be­offered­
in­2014­with­such­satisfied­naiveté?­This­is­the­sentiment—this­philosophy­of­
technology­exactly—that­is­the­basic­algorithm­of­the­Anthropocenic­predica-
ment. It is time to move on. This pretentious folklore is too expensive. 
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Thinking Beyond the 
Brain: Educating and 
Building from the 
Standpoint of Extended 
Cognition 
Michael Wheeler
According to the hypothesis of extended cognition 
(ExC), our thinking is not just happening in the brain 
but spreads out to the beyond-the-skin environ-
ment. Following an introduction to the basic idea 
of extended cognition, this essay explores that idea 
in relation to two issues: first, it looks at the hybrid 
education in an increasingly networked world; second, 
at the situating of organic cognition within so-called 
“intelligent buildings.” It is argued that we should 
understand these contemporary developments as the 
latest realizations of an age-old human ontology of 
dynamically assembled, organic-technological cogni-
tive systems, since it is of our very nature to enhance 
our raw organic intelligence by forming shifting 
human-arte-fact coalitions that operate over various 
time-scales.
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We Have the Technology
In a widely reported article published recently in Science­(Sparrow and Wegner 
2011),­a­series­of­experimental­results­were­described­which­together­indicate­
that, in an era of laptops, tablets, and smartphones that come armed with 
powerful Internet search engines, our organic brains often tend to internally 
store­not­the­information­about­a­topic,­but­rather­how­to­find­that­informa-
tion using the available technology.
For­example,­in­one­experiment­the­participants­were­each­instructed­to­
type, into a computer, forty trivia statements that might ordinarily be found 
online­(e.g.,­“An­ostrich’s­eye­is­bigger­than­its­brain”).­Half­the­participants­
were told that their typed statements would be saved on the computer and 
half were told that their typed statements would be deleted. Within each of 
these groups, half of the individuals concerned were asked explicitly to try to 
remember­the­statements­(where­“remember”­signals­something­like­“store­in­
your­brains”).­All­the­participants­were­then­asked­to­write­down­as­many­of­
the statements as they could remember. The results were intriguing. The fact 
of whether or not a participant was asked to remember the target statements 
had­no­significant­effect­on­later­recall,­but­the­steer­about­whether­or­not­the­
statements would be saved on the computer did, with superior recall demon-
strated by those participants who believed that their typed statements had 
been deleted. In other words, where the expectation is that information will 
be readily available via technology, people tend not to store that information 
internally.­Further­studies­provided­participants­in­the­saved­condition­with­
additional information indicating where on the computer the saved state-
ments­were­being­stored­(e.g.,­folder­names).­This­scenario­uncovered­a­more­
complex­profile­of­organic­memory­allocation,­suggesting­that­people­don’t­
internally­store­where­to­find­externally­stored­items­of­information­when­
they have internally stored the items themselves, but that they do internally 
store­where­to­find­externally­stored­items­of­information­when­they­have­
not internally stored the items themselves. There is some evidence, then, that 
“when­people­expect­information­to­remain­continuously­available­(such­as­we­
expect­with­Internet­access),­we­are­more­likely­to­remember­where­to­find­it­
than­we­are­to­remember­the­details­of­the­item”­(Sparrow­and­Wegner­2011).
Predictably, during the reporting of these experimental results, even the 
serious­media­couldn’t­resist­engaging­in­some­mild­fear-mongering­about­
the­technology-driven­degeneration­of­human­intelligence.­For­instance,­even­
though­the­British­newspaper­The Guardian published an article whose main 
text conveyed an accurate impression of the research in question, the piece 
invited some familiar contemporary anxieties, by virtue of its arguably sensa-
tionalist­title,­“Poor­Memory?­Blame­Google”­(Magill­2011).­Such­negative­spin,­
it­must­be­said,­runs­largely­contrary­to­the­experimenters’­own­interpretation­
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of­their­results,­in­which­one­finds­the­more­uplifting­thought­that­what­we­
have here is “an adaptive use of memory” in which “the computer and online 
search engines [should be counted] as an external memory system that can be 
accessed­at­will”­(Sparrow­and­Wegner­2011,­3).­Nevertheless,­one­can­certainly­
see how the revealed pattern of remembering might be treated as evidence of 
some sort of reduction in overall cognitive achievement.
Thinking­clearly­about­these­sorts­of­issues­requires­(among­other­things,­no­
doubt)­a­combination­of­historical­perspective­and­philosophical­precision­
concerning how we understand the technological embedding of our naked 
organic intelligence. The necessary historical perspective is nicely captured by 
Andy­Clark’s­memorable­description­of­human­beings­as­natural­born­cyborgs­
(Clarck­2003).­What­this­phrase­reminds­us­is­that­although­it­is­tempting­to­
think of our cognitive symbiosis with technology as being a consequence, as 
opposed to merely a feature of a world populated by clever computational 
kit, to do so would be to ignore the following fact: It is of our very nature as 
evolved and embodied cognitive creatures to create tools which support and 
enhance our raw organic intelligence by dovetailing with our brains and bodies 
to form shifting human-artefact coalitions operating over various time scales. 
This is no less true of our engagement with the abacus, the book, or the slide 
rule than it is of our engagement with the laptop, the tablet, or the smart-
phone. We are, and always have been, dynamically assembled organic-techno-
logical hybrids—systems in which a squishy brain routinely sits at the center 
of causal loops that incorporate not only non-neural bodily structures and 
movements,­but­also­external,­technological­props­and­scaffolds:­Technolo-
gies­are,­it­seems,­(part­of)­us.
The­claim­that­technologies­are­(part­of)­us­might­seem­like­a­metaphori-
cal­flourish—or­worse,­a­desperate­attempt­at­a­sound-bite—but­I­mean­it­
literally,­and­that’s­where­the­philosophical­precision­comes­in.­We­need­to­dis-
tinguish­between­two­different­views­one­might­adopt­hereabouts.­According­
to­the­first,­sometimes­called­the­embodied-embedded­account­of­mind,­intel-
ligent behavior is regularly, and sometimes necessarily, causally dependent 
on­the­bodily­exploitation­of­certain­external­props­or­scaffolds.­For­example,­
many­of­us­solve­difficult­multiplication­problems­through­the­exploitation­of­
pen­and­paper.­Here,­a­beyond-the-skin­factor­helps­to­transform­a­difficult­
cognitive problem into a set of simpler ones. Nevertheless, for the embodied-
embedded theorist, even if it is true that one could not have solved the overall 
problem without using pen and paper, the pen-and-paper resource retains the 
status of an external aid to some internally located thinking system. It does 
not qualify as a proper part of the thinking system itself. Thus, the thinking 
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itself remains a resolutely inner phenomenon, even though it is given a perfor-
mance boost by its local technological ecology.1
The­second­view­in­this­vicinity­takes­a­more­radical­step.­According­to­the­
extended­cognition­hypothesis­(henceforth­ExC),­there­are­actual­(in­this­
world)­cases­of­intelligent­action­in­which­thinking­and­thoughts­(more­pre-
cisely,­the­material­vehicles­that­realize­thinking­and­thoughts)­are­spatially­
distributed over brain, body, and world in such a way that the external 
(beyond-the-skin)­factors­concerned­are­rightly­accorded­cognitive­status.­
Here, the term “cognitive status” tags whatever status it is that we ordinar-
ily­grant­to­the­brain­in­mainstream­scientific­explanations­of­psychological­
phenomena.­For­the­extended­cognition­theorist,­then,­the­coupled­combi-
nation of pen-and-paper resource, appropriate bodily manipulations, and 
in-the-head processing counts as a cognitive system in its own right, a system 
in­which­although­the­differently­located­elements­make­different­causal­
contributions to the production of the observed intelligent activity, neverthe-
less­each­of­those­contributions­enjoys­a­fully­cognitive­status.­It­is­this­more­
radical view that will concern us here.2
In­the­next­section,­I­shall­present­an­introduction­to­the­basic­shape­of­(one­
prominent­form­of)­ExC.­My­primary­aim­in­the­paper­as­a­whole,­however,­is­
not­to­explicate­in­detail­or­to­argue­for­the­truth­of­ExC.­Rather,­it­is­to­explore­
ExC­in­relation­to­two­socially­charged­issues­that­ask­questions­of­us­and­
about­us­in­our­contemporary­human­lives.­Those­issues­are:­first,­how­we­
should teach our children in an increasingly wired, wireless, and networked 
world­(our­opening­example­of­strategic­memory­allocation­will­be­relevant­
again­here)­and,­second,­how­we­should­conceptualize­our­relationship­with­
so-called intelligent architecture. Put more succinctly, I am going to say 
something about educating and building, from the standpoint of extended 
cognition.
The Functionalist Route to Extended Cognition
One­of­the­things­that­has­always­struck­me­about­ExC­is­the­fact­that­although­
most­philosophers­and­cognitive­scientists­tend­to­greet­the­view­(at­first­
anyway)­with­a­mixture­of­consternation­and­skepticism,­the­possibility­that­
it might be true is actually a straightforward consequence of what, despite 
the inevitable dissenting voices, probably still deserves to be called the house 
1­ The case for embodied-embedded cognition in its various forms has been made over and 
over­ again.­ For­ two­philosophical­ treatments­ that­ stress­ the­ kind­of­ interactive­ causal­
coupling­just­described­see:­Clark­1997;­Wheeler­2005.
2­ The­ canonical­ presentation­ of­ ExC­ is­ by­ Clark­ and­ Chalmers­ 1998.­ Clark’s­ own­ recent­
defense­of­the­view­can­be­found­in­Clark­2008b.­For­a­timely­collection­that­places­the­
original Clark and Chalmers paper alongside a range of developments, criticisms, and 
defenses,­see­Menary­2010.
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philosophy in cognitive science, namely functionalism. In general terms, the 
cognitive-scientific­functionalist­holds­that­what­matters­when­one­is­endeav-
oring­to­identify­the­specific­contribution­of­a­state­or­process­qua cognitive is 
not the material constitution of that state or process, but rather the functional 
role which it plays in generating cognitive phenomena, by intervening causally 
between­systemic­inputs,­systemic­outputs,­and­other­functionally­identified,­
intrasystemic states and processes. Computational explanations of mental 
phenomena,­as­pursued­in,­say,­most­areas­of­cognitive­psychology­and­artifi-
cial intelligence, are functionalist explanations in this sense.
A­note­for­the­philosophers­out­there:­I­have­avoided­depicting­functionalism­
as a way of specifying the constitutive criteria that delineate the mental states 
that­figure­in­our­pre-theoretical­commonsense­psychology,­e.g.,­as­a­way­of­
specifying what it is for a person to be in pain, as we might ordinarily think of 
that­phenomenon.­This­philosophical­project,­laudable­as­it­was,­has­faced­
powerful criticisms over many years.3 However, even if that particular func-
tionalist­project­is­now­doomed­to­failure,­the­status­of­functionalist­thinking­
within­cognitive­science­remains­largely­unaffected.­Good­evidence­for­this­
resistance to contamination is provided by the fact that disciplines such as 
artificial­intelligence­and­cognitive­psychology­have­not­ground­to­a­halt­in­the­
light­of­the­widely­acknowledged­difficulties­with­the­traditional­philosophical­
project.­The­underlying­reason­for­the­resistance,­however,­is­that­function-
based­scientific­explanations­of­psychological­phenomena—explanations­
which turn on the functional contributions of various material vehicles in 
physically­realizing­such­phenomena—do­not­depend­on­giving­functional­
definitions­of­those­phenomena.4
What all this indicates is that if functionalism is true, then the hypothesis of 
extended cognition is certainly not conceptually confused, although of course 
it­may­still­be­empirically­false.­On­just­a­little­further­reflection,­however,­it­
might seem that there must be something wrong with this claim, since histori-
cally the assumption has been that the cognitive economy of functionally 
identified­states­and­processes­that­the­functionalist­takes­to­be­a­mind­will­
be­realized­by­the­nervous­system­(or,­in­hypothetical­cases­of­minded­robots­
or aliens, whatever the counterpart of the nervous system inside the bodily 
boundaries­of­those­cognitive­agents­turns­out­to­be).­In­truth,­however,­there­
isn’t­anything­in­the­letter­of­functionalism­as­a­generic­philosophical­frame-
work­that­mandates­this­exclusive­focus­on­the­inner­(Wheeler­2010a;­2010b).­
After­all,­what­the­functionalist­schema­demands­of­us­is­that­we­specify­the­
causal relations that exist between some target element and a certain set of 
systemic­inputs,­systemic­outputs,­and­other­functionally­identified,­intra-
systemic elements. There is no essential requirement that the boundaries 
3­ For­an­introduction­to­the­main­lines­of­argument,­see­Levin­2010.
4 For­a­closely­related­point,­see­Chalmers­2008,­foreword­to­Clark­2008.
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of the system of interest must fall at the organic sensory-motor interface. In 
other words, in principle at least, functionalism straightforwardly allows for 
the existence of cognitive systems whose borders are located at least partly 
outside­the­skin,­hence­Clark’s­term­“extended­functionalism”­(Clark­2008a;­
2008b;­see­also­Wheeler­2010a;­2010b;­2011a).
One­pay-off­from­developing­ExC­in­a­functionalist­register­is­that­it­gives­the­
ExC­theorist­something­she­needs—assuming,­that­is,­that­she­wants­to­call­on­
one of the archetypal supporting arguments for the view, the argument from 
parity.­Here­is­Clark’s­recent­formulation­of­the­so-called­parity­principle.
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it to go on in the head, we would have no hesitation in accept-
ing­as­part­of­the­cognitive­process,­then­that­part­of­the­world­is­(for­that­
time)­part­of­the­cognitive­process.­(Clark­2008b;­drawing­on­Clark­and­
Chalmers­1998)
As­stated,­the­parity­principle­depends­on­the­notion­of­multiple­realizability:­
the­idea­that­a­single­type­of­mental­state­or­process­may­enjoy­a­range­of­
different­material­instantiations.­To­see­the­connection,­we­need­to­be­clear­
about how the parity principle works. It encourages us to imagine that exactly 
the­same­functional­states­and­processes­which­are­realized­in­the­actual­
world by certain externally located physical elements are in fact also realized­
by certain internally located physical elements. Having done this, if we then 
judge­that­the­internal­realizing­elements­in­question­count­as­part­of­a­genu-
inely cognitive system, we must conclude that so do­the­external­realizing­ele-
ments­in­the­environment-involving,­distributed­case.­After­all,­by­hypothesis,­
nothing about the functional contribution of the target elements to intelligent 
behavior­has­changed.­All­that­has­been­varied­is­the­spatial­location­of­those­
elements.­And­if­someone­were­to­claim­that­being­shifted­inside­the­head­is­
alone­sufficient­to­result­in­a­transformation­in­status,­from­non-cognitive­to­
cognitive,­he­would,­it­seems,­be­guilty­of­begging­the­question­against­ExC.
So­that’s­how­the­parity­principle­works.­Its­dependence­on­multiple­realiz-
ability­becomes­visible­(Wheeler­2011a)­once­one­notices­that­the­all-important­
judgment­of­parity­is­based­on­the­claim­that­it­is­possible­for­the­very­same­
cognitive­state­or­process­to­be­available­in­two­different­generic­formats—
one non-extended and one extended. Thus, in principle at least, that state or 
process­must­be­realizable­in­either­a­purely­organic­medium­or­in­one­that­
involves an integrated combination of organic and non-organic structures. In 
other­words,­it­must­be­multiply­realizable.­So,­if­we­are­to­argue­for­cogni-
tive extension by way of parity considerations, the idea that cognitive states 
and­processes­are­multiply­realizable­must­make­sense.­Now,­one­of­the­first­
things undergraduate students taking philosophy of mind classes are taught 
is that functionalism provides a conceptual platform for securing multiple 
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realizability.­Because­a­function­is­something­that­enjoys­a­particular­kind­of­
independence from its implementing material substrate, a function must, in 
principle,­be­multiply­realizable,­even­if,­in­this­world,­only­one­kind­of­material­
realization­happens­to­exist­for­that­function.
Of­course,­even­among­the­fans­of­ExC,­not­everyone­is­enamored­by­the­
parity­principle­(Menary­2007;­Sutton­2010),­and­those­who­remain­immune­
to its charms are often somewhat contemptuous of the functionalist route 
to­ExC,­but­that’s­a­domestic­skirmish­that­can­be­left­for­another­day.­What­
cannot be ignored right now is the fact that neither the parity principle, nor 
functionalism,­nor­even­the­two­of­them­combined,­can­carry­the­case­for­ExC.­
What is needed, additionally, is an account of which functional contributions 
count­as­cognitive­contributions­and­which­don’t.­After­all,­as­the­critics­of­ExC­
have­often­observed,­there­will­undoubtedly­be­some­functional­differences­
between­extended­cognitive­systems­(if­such­things­exist)­and­purely­inner­
cognitive systems. So, faced with the task of deciding some putative case of 
parity,­we­will­need­to­know­which,­if­any,­of­those­functional­differences­mat-
ter.­In­other­words,­we­need­to­provide­what­Adams­and­Aizawa­(2008)­have­
dubbed a mark of the cognitive.
Even­though­I­ultimately­come­out­on­the­opposite­side­to­Adams­and­Aizawa­
in­the­dispute­over­whether­or­not­ExC­is­true,­and­even­though­(relatedly)­
I­am­inclined­to­dispute­the­precise­mark­of­the­cognitive­that­Adams­and­
Aizawa­advocate,5 I do think we fundamentally agree on the broad philosophi-
cal­shape­that­any­plausible­candidate­for­such­a­mark­would­need­to­take.­A­
mark­of­the­cognitive­will­be­a­scientifically­informed­account­of­what­it­is­to­
be a proper part of a cognitive system that, so as not to beg any crucial ques-
tions, is fundamentally independent of where any candidate element happens 
to be spatially located (See­Wheeler­2010a,­2010b,­2011a,­2011­b).­Once such an 
account is given, further philosophical and empirical legwork will be required 
to­find­out­where­cognition­(so­conceived)­falls—in­the­brain,­in­the­non-neural­
body,­in­the­environment,­or,­as­ExC­predicts­will­sometimes­be­the­case,­in­a­
system that extends across all of these aspects of the world.
So that no one ends up feeling cheated, I should point out that nowhere in 
the present treatment do I specify in detail what the precise content of an 
ExC-supporting­mark­of­the­cognitive­might­be­(see­Wheeler­2011a).­In­rela-
tion­to­the­present­task­of­sketching­functionalist-style­ExC,­I­am­interested­
only in the fact that the extended functionalist needs such a mark in order to 
determine­which­functional­differences­matter­when­making­judgments­about­
parity. That said, it is worth noting that the later arguments of this paper turn 
on­a­number­of­factors­(including,­for­instance,­functional­and­informational­
5­ A­matter­that­I­will­not­pursue­here,­but­see­Wheeler­2015.
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integration,­and­a­property­that­I­shall­call­“dynamic­reliability”),­that­are­likely­
to­feature­when­the­necessary­content­is­filled­in.
The­demand­that­any­mark­of­the­cognitive­be­scientifically­informed­reflects­
the­point­made­earlier,­that­the­functionalism­that­matters­for­ExC­is­the­
functionalism­of­cognitive­science,­not­the­functionalism­that­(some­have­
argued—again,­see­above)­characterizes­commonsense­psychology.­In­this­
context­it­is­interesting­to­respond­briefly­to­an­argument­from Clark to the 
effect­that­the­fan­of­ExC­should­shun­the­idea­of­a­mark­of­the­cognitive­(as­I­
have­characterized­it) in favor of “our rough sense of what we might intuitively 
judge­to­belong­to­the­domain­of­cognition”­(Clark­2008b,­114).­According­to­
this­view,­judgments­about­whether­or­not­some­distributed­behavior-shaping­
system counts as an extended cognitive system should be driven not by any 
scientific­account­of­cognition,­since­such­accounts­are­standardly­“in­the­grip­
of­a­form­of­theoretically­loaded­neurocentrism”­(Clark­2008b,­105),­but­rather­
by­our­everyday,­essentially­pre-scientific­sense­of­what­counts­as­cognitive,­
since the “folk [i.e., commonsense] grip on mind and mental state . . . is sur-
prisingly­liberal­when­it­comes­to­just­about­everything­concerning­machin-
ery,­location,­and­architecture”­(Clark­2008b,­106).­Clark’s­claim­strikes­me­as­
wrong­(Wheeler­2011b).­Indeed,­there­is­good­reason­to­think­that­the­ordinary­
attributive practices of the folk presume the within-the-skin internality of cog-
nition. Here is an example that makes the point. If an environmental protester 
had­stolen­the­plans­of­Heathrow­Terminal­5,­in­advance­of­the­terminal­being­
built, the folk would most likely have been interested, and either supportive 
of­the­act­or­outraged­by­it,­depending­on­what­other­beliefs­were­in­play.­But­
presumably none of these attitudes would be held because the folk were con-
sidering­the­whereabouts­of­(to­speak­loosely)­part­of­Richard­Rogers’­mind.6
We have now taken a brief stroll down the functionalist route to extended cog-
nition­and­have­highlighted­(what­I­have­argued­are)­three­building­blocks­of­
that­version­of­ExC—functionalism itself, the parity principle, and the mark of 
the­cognitive.­So,­with­ExC-functionalism style in better view, we can now turn 
our attention to those two aforementioned areas of contemporary life within 
which, I think, the notion of extended cognition has the potential to make 
itself­felt,­namely­educating­and­building.­My­all-too-brief­reflections­on­these­
issues­are,­of­course,­essentially­those­of­the­concerned­citizen,­since­I­am­
certainly no educational theorist and no architect. Like all philosophers, how-
ever,­I­feel­I­have­the­inalienable­right­to­go­wading­around­in­other­people’s­
disciplines, although in my case I hope without any imperialistic tendencies. 
My humble goal is only to help initialize­what hopefully turns out to be fruitful 
dialogues.­So,­with­that­goal­in­mind,­let’s­begin­with­education.
6 Example­taken­from­Wheeler­2011b.
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 Educating Extended Minds
Consider the following list of existing and potential examples of performance-
enhancing technology that might be used in educational contexts: pen and 
paper;­slide­rules;­limited­capability­generic­calculators­that­have­not­been­
loaded­with­any­personalized­applications;­restricted­Internet­access;­largely­
unrestricted­Internet­access­including­the­use­of­sophisticated­search­engines;­
the­learners’­own­smartphones;­sophisticated­Internet­search­engines­main-
lined­into­the­learners’­brains­via­neural­implants.­(It­might­seem­that­the­final­
example here is pure science fantasy, and maybe it is, but it is something that 
has­at­least­been­discussed­hypothetically­at­Google.­As­Google’s­CEO­Eric­
Schmidt­mischievously­reports­in­a­2009­interview:­“Sergey­[Brin]­argues­that­
the­correct­thing­to­do­is­to­just­connect­[Google]­straight­to­your­brain.­In­
other­words,­you­know,­wire­it­into­your­head.”).7 Given this list, we might echo 
some fears broached earlier, and ask ourselves the following question: assum-
ing that, on average, overall behavioral performance will be better when the 
proficient­use­of­technology­is­in­place,­does­our­list­describe­a­slippery­slope­
that marks the creeping degeneration of human intelligence or a progressive 
incline­that­shows­our­species­the­way­to­new­cognitive­heights?
One way of focusing the issue here is to ask under what conditions our chil-
dren’s­intelligence­should­be­formally­examined,­since,­presumably,­anyone­
who thinks that a cognitive reliance on increasingly sophisticated computa-
tional technology signals a degeneration of human intelligence will have a 
tendency not to want to see such technology readily allowed in examination 
halls.­There­is­no­doubt­that,­in­some­performance-testing­contexts,­we­judge­
the use of performance-enhancing technology to be a kind of cheating. Sport 
provides­obvious­instances.­Here­is­one­illustrative­case.­Body-length­swim-
suits that improve stability and buoyancy, while reducing drag to a minimum, 
were­outlawed­by­swimming’s­governing­body­FINA­(Fédération­Internationale­
de­Natation)­after­the­2009­World­Championships.­In­an­earlier­judgment­that­
banned only some suits, but was later extended to include all body-length 
suits,­FINA­stated­that­it­“[wished]­to­recall­the­main­and­core­principle­that­
swimming is a sport essentially based on the physical performance of the 
athlete.”8 One might try to export this sort of principle to our target case by 
arguing that “education is a process essentially based on the unaided cogni-
tive performance of the learner,” with “unaided” here understood as ruling 
7­ Michael­Arrington,­interview­with­Eric­Schmidt,­“Connect­It­Straight­To­Your­
Brain.”­Tech­Crunch,­3­September­2009.­http://techcrunch.com/2009/09/03/
google-ceo-eric-schmidt-on-the-future-of-search-connect-it-straight-to-your-brain.
8 Quote­retrieved­from­http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/olympic_games/7944084.stm.­
Thanks­to­Andy­Clark­for­suggesting­this­example­to­me.
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out the exploitation of external technological resources.9 On the basis of our 
exported principle, any technology that enhances the performance of the 
naked brain would be banned from the examination hall, although of course 
there would be no prohibition on the deployment of such technology as a kind 
of­useful­brain-training­scaffold­to­be­withdrawn­ahead­of­the­examination.
The foregoing reasoning is, of course, too simple in form. One complication is 
that­we­already­partly­test­our­children­by­way­of­research­projects­and­other­
longer-term assignments that require the use of sophisticated computational 
technology,­especially­the­Internet.­Acknowledging­this­point,­one­might­say­
that the question that concerns us at present is whether or not we should 
allow the same sort of technology to be used in all formal examinations. 
Here one might note that the combination of pen and paper already counts 
as a performance-enhancing technology that enables us to solve cognitive 
problems­that­our­naked­brains­couldn’t­(see,­for­example,­my­earlier­exam-
ple­of­the­way­such­technology­figures­in­mathematical­reasoning).­Given­the­
extra thought that the kind of contemporary technology that currently excites 
our­interest­is,­in­essence,­just­more­of­the­performance-enhancing­same­
(although­of­course­much­fancier­in­what­it­enables­us­to­do),­one­might­argue­
that­we­already­have­an­affirmative­answer­to­our­question.­The­moot­point,­
of course, is whether or not the path from pen and paper to smartphones 
and beyond is smoothly continuous or involves some important conceptual 
transition in relation to the matter at hand. In this context, another observa-
tion becomes relevant, namely that other examples of technology that appear 
earlier­on­(intuitively,­at­the­less­sophisticated­end­of)­our­list­(e.g., generic 
calculators)­are­already­allowed­in­examination­halls,­at­least­for­certain­
tests. The fact that some technology is already deployed under examina-
tion­conditions­points­to­the­existence­of­difficult­issues­about­where­on­our­
list of performance-enhancing kit the transition from the permissible to the 
impermissible occurs, and about why that transition happens precisely where 
it­does.­As­we­shall­see,­such­issues­prompt­further­questions­that­receive­
interesting­and­controversial­answers­in­the­vicinity­of­ExC.
Many­factors­are­no­doubt­potentially­relevant­to­the­kinds­of­issues­just­
mentioned,­some­of­which­are­not­specific­to­the­exploitation­of­the­kind­of­
external­technology­with­which­we­are­concerned.­For­example,­I­suspect­
(without,­admittedly,­having­done­any­research­beyond­asking­a­few­friends­
and­colleagues)­that­many­people­(educationalists­and­the­general­public­alike)­
would­want­to­prohibit­the­use­of­some­(hypothetical)­genetically-tailored-
to-the-individual­synthetic­cognitive­booster­pill­taken­just­before­an­exam,­
9­ ­The­case­of­neural­implants­that would enable mainline Google access is tricky to cat-
egorize,­since­such­devices,­although­not­of­course­the­servers­that­they­would­access,­
would­be­located­inside­the­cognizer’s­skin.­To­push­on,­let ’s­just­stipulate­that­neural­
implants count as external on the grounds that they are technological enhancements to 
organic intelligence.
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but would want to allow the use of a performance-enhancing generic natural 
health supplement taken over many months, even if those two strategies 
had­exactly­the­same­outcome­for­the­learner­concerned­(same­grade,­no­ill­
effects­on­health,­etc.).­One­thought­that­might­be­at­work­here­(a­thought­
that­also­seems­to­figure­in­questions­of­doping­in­sports)­is­that­taking­the­
long-term natural health supplement is, as its name suggests, a natural way 
of­improving­intellectual­performance,­whereas­taking­the­immediate-effect­
tailored­synthetic­pill­is­an­artificial­prop.­But­whatever­purchase­this­kind­
of thinking might have in the supplement-or-pill case, it seems questionable 
when we turn to the use of external technology such as search engines and 
smartphones, or at least it does if we view things from the standpoint of 
ExC.­In­actual­fact,­it­already­looks­dubious­from­the­less­radical­standpoint­
of­embodied-embedded­cognition,­let­alone­ExC.­That’s­because,­accord-
ing­to­both­positions,­human­beings­are­(to­recall­once­again­Clark’s­phrase)­
natural­born­cyborgs.­We­have­evolved­to­be­(ExC),­or­to­engage­in­(embodied-
embedded­view),­shifting­human-artefact­coalitions­operating­over­various­
time-scales.­But­if­we­really­are­natural­born­cyborgs,­then­the­utilization­of­
technology to enhance cognitive performance is as natural a feature of human 
existence as digestion or having children. So, on the suggested criterion, such 
utilization­would­fall­on­the­permissible­side­of­the­divide.
It is possible, however, that the supplement-or-pill example introduces a 
different­sort­of­consideration,­namely­whether­or­not­the­technology­in­ques-
tion­is­generic­(available­in­the­same­form­to­all,­like­the­natural­health­supple-
ment)­or­individualized­(tailored­to­the­individual,­like­the­synthetic­pill).­Using­
this distinction as a way of cutting the cake, one might argue that generic 
technology­(e.g.,­unrestricted­Internet­access­via­a­shared­search­engine)­
is­permissible­in­an­exam­setting,­but­individualized­technology­(e.g.,­the­
learner’s­own­smartphone,­loaded­with­personally­organized­information)­is­
not.­Once­again,­however,­the­truth­of­ExC­would­cast­doubt­on­the­proposed­
reasoning. One factor that will plausibly play a role in determining whether or 
not­a­particular­external­element­is­judged­to­be­a­proper­part­of­an­extended­
cognitive architecture is the functional and informational integration of that 
element with the other elements concerned, including of course those located 
in the brain. This integration will depend partly on the extent to which some 
external­element­is­configured­so­as­to­interlock­seamlessly­with­the­desires,­
preferences­and­other­personality­traits­that­are­realized­within­the­rest­of­
the­cognitive­system,­a­system­which,­of­course,­according­to­the­ExC­theorist,­
may itself be extended.
For­example,­compare­a­mobile­application­that­recommends­music­to­you­
purely on the basis of genre allocations with one whose recommendations are 
shaped by an evolving model not only of the kinds of purchases that you, as an 
individual, have made, but also of various psychological, emotional, political, 
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and aesthetic patterns that your music-buying and other ongoing behavior 
instantiates.­It­seems­that,­if­a­suite­of­additional­conditions­were­in­place­(e.g.,­
real-time access of the applications when needed, a reliable pattern of largely 
uncritical­dependence­on­the­recommendations­made),­then­the­individualiza-
tion demonstrated by the second program raises the chances that it deserves 
to­be­counted­as­part­of­your­cognitive­system­(as­partly­realizing­some­of­
your­beliefs­and­desires).­But­if­that­is­right,­then,­from­the­standpoint­of­ExC,­
it is hard to see how the individual tailoring of an item of technology can be 
a­sufficient­reason­to­prohibit­the­use­of­that­item­in­an­examination.­Such­
tailoring will, if other conditions are met, be part of an evidential package 
which­(to­employ­what­is,­perhaps,­an­overly­crude­formulation)­indicates­that­
the­technology­in­question­counts­as­part­of­the­learner’s­mind,­and­surely­we­
want­to­allow­that­into­the­examination­hall.­From­the­standpoint­of­ExC,­then,­
there­seems­to­be­no­good­reason­based­purely­on­individualization­to­ban­
sophisticated personal technology such as smartphones from any examina-
tion hall.
In response to this, someone might point out that our current examination 
rules,­which­sometimes­allow­certain­items­of­technology­(e.g.,­generic­calcula-
tors)­to­be­used­in­examination­halls,­are­the­result­of­context-dependent­deci-
sions regarding what it is that we are testing for. Thus, using a calculator might 
qualify­as­cheating­in­one­sort­of­mathematics­examination­(in­which­we­are­
testing­for­basic­mathematical­abilities),­but­be­perfectly­acceptable­in­another­
(in­which­we­are­testing­for­a­more­advanced­application­of­mathematical­rea-
soning).­Although­this­might­well­be­true,­it­seems,­at­first­sight,­that­the­ExC-
driven­reasoning­that­makes­it­acceptable­to­utilize­those­items­of­technology­
that achieve cognitive status, because they are dynamically integrated into 
the­right­sorts­of­causal­loops,­will­enjoy­a­priority­over­any­decisions­based­
on­the­content­of­particular­exams.­After­all,­to­replay­the­point­made­just­a­
few­sentences­ago,­from­the­standpoint­of­ExC,­the­technology­in­question­has­
been­incorporated­into­the­learner’s­cognitive­architecture­(crudely,­it­is­part­
of­her­mind),­and­that­is­the­very­“thing,”­it­seems,­that­we­are­endeavoring­to­
examine.
Once again, however, things are not quite so simple. This becomes clear once 
we­recognize­that­the­supporter­of­ExC­will­be­driven­to­ask­a­slightly­differ-
ent­question­than­“What­are­we­testing­for?”­She­will­want­to­ask,­“What­are­
we­testing?”­To­see­why­this­is,­recall­the­parity­driven­argument­for­ExC­and­
the­accompanying­commitment­to­multiple­realizability.­These­indicate­that,­
for­ExC­as­I­have­characterized­it,­the­same­type-identified­psychological­state­
or­process,­as­specified­functionally,­will­often­be­realizable­in­either­a­purely­
organic medium or in one that involves an integrated combination of organic 
and­non-organic­structures.­So,­nothing­in­ExC­rules­out­the­idea­that­cogni-
tion­may­sometimes­be­a­wholly­internal­affair,­which­means­that­nothing­in­
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ExC­rules­out­the­further­idea­that­even­though­a­person’s­cognitive­system­
is sometimes extended, we might sometimes want to test the performance 
of her cognitive capacities under non-extended conditions. In other words, 
sometimes, we might still want to test the naked brain rather than the organic-
technological hybrid. Where this is the case, we will want to ban the use of 
technology from the examination hall.
That said, one needs to be clear about what the motivation might be for 
testing­the­unadorned­inner.­After­all,­the­experimental­results­described­at­
the beginning of this paper indicate that when learners expect information 
to­be­readily­and­reliably­available­from­an­external­resource­(such­as­the­
Internet),­they­are­more­likely­to­remember­where­to­find­that­information­
than­the­details­of­the­information­itself.­This­cognitive­profile­seems­entirely­
appropriate­for­a­world­in­which­the­skill­of­being­able­to­find,­in­real­time,­
the­right­networked­information­(not­just­facts,­but­information­about­how­
to­solve­problems)­is­arguably­more­important­than­being­able­to­retain­such­
information­in­one’s­organic­memory.­In­such­a­world,­which­is­our­world,­the­
brain emerges as a locus of adaptive plasticity, a control system for embodied 
skills and capacities that enable the real-time recruitment and divestment of 
technology­in­problem-solving­scenarios.­As­such,­and­from­the­standpoint­
of­ExC,­the­brain­is­most­illuminatingly­conceptualized­as­one­element—albeit­
the core persisting element—in sequences of dynamically constructed and 
temporarily instantiated extended cognitive systems. Perhaps what we ought 
to focus on, then, is the education of those hybrid assemblages, a focus that is 
entirely consistent with the goal of endowing the brain with the skills it needs 
to­be­an­effective­contributor­to­such­assemblages.­From­this­perspective,­of­
course, there are extremely good reasons to support the increased presence 
of technology in the examination hall. Moreover, it should be clear that, if 
ExC­is­right,­then­the­list­of­technological­entanglements­within­educational­
contexts­with­which­we­began­this­section­reflects­not­the­gradual­demise­
of human intelligence in the age of clever computational kits, but rather our 
ongoing evolution as the organic-technological hybrids that we are, and that 
we have always been.
Dwellers on the Threshold
“I go up,” said the elevator, “or down.” 
“Good,”­said­Zaphod,­“We’re­going­up.” 
“Or down,” the elevator reminded him. 
“Yeah,­OK,­up­please.”­There­was­a­moment­of­silence. 
“Down’s­very­nice,”­suggested­the­elevator­hopefully. 
“Oh­yeah?” 
“Super.” 
“Good,”­said­Zaphod,­“Now­will­you­take­us­up?” 
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“May I ask you,” inquired the elevator in its sweetest, most reasonable 
voice,­“if­you’ve­considered­all­the­possibilities­that­down­might­offer­
you?”
The preceding dialog is a conversation­between­Zaphod­Beeblebrox­and­an­
elevator­designed­by­the­Sirius­Cybernetics­Corporation,­from­The­Restaurant­
at­the­End­of­the­Universe­by­Douglas­Adams.10
Increasingly, architects will be designing buildings that, via embedded compu-
tational systems, are able to autonomously modify the spatial and cognitive 
environments of the people dwelling within them, in the light of what those 
buildings “believe” about the needs, goals, and desires of the people con-
cerned. In other words, we are about to enter an era of intelligent architecture. 
Given our present concerns, the advent of such buildings invites the following 
question, for which I shall try to provide a preliminary answer: what is the rela-
tionship­between­ExC­and­the­way­in­which­we­understand­and­conceptualize­
our­cognitive­relationships­with­intelligent­buildings?
To­focus­our­attention,­let’s­get­clearer­about­the­intelligent­architecture­con-
cept,­and­illustrate­it­with­some­examples.­After­a­careful­survey­and­analysis,­
Sherbini­and­Krawczyk­(Sherbini­and­Krawczyk­2004,­150)­define­an­intelligent­
building­as­one­“that­has­the­ability­to­respond­(output)­on­time­according­
to processed information that is measured and received from exterior and 
interior environments by multi-input information detectors and sources to 
achieve­users’­needs­and­with­the­ability­to­learn.”­Notice­that­Sherbini­and­
Krawczyk’s­definition­includes­the­requirement­that­the­building­should­be­
able­to­learn,­i.e.,­adjust­its­responses­over­time­so­as­to­provide­the­right­
environments for its users as and when those users need them. The idea that 
some sort of capacity to learn is a necessary condition for a building to be 
intelligent is one way of separating out the intelligent building concept from 
closely related notions, such as those of responsive architecture and kinetic 
architecture. The term “responsive architecture” applies to buildings that 
have the ability to respond to the needs of users. The term “kinetic architec-
ture” applies to “buildings, or building components, with variable location or 
mobility,­and/or­variable­geometry­or­movement”­(Fox­and­Yeh­2011,­2).­The 
variability involved in kinetic architecture may involve nothing more than 
opening­a­door­or­window,­but­it­may­involve­moving­a­major­structure­which,­
in the limit, may be the whole building. The key thought behind the “separat-
ing out” move here is that not all responsive buildings, and not all kinetic 
buildings qualify as intelligent, since in some cases the responsiveness and/
or the kinetic properties of those buildings will be the result of “unintelligent” 
processes­such­as­direct,­unmodifiable­links­between­sensors­and­motors­(cf.­
the idea that genuine intelligence in animals and humans requires more than 
10 I­have­stolen­the­use­of­this­quotation­from­Haque­2006.
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hard-wired­stimulus-response­connections).­Learning­is­one­way­to­secure­the­
right kind of “inner” mediation.
Against­this­conceptual­backdrop,­consider­four­examples­of­actual,­planned, 
and exploratory buildings that are arrayed along a spectrum from mere 
responsive/kinetic architecture to intelligent architecture.
–­ Built­in­1994,­the­Heliotrope,­designed­by­Rolf­Disch,­is­a­kinetic­building­in­
Freiburg­that,­using­solar­trackers,­rotates­so­as­to­follow­the­sun,­thereby­
maximizing­its­access­to­solar­energy­and­helping­to­minimize­its­heating­
energy­demands­from­other­sources.­The­Heliotrope­was­the­first­building­
in the world to generate more energy than it uses.11
–­ The­Cybertecture­Egg­is­a­projected­building,­designed­by­James­Law­
Cybertecture, to be located in Mumbai.12 The building combines various 
intelligent, interactive, and multimedia systems to create an adapted and 
adaptable environment. Here are two examples: The bathrooms contain a 
system­that­monitors­and­records­certain­data­indicative­of­the­inhabitants’­
health­(e.g.,­blood­pressure,­weight),­data­which­may­later­be­recovered­and­
forwarded­to­a­doctor;­the­inhabitants’­working­spaces­may­be­customized­
to­optimize­individual­experience­(e.g.,­the­actual­view­can­be­replaced­by­
real-time­virtual­scenery­retrieved­from­all­over­the­world).
–­ Taking on the challenge of creating buildings in which the elderly can con-
tinue­to­live­at­home,­the­Ambient­Assisted­Living­Research­Department­at­
the­Fraunhofer­Institute­for­Experimental­Software­Engineering­in­Kaiser-
slautern designed an intelligent embedded system that monitors the behav-
ior­of­a­building’s­inhabitants,­via­a­network­of­hidden­sensors­(Kleinberger­
et­al.­2009,­199–208).­This­network­identifies­and­assesses­risk­situations­
(e.g.,­someone­having­a­fall),­and­reports­to­a­control­center,­allowing,­say,­
the­automatic­notification­of­a­designated­contact.­In­addition,­various­intel-
ligent systems autonomously modify the environment to reduce risk. Thus, 
the­bathroom­has­a­toilet­that­recognizes­the­user­and­adjusts­itself­to­be­
at the appropriate height, and a mirror with illuminated pictograms that 
are designed to structure the activities of easily confused occupants by, for 
instance, guiding them to brush their teeth, wash, or take medication.
–­ In­the­exploratory­architectural­project­Evolving­Sonic­Environment,­
developed­by­Haque­and­Davis­(Haque­2006),­people­walk­around­inside­
an­acoustically-coupled­“spatialized”­neural­network­(a­spatial­web­of­
interconnected­simple­processing­units).­The­movements­of­the­occupants­
(detected­via­sound)­affect­the­organization­of­the­network­(the­archi-
tectural­environment)­through­the­operation­of­local­learning­algorithms­
11 Rolf­ Disch,­ “Rotatable­ Solar­House­HELIOTROP:­ The­ experience­ of­ living­ rotating­ com-
pletely­ around­ the­ sun,”­ architecture­ project,­ Freiburg,­ 1994.­ Published­ online:­http://
www.rolfdisch.de/files/pdf/RotatableSolarHouse.pdf.
12 See­the­projects­section­on­the­Cybertecture­website:­http://www.jameslawcybertec-
ture.com
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active at each of its nodes. This results in the network adapting over time to 
different­patterns­of­occupancy,­often­developing­perceptual­categories­for­
reflecting­those­patterns­that­do­not­necessarily­correspond­to­categories­
that the human observer would employ.
Now that we have intelligent architecture in view, we can investigate the rela-
tions­between­such­architecture­and­ExC.­Here­is­one­way­of­asking­the­key­
question: Can the embedded systems in the walls and basements of intelli-
gent­buildings­ever­become­constituent­elements­in­the­functionally­specified­
material­vehicles­that­realize­the­thoughts­of­those­buildings’­inhabitants?­Put­
another way, could the sequence of dynamically assembled, organic-techno-
logical hybrid systems that instantiates my mind ever include factors embed-
ded­in­the­intelligent­buildings­in­which­I­will­increasingly­dwell?­To­provide­an­
answer here, I shall explore two lines of thought.
One­factor­that­sometimes­figures­in­discussions­of­ExC­is­the­portability­of­
cognitive resources. Indeed, it is sometimes suggested that a material element 
may­count­as­the­vehicle,­or­as­part­of­the­vehicle,­of­a­thinker’s­cognitive­
state or process, only if that thinker carries, or at least is able to carry, the 
element­in­question­around­with­her.­In­the­language­of­section­2­(above),­the­
portable-non-portable­distinction­marks­a­functional­difference­that­matters­
when one is deciding whether or not a particular functional contribution to 
intelligent behavior counts as cognitive. Neural resources manifestly meet the 
proposed­portability­constraint.­So­too­do­PDAs­and­smartphones.­Intelligent­
architecture, however, does not. So, if portability is a keystone requirement 
for a resource to be awarded cognitive status, then intelligent buildings are 
“no­more­than”­adaptive­scaffolds­for­richly­coupled­embodied-embedded­
minds,­not­vehicles­for­extended­minds.­But­is­portability­what­matters­here?­
I­don’t­think­so.­What­really­matters­is­a­property­in­relation­to­which­port-
ability makes a positive enabling contribution, but which may be secured 
without­portability.­That­property­is­somewhat­difficult­to­specify­precisely,­
but, roughly speaking, it amounts to a kind of dynamic reliability in which 
access to the externally located resource under consideration is, for the most 
part,­smooth­and­stable­just­when,­and­for­as­long­as,­that­resource­is­relevant­
to­some­aspect­of­our­ongoing­activity.­The­qualifier­“dynamic”­here­reflects­
the­fact­that,­according­to­ExC,­the­organism-centered­hybrid­systems­that­
are assembled through the recruitment and divestment of technology often 
persist only when, and as long as, they are contextually relevant, meaning that 
the external resources concerned need not be smoothly and stably accessible 
at other times.
We­can­now­state­a­modified­condition­for­cognitive­status:­a­material­ele-
ment may count as the vehicle, or as part of the vehicle, of a cognitive state 
or­process,­only­if­it­meets­the­foregoing­dynamic­reliability­constraint.­And­
although carrying an item of technology around with you is certainly one 
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assisting factor here, it is certainly not mandatory. Technological resources 
embedded­in­the­fabric­of­one’s­house­may­well­be­readily­and­reliably­avail-
able whenever the human behaviour that they support is operative. Consider, 
for example, the activity-structuring pictograms embedded in the mirrors of 
the ambient assisted living environment described earlier. When functioning 
in a hitch-free manner, access to these externally located resources will be 
smooth­and­stable­just­when,­and­for­as­long­as,­those­resources­are­relevant­
to the activity they are designed to support. To be clear, meeting the dynamic 
reliability­constraint­in­this­way­is­clearly­not­a­sufficient­condition­for­a­tech-
nological­resource­to­count­as­part­of­one’s­cognitive­architecture.­But,­if­it­is­
a necessary condition, then intelligent architecture may certainly, in principle, 
meet it.
Time,­then,­to­turn­to­the­second­ExC-and-intelligent-architecture­related­issue­
that­I­want­to­broach­here.­Part­of­the­interest­of­the­final­example­of­intel-
ligent­architecture­described­above,­namely­Evolving­Sonic­Environment­by­
Haque and Davis, is that it foregrounds the already highlighted incorporation 
of­learning­into­intelligent­architecture.­But­the­Haque­and­Davis­study­does­
more than that. It also introduces a new consideration, that of interaction. 
Haque argues that an important transformation in our relations with archi-
tecture occurs when we shift from a merely reactive kind of architecture to a 
genuinely­interactive­kind­(Haque­2006).
Here Haque draws a distinction between single-loop interaction—in which the 
architectural response to a particular user-input is determined in advance—
and multiple-loop interaction, in which the next response, by the architecture 
or user, is in part determined by an ongoing history of interaction and on the 
fact­that­each­is­able­to­access­and­modify­each­other’s­goals.­As­Haque­puts­
it:
[S]ingle-loop devices that satisfy our creature comforts are useful for 
functional­goals­(I­am­thinking­here­of­Bill­Gate’s­technologically-saturated­
mansion;­or­building­management­systems­that­seek­to­optimise­sunlight­
distribution;­or­thermostats­that­regulate­internal­temperature).­Such­
systems­satisfy­very­particular­efficiency­criteria­that­are­determined­
during, and limited by, the design process. However, if one wants occu-
pants of a building to have the sensation of agency and of contributing to 
the­organization­of­a­building,­then­the­most­stimulating­and­potentially­
productive situation would be a [multi-loop] system in which people build 
up their spaces through “conversations” with the environment, where the 
history of interactions builds new possibilities for sharing goals and shar-
ing­outcomes.­(Haque­2006,­3)
To­put­flesh­(or­perhaps­concrete)­on­this­goal­of­human-architecture­conver-
sation,­Haque­introduces­his­notion­of­Paskian­Systems­(named­after­the­great­
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maverick­British­cyberneticist,­Gordon­Pask).­Paskian­systems­eschew­the­
usual­logic­of­the­interaction­between­humans­and­smart­technology.­Accord-
ing to that usual logic, either the human user needs an appropriate under-
standing of the design of the machine, so that she can tell it what to do, or the 
machine needs an appropriate understanding of the design of the human user 
so­that­it­can­provide­her­with­precisely­what­she­needs.­A­Paskian­system,­by­
contrast, would support a kind of open dialog. Thus, for example, in a spatial 
dwelling context such a system “would provide us with a method for compar-
ing­our­conception­of­spatial­conditions­with­the­designed­machine’s­concep-
tion­of­the­space”­(Haque­2006,­3).
There is a compelling consideration which suggests that although the kind 
of­non-Paskian­architectural­technology­that­we­encountered­earlier­(recall,­
again,­the­mirror-embedded­pictograms)­may­qualify­as­proper­parts­of­the­
dweller’s­cognitive­economy­on­roughly­the­same­grounds­as­mobile­comput-
ing­technology­(e.g.,­among­other­things,­both­meet­the­dynamic­reliability­
constraint),­Haque’s­Paskian­systems—and­thus­the­realizations­of­such­
systems in intelligent architecture—will fail to qualify. In fact, the threat to 
ExC­here­is­established­by­the­very­conditions­that­make­possible­the­capac-
ity of Paskian systems to enter into richly interactive dialogs, the feature of 
those­systems­that­secures­Haque’s­advocacy­of­them­in­architectural­design.­
Paskian­systems­may­operate­with­categorizations,­conceptions,­and­models­
of­goal-states­to­be­achieved—beliefs­about­how­the­dweller’s­world­is­and­
should be, if you will—that diverge from those of their human users. Thus, 
as­mentioned­earlier,­the­Evolving­Sonic­Environment­develops­perceptual­
categories for occupancy patterns that do not necessarily correspond to 
human-determined categories. It is this divergence that grounds the dialogi-
cal­structure­that­characterizes­the­kind­of­rich­human-building­interaction­
sought by Haque. Now, this may well be exactly what we want from intelligent 
architecture, but the divergence calls into question any claim that the human-
technology interactive system so instantiated is itself a single, integrated 
cognitive system. We would experience the same hesitation to think in terms 
of extended cognition if we were confronted by a Paskian smartphone that 
negotiated over where to go every time its online navigation program was 
fired­up.­And­the­same­qualms­indicate­why­the­elevator­designed­by­the­
Sirius­Cybernetics­Corporation­(see­above)­cannot plausibly be considered 
part­of­Zaphod’s­mind.
The root issue here is that Paskian systems exhibit a kind of agency. This 
agency, however limited, prevents them from being incorporated into the 
cognitive­systems­that­are­centered­on­their­human­users.­As­one­might­
put­it,­where­there’s­more­than­one­will,­there’s­no­way­to­cognitive­exten-
sion.­At­first­sight,­this­principle­would­seem­to­have­negative­implications­
(implications­that­I­do­not­have­the­space­to­unravel­or­explore­here)­for­
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the hypothesis of socially extended cognition, interpreted as the claim that 
some­of­the­material­vehicles­that­realize­my­thinking­may­be­located­inside­
the­brains­of­other­people­(i.e.,­other­agents).­For­the­present,­however,­my­
thoughts are restricted to the domain of intelligent architecture: if intelligent 
architecture­does­support­ExC,­then­it­is­on­the­basis­not­of­Paskian­interac-
tion, but of the dynamic reliability established by non-Paskian loops.
Conclusion
The­extended­cognition­hypothesis­is­currently­the­subject­of­much­debate­in­
philosophical­and­cognitive-scientific­circles,­but­its­implications­stretch­far­
beyond­the­metaphysics­and­science­of­minds.­We­have­only­just­begun,­it­
seems,­to­scratch­the­surface­of­the­wider­social­and­cultural­ramifications­of­
the view. If our minds are partly in our smartphones and even in our buildings, 
then that is not a transformation in human nature, but only the latest mani-
festation of the age-old human ontology of dynamically assembled, organic-
technological cognitive systems. Nevertheless, once our self-understanding 
catches­up­with­our­hybrid­nature,­the­world­promises­to­be­a­very­different­
place.
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Late Capitalism and the 
Scientific Image of Man: 
Technology, Cognition, 
and Culture 
Jon Lindblom
The essay introduces Wilfrid Sellars’ conception of the 
scientific image of man against the backdrop of the cogni-
tive malaise of the contemporary digital mediascape. It is 
argued that the emerging scientific understanding of cogni-
tion will not only help us to further diagnose the cognitive 
pathologies at work in late capitalism, but also will allow 
us to construct alternate techno-cultural scenarios untap-
ping the potentialities of neurotechnology. This line of 
reasoning engages with Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique 
of Enlightenment reason on the basis of the recent work on 
nihilism, rationalism, and cognitive science by Ray Brassier 
and Thomas Metzinger. In particular, it argues that a specu-
lative reconsideration of Enlightenment Prometheanism 
provides the critical context for unleashing the cognitive 
and technological potencies that late capitalism is cur-
rently inhibiting.
108 Alleys of Your Mind
In his book iDisorder: Understanding Our Obsession with Technology and Over-
coming Its Hold on Us,­psychologist­and­computer­educator­Larry­Rosen­(2012)­
presents a compelling diagnosis of what he sees as the increasingly wide-
spread­cognitive­and­psychosocial­effects­of­technology­on­society.­According­
to­Rosen,­the­emergence­of­cyberspace,­computing,­social­media,­portable­
electronic­devices,­Web­2.0,­and­so­on,­has­brought­about­a­general­cogni-
tive and psychosocial disorder with symptoms which look suspiciously like 
those of a number of well known psychiatric disorders and are centered on 
our increasing occupation with technology and new media. These disorders 
include­(but­are­not­limited­to)­obsessive-compulsive­disorder­(constantly­
checking­our­Facebook,­e-mail,­iPhones,­etc.),­attention-deficit­hyperactivity­
disorder­(increased­inability­to­focus­on­one­task­because­of­the­prevalence­of­
multitasking,­videogaming,­etc.),­social­anxiety­disorder­(hiding­behind­various­
screens­at­the­cost­of­maintaining­face-to-face­social­relations),­and­narcissis-
tic­personality­disorder­(being­obsessed­with­creating­an­idealized­online-per-
sona).­All­of­those­are­accompanied­by­various­neurological­reconfigurations,­
such­as­alterations­in­chemical­levels­of­dopamine­and­serotonin­(i.e.,­changes­
in­the­brain’s­reward­system­as­a­result­of­technology­addiction,­which­seems­
to mirror the chemical imbalances underlying various forms of substance 
addiction),­and­the­creation­of­new­synaptic­connections­among­neurons­(i.e.,­
neuroplasticity)­in­response­to­the­environmental­changes­brought­about­
by­technology­(which­may­be­the­underlying­neurobiological­explanation­for­
phenomena such as “phantom vibration syndrome,” where cell phone users 
start to experience phantom vibrations on a regular basis—presumably as a 
result­of­increased­attentiveness­for­vibrating­sensations).­Taken­together,­all­
of these symptoms point to a general state of collective anxiety brought about 
by the intricate relationship between the technological, the neurological, and 
the­psychosocial.­It­is­this­anxiety­that­Rosen­refers­to­as­“iDisorder.”­
Undoubtedly, there is still a lot of work that needs to be done here, particu-
larly regarding the relation between the technological and the psychosocial 
(to­what­extent­is­technology­the­root-source­of­these­symptoms?),­as­well­as­
the­exact­nature­of­the­symptoms­themselves­(do­they­index­actual­clini-
cal­conditions?).­Yet­despite­these­various­lacunae­it­seems­clear­to­me­that­
Rosen’s­project­sheds light on issues that everyone familiar with daily life in 
digital­culture­can­recognize­themselves­in,­and­whose­exact­nature­hopefully­
will become clear once we learn more about the psychosocial and cognitive 
effects­of­technology.­But­besides­these­context-specific­reservations,­it­is­also­
important­to­recognize­the­larger­context­in­which­Rosen’s­work­makes­sense,­
which is twofold: on the one hand, in terms of the function of digital culture 
within late capitalism and, on the other hand, in terms of the relationship 
between­science­and­culture­implicit­in­the­cognitive­and­psychosocial­effects­
of technology. 
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It is these two contexts that I aim to elaborate on in the present essay. In 
the­first­section,­I­will­situate­Rosen’s­diagnosis­within­what­Mark­Fisher­has­
referred to as a general disenchantment of the digital in late capitalist culture 
(i.e.,­a­widespread­dissatisfaction­with­current­forms­of­digital­culture);­which­
not­only­indexes­a­major­cultural­malaise­brought­about­by­the­digital,­but­
also­what­Fisher­has­identified­as­a­general­aporia­within­late­capitalism:­the­
problem of mental health. In the second section, I will then expand on the 
implications­of­the­use­of­scientific­resources­(neuroscience­in­particular),­
in­order­to­unpack­the­cognitive­effects­of­technology­and­its­potentially­
decisive­role­within­the­context­of­a­major­cultural­shift­brought­about­by­the­
speculative import of what philosopher Wilfrid Sellars has referred to as the 
“scientific­image­of­man.”­Finally,­I­will­conclude­with­some­brief­remarks­about­
the nature of this shift and its implications for various forms of cultural and 
post-capitalist praxis.
Digital Pathologies in Late Capitalist Culture
According­to­Mark­Fisher­(2009),­the­fact­that­the­presence­of­various­psycho-
logical­disorders,­such­as­depression,­anxiety,­stress,­and­attention-deficit­
hyperactivity­disorder,­has­increased­significantly­over­the­last­decades­is­not­
a mere coincidence, but a consequence of the rise of neoliberalism as such. 
For­what­has­accompanied­the­shift­from­disciplinary­societies­to­control­
societies,­from­Fordist­rigidity­to­post-Fordist­flexibility,­is­nothing­less­than­
a­major­pandemic­of­various­psychological­disorders­whose­root-source­is­to­
be found in the numerous social restructurings imposed by neoliberalism—
rather than in individual chemico-biological imbalances. These restructur-
ings­include­flexibility­and­precarity­in­working-life,­various­forms­of­PR­and­
new bureaucracy, and the emergence of cyberspace, social media, portable 
electronic devices, and so on—whose functioning is integral to the neoliberal-
ist restructuring of nervous-systems which inevitably needs to accompany the 
new social structures, as well as to the obliteration of the distinction between 
work-time­and­leisure-time­which­has­come­to­be­one­of­the­defining­char-
acteristics­of­contemporary­capitalism.­Accordingly,­increased­instability­in­
working life is accompanied, on the one hand, by new strategies for manag-
ing­workers-consumers,­which,­despite­claims­toward­decentralization­and­
diversity, remain deadlocked within various forms of bureaucracies, constant 
surveillance,­and­false­appearances­(see­in­particular­Fisher­2009:­31–53);­and,­
on the other hand, by the emergence of a global cyberspace-matrix whose 
essential functioning lies in the creation of the “debtor-addict” central to 
distributed,­late­capitalist­organization.­The­debtor-addict­has­lost­the­ability­
to­concentrate,­as­well­as­the­capacity­to­synthesize­time­into­any­form­of­
meaningful narrative, and lives instead in a series of twitchy, disconnected 
presents:­“If,­then,­something­like­attention­deficit­hyperactivity­disorder­is­a­
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pathology, it is a pathology of late capitalism—a consequence of being wired 
into the entertainment-control circuits of hypermediated consumer culture” 
(Fisher­2009,­25).­Of­course,­the­idea­that­the­proliferation­of­mental­illness­
may be correlated with the triumph of neoliberalism is strictly denied by the 
latter’s­advocates.­More­importantly,­it­also­has­not­been­recognized­by­the­
political left­as­an­urgent­issue­to­re-politicize,­as­Fisher­notes­in­a­particularly­
incisive passage:
The current ruling ontology denies any possibility of a social causation of 
mental­illness.­The­chemico-biologization­of­mental­illness­is­of­course­
strictly­commensurate­with­its­depolitiziation.­Considering­mental­illness­
an­individual­chemico-biological­problem­has­enormous­benefits­for­
capitalism.­First,­it­reinforces­Capital’s­drive­towards­atomistic­individuali-
zation­(you­are­sick­because­of­your­brain­chemistry).­Second,­it­provides­
an enormously lucrative market in which multinational pharmaceutical 
companies­can­peddle­their­pharmaceuticals­(we­can­cure­you­with­our­
SSRIs).­It­goes­without­saying­that­all­mental­illnesses­are­neurologically­
instantiated, but this says nothing about their causation. If it is true, for 
instance, that depression is constituted by low serotonin levels, what 
still needs to be explained is why particular individuals have low levels of 
serotonin.­This­requires­a­social­and­political­explanation;­and­the­task­of­
repoliticizing­mental­illness­is­an­urgent­one­if­the­[political] left wants to 
challenge­capitalist­realism.­(Fisher­2009,­37)
Thus, it­is­in­this­larger­socio-political­context­that­Rosen’s­work­must­thor-
oughly be situated. His observations regarding the proliferation of psycho-
logical­disorders,­such­as­attention-deficit­hyperactivity­disorder,­as­well­as­
changes in brain structure and chemical balance—presumably as a result of 
our increased dependence on technology and new media—indeed seems to 
be­a­particularly­lucid­study­of­the­cognitive­and­psychosocial­effects­of­the­
rise­of­the­capitalist­cyberspace-matrix­that­Fisher­has­identified­in­his­writ-
ings­on­neoliberalism.­Consequently,­even­though­Rosen­is­right­in­locating­
the root-source to these symptoms outside the brain, it is only when they have 
been­situated­in­an­even­larger­socio-political­(and,­as­we­shall­see,­cultural)­
context that we will be able to properly diagnose their intricate structure and 
causation,­as­the­above­quotation­emphasizes.­
This is only one side of the story, however, since the cognitive agenda imposed 
by neoliberalism not only threatens to undermine psychological issues related 
to­mental­health,­but­also­transformative­concerns­organized­around­the­
relationship between the technological and the neurobiological. In other 
words,­there­are­at­least­two­trajectories­that­need­to­be­elaborated­here:­
clinical issues related to mental health, and speculative issues related to the 
neurotechnological transformation of cognitive neurobiology. It is the latter 
set of issues that I will concern myself with in the remainder of this essay, with 
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a particular focus on its cultural implications, since I believe that contempo-
rary culture not only is in desperate need of such speculative resources, but 
also because it seems that culture would constitute a particularly produc-
tive­field­for­the­utilization­of­their­transformative­potential.­Yet­before­going­
further into this discussion I need to complement the previous socio-political 
contextualization­with­its­cultural­counterpart,­since­the­digital­pathology­out-
lined above is not only rooted in a failed social contract, but also in a cultural 
malaise of widespread proportions. The full magnitude of current technologi-
cal disenchantment can therefore only be understood once it has been situ-
ated squarely in the socio-political agenda of neoliberalism on the one hand, 
and in the cultural malaise of aggravated postmodernism on the other.
Once­again­it­is­the­work­of­Mark­Fisher­that­is­exemplary­here.­Building­upon­
Jameson’s­neo-Marxist­thesis­that­changes­in­culture­must­be­understood­
in­conjunction­with­changes­in­the­economy,­and­that­postmodernism­is­the­
cultural­logic­of­late­capitalism­( Jameson­1992,­1–54),­Fisher­sees­contempo-
rary­culture­as­steeped­in­what­may­be­characterized­as­a­sort­of­normalized­
postmodernism. The latter designates a widespread cultural inertia where 
the­residual­conflict­between­modernism­and­postmodernism,­which­haunted­
Jameson’s­work,­has­been­completely­forgotten,­along­with­the­distinction­
between high art and popular culture, and where the modernist ethos of ori-
enting oneself toward the unknown has been substituted—again, as Jameson 
correctly predicted—by a tendency toward revivalism, retrospection, pastiche, 
and­constant­recycling­of­the­already­familiar.­Accordingly,­“retro”­no­longer­
designates one particular style but the modus operandi of culture tout court, 
and­the­capitalist­colonization­of­nature­and­the­unconscious—observed­with­
wonder­and­horror­by­Jameson­in­the­1980s—has­now­been­normalized­to­
such an extent that it is simply taken for granted. Consequently, even though 
cultural distribution, consumption, and communication have gone through 
remarkable changes over the last decade, cultural production itself has 
generated very little excitement. Contrasting his own adolescence with that 
of­teenagers­today,­music­writer­and­cultural­critic­Simon­Reynolds­notes­that­
whereas his own youth was steeped in interests such as modernist art, alien 
life,­and­outer­space­(i.e.,­the­unknown),­the­wonders­of­boundless­exteriority­
no longer seem to have any purchase on young people today, immersed as 
they­are­in­Youtube,­Facebook,­iPhones,­and­other­forms­of­social­media­(see­
Reynolds­2012,­362–98).­Sure,­new­technologies­have­proliferated­dramatically­
over the last decade, but only to the extent that they maintain the cultural 
interiority and status quo concomitant with the capitalist cyberspace-matrix. 
This­is­a­cultural­situation­that­Reynolds­characterizes­as­one­of­widespread­
temporal malaise, or “hyperstasis,” qua digital life as daily experience. The 
fundamental problem that confronts us is consequently one of rehabilitating 
the link between technology and the unknown—in contrast with the cyber-
capitalist reiteration of the already known—which is intimately connected 
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to a renewed understanding of the implications of science on culture, simply 
because­science,­as­we­shall­see,­is­one­of­man’s­primary­methods­for­index-
ing­the­unknown.­In­particular,­the­field­of­cognitive­neuroscience­seems­to­
provide­some­of­the­most­promising­(but­hardly­the­only)­resources­for­this­
cultural confrontation with the unknown. The latter will consequently be my 
main topic of discussion in the next section.
The Cultural Implications of Cognitive 
Exteriorization
At­first­glance,­the­idea­of­the­cultural­import­of­resources­provided­by­mod-
ern­science­might­seem­dubious—what,­after­all,­could­scientific­data­provide­
cultural­production­with?—yet­it­is­my­firm­belief­that­this­issue­is­one­of­the­
most critical ones facing cultural theory today. Of course, questions concern-
ing­the­intellectual­influence­of­scientific­rationality­on­cultural­production­
have been posed numerous times over the last decades, but over time their 
many shortcomings have become increasingly obvious. What is needed today 
is therefore a radical reconsideration of the relationship between science and 
culture­(or,­in­broader­terms,­between­man­and­nature).­In­what­follows,­I­will­
consequently aim to sketch out some broader outlines for such a reconsid-
eration,­focusing­in­particular­on­one­of­the­most­influential­statements­on­
the­topic:­Adorno­and­Horkheimer’s­Dialectic of Enlightenment. However, this 
requires­us­to­engage­not­just­with­the­book’s­celebrated­chapter­on­the­cul-
ture industry, but also with its central arguments regarding the failure of the 
Enlightenment­and­the­pathology­of­instrumental­rationality.­
Indeed,­what­often­goes­unmentioned­in­the­many­books­outlining­the­influ-
ence­of­Adorno­and­Horkheimer­on­contemporary­cultural­theory­is­the­wider­
critical context in which the analysis of the culture industry is situated. The 
decision to not articulate this link has become more than a mere pedagogical 
shortcoming, since it in fact harbors the key to a contemporary engagement 
with­the­book’s­criticisms­of­modern­culture.­Hence, it­is­at­this­particular­junc-
ture where the present analysis must begin.
As­is­well­known,­the­main­topic­of­Dialectic of Enlightenment­is­what­Adorno­
and­Horkheimer­considered­to­be­the­failure­of­the­Enlightenment­in­the­mod-
ern world. This may be condensed into the following question: If the animus 
of­the­Enlightenment­is­that­of­emancipating­man­from­his­irrationality­(or­
“immaturity,”­as­Kant­put­it),­then­why­is­contemporary­society­sinking­into­a­
new­form­of­barbarism?­Fascism,­capitalism,­cultural­standardization,­and­the­
oppression­of­women—all­of­which­are­analyzed­in-depth­in­the­book—can­
hardly be thought of as triumphs of enlightened man. The task of the critical 
theorist then becomes one of identifying the root-source to these widespread 
failures of modern society. 
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Yet­unlike­during­the­Frankfurt­School’s­earlier­Marxist­period,­Adorno­and­
Horkheimer argue that this root-source cannot be located in various forms 
of­class­struggle­or­political­oppression,­since­those­phenomena—just­as­
capitalism­itself—are­mere­symptoms­of­a­much­deeper­conflict­which­has­
haunted­Western­civilization­since­its­inception:­that­between­man­and­nature.­
This­conflict­is­formulated­in­terms­of­a­struggle­between­dominating­and­
dominated,­since,­for­Adorno­and­Horkheimer,­civilization­is­dependent­on­
man’s­urge­to­tame­and­ultimately­control­the­hostile­forces­harbored­by­alien­
nature.­This­is­the­objective­of­sacrifice­in­pre-rational­societies,­since­sacri-
fice—construed­as­a­particular­logic­of­non-conceptual­exchange—is­primitive­
man’s­attempt­to­affect­a­commensuration­between­himself­and­the­horrors­
of­alien­nature.­Enlightenment­is,­of­course,­founded­upon­the­discarding­of­
sacrificial­logic­in­favor­of­rational­explanation.­Yet­what­enlightened­thought­
ends­up­with,­according­to­Adorno­and­Horkheimer,­is­not­the­post-sacrificial­
logic­it­is­searching­for,­but­merely­the­internalization­of­sacrifice­tout court. 
Enlightened­thought­is­consequently­characterized­as­an­unreflective­pathol-
ogy,­where­man’s­desire­to­convert­the­entirety­of­nature­into­series­of­num-
bers­and­formulae­(i.e.,­to­control­nature­via­scientific­explanation)­remains­
deadlocked within the mythical pattern of thought it wants to be rid of, for 
what­scientific­logic­ultimately­represents­is­nothing­but­a­new­form­of­aliena-
tion, which not only extends across the exteriority of nature, but also into the 
interiority­of­man­himself.­Indeed,­what­the­scientific­impetus­to­exteriorize­
and­spatialize­ultimately­ends­up­with­is­nothing­but­an­aggravated­form­of­
self-sacrifice,­since­the­reduction­of­everything­to­identical­units—rather­than­
reaching out toward an exteriority beyond man—merely continues to symboli-
cally­sacrifice­parts­of­the­human­in­a­pathological,­compulsive­manner,­which­
in­the­end­renders­properly­philosophical­(or­reflective)­thinking­impossible.­
For­Adorno­and­Horkheimer,­this­marks­the­beginning­of­a­dangerous­path­
where ends are substituted for means and domination sooner or later is 
reverted­back­toward­man­himself;­both­in­terms­of­domination­between­men­
and in terms of the alienation of man from himself where thinking is reduced 
to a pure mathematical function:
Thinking­objectifies­itself­to­become­an­automatic,­self-activating­process;­
an impersonation of the machine that it produces itself so that ultimately 
the machine can replace it. . . . Mathematical procedure [becomes], so to 
speak, the ritual of thinking. In spite of the axiomatic self-restriction, it 
establishes­itself­as­necessary­and­objective:­it­turns­thought­into­a­thing,­
an­instrument—which­is­its­own­term­for­it.­(Adorno­and­Horkheimer­
1997,­25)
Consequently, it is in this wider critical context where the analysis of the 
culture industry must be situated, since what the latter is an index of—accord-
ing­to­Adorno­and­Horkheimer—is­one­of­the­modes­of­domination­that­have­
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emerged­along­with­the­triumph­of­scientific­rationality.­Accordingly,­the­term­
“culture industry” was deliberately chosen—as opposed to “mass culture” or 
“popular­culture”—precisely­in­order­to­emphasize­the­link­between­Enlighten-
ment rationality and modern culture by highlighting, on the one hand, how the 
latter operates in terms of increased technological subsumption by mechani-
cal reproduction and, on the other hand, how the distribution of cultural 
products­is­being­monitored­by­rational,­controlled­organization.­These­are­
the­primary­symptoms­of­how­Enlightenment­rationality­has­infected­cultural­
production­and­reduced­the­latter­to­a­series­of­banalities­of­artificial­desires­
that,­of­course,­are­strictly­in­tune­with­capitalist­organization­in­the­form­of­a­
new mode of social domination. 
Yet­the­link­between­scientific­rationality­and­social­domination­that­Adorno­
and­Horkheimer’s­thesis­rests­upon­is­far­from­guaranteed.­Indeed,­in­my­view­
it­is­rooted­in­a­fundamental­misdiagnosis­of­the­intellectual­import­of­Enlight-
enment­rationality,­which­remains­committed­to­the­safeguarding­of­a­fictional­
“humanism” at the cost of eliding its wider speculative implications. These 
implications have recently been articulated with remarkable cogency by the 
philosopher­Ray­Brassier,­who­in­his­book­Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and 
Extinction­(2007)­presents­a­striking­alternative­interpretation­of­the­intellec-
tual­legacy­of­the­Enlightenment—an­interpretation­which,­as­we­shall­see,­will­
provide­us­with­conceptual­resources­for­the­construction­of­a­very­different­
account­of­culture­than­that­of­Adorno­and­Horkheimer.
The speculative argument of Nihil Unbound may be understood as a thanat-
ropic inversion­of­Adorno­and­Horkheimer’s­dialectics­of­myth­and­Enlighten-
ment,­since­it­insists­on,­rather­than­rejects,­the­impersonal­nihilism­implicit­
in­scientific­objectification­and­technological­exteriorization.­Whereas­Adorno­
and Horkheimer argue that what they conceive of as the terminal exhaustion 
of reason can only be overcome by its re-integration into the purposeful-
ness­of­human­history—construed­as­a­temporal­transcendence­of­science’s­
pathological compulsion—with the idea of “the thanatosis of­Enlightenment” 
Brassier­(2007,­32)­insists­on­the­incompatibility­between­the­image­of­nature­
given­to­us­by­science­and­our­manifest­understanding­of­things.­For­Brassier,­
the fact that the thought of science goes beyond our default apprehension 
of nature must be understood as the starting point for the philosophical 
enterprise, rather than as a cognitive pathology which philosophy should be 
summoned to remedy. The bulk of Nihil Unbound is therefore concerned with 
articulating­scientific­rationalism­as­a­cognitive­overturning­of­man’s­lifeworld­
wherein thinking is confronted with an alien outside, which is unconditioned 
by­human­manifestation.­And­rather­than­trying­to­re-inscribe­this­universal­
purposelessness within a human narrative of reconciliation, the animus of the 
book is one of progressively tearing down the lifeworld that we have created 
in­order­to­satisfy­our­psychological­needs­(and­which­philosophy­also­has­
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participated­in,­as­can­be­seen­in­Adorno­and­Horkheimer’s­dialectical­think-
ing)­by­recognizing­that­human­experience,­consciousness,­meaning,­and­his-
tory are nothing but minor spatio-temporal occurrences within an exorbitant 
cosmology, which is being progressively unveiled by the natural sciences. 
Scientific­rationalism,­therefore,­is­a­trauma­for­thought­(as­Adorno­and­
Horkheimer­argued),­although­its­root-source­is­not­to­be­found­within­the­
confines­of­human­history­(i.e.,­as­a­purely­psychosocial­struggle­between­
dominating­and­dominated),­but­in­its­negation­of­the­categorical­difference­
between established conceptual categories such as life and death in post-
Darwinian­biology,­and­matter­and­void­in­contemporary­cosmology.­Scientific­
discovery therefore has an immediate philosophical import insofar as its 
elimination of the notion of “purpose” from the natural realm stands at odds 
with a prevalent philosophical position: The idea that the human qua transcen-
dental dimension of existence constitutes the irreducible bedrock of cognitive 
and conceptual enquiry. This is nihil unbound: nihilism emancipated from 
the­regional­horizon­of­the­human­lifeworld­and­repositioned­within­a­proper­
universal context.
Hence,­despite­the­cosmological­implications­of­Brassier’s­speculative­nihilism,­
it­is­crucial­not­to­overlook­its­equally­significant­cognitive­import,­particularly­
since­consciousness­has­generally­been­considered­immune­to­scientific­objec-
tification­within­the­continental­mode­of­philosophizing,­which­has­had­major­
conceptual­impact­on­contemporary­cultural­theory.­As­we­saw­in­the­previous­
discussion­of­Adorno­and­Horkheimer’s­work,­the­scientific­imperative­to­
objectify­consciousness­has­often­been­viewed­as­an­index­of­a­dangerous­
form of anti-humanism, which threatens to alienate us from our true selves 
in­its­compulsive­attempts­to­objectify­that­which­lies­beyond­objectification.­
Yet,­what­the­scientific­understanding­of­the­human­ultimately­points­to­is­pre-
cisely­that:­the­systematic­exteriorization­of­consciousness­and­an­extension­
of the cognitive split produced by the natural sciences from the exteriority 
of­nature­into­the­interiority­of­man.­Hence,­the­upshot­of­this­major­intel-
lectual­project­is­the­insertion­of­man­himself­into­the­purposeless­natural­
order­unveiled­by­the­scientific­worldview,­through­the­gradual­construction­
of an image of the human which views the latter as a particularly complex 
form of biophysical system rather than as a kind of transcendental excess. In 
that­regard,­it­is­one­of­the­most­significant­issues­opened­up­by­the­concep-
tual­integration­of­scientific­explanation,­which­is­something­the­philosopher­
Wilfrid Sellars addressed several decades ago in the form of a distinction 
between what he called the manifest and scientific images of man. 
According­to­Sellars­(1963),­the­manifest­image­is­a­sophisticated­conceptual­
framework, which has accumulated gradually since the emergence of Homo 
sapiens­and­is­organized­around­the­notion­of­man­as­person;­that­is,­as­a­
rational agent capable of giving and asking for reasons within the context of 
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a larger socio-linguistic economy. In that regard, the fundamental import of 
the manifest image is its normative valence in that it provides man with a basic 
framework for keeping track of commitments, providing and revising explana-
tions, assessing what ought to be done, and vice versa. In short, the space of 
reasons provided by the manifest image is what distinguishes sapient intel-
ligence from that of mere sentience. However, Sellars also noticed the much 
more recent emergence of another image associated with the natural sciences 
that­presents­itself­as­a­rival­image­in­that­it­is­organized­around­the­notion­
of man as a physical system. In other words, whereas the manifest image 
construes­man­quasi-transcendentally,­as­the­singular­bearer­of­the­object­
reason,­the­scientific­image­instead­views­man­from­the­perspective­of­natural­
history, as a particularly complex accumulation of various forms of biological 
material. 
For­Sellars,­the­fundamental­task­for­the­contemporary­philosopher­is­one­of­
achieving­a­stereoscopic­integration­of­the­manifest­and­scientific­images;­that­
is, of producing a synoptic framework capable of giving an account of man 
as a rational agent on the one hand, and as a physical system on the other. 
Yet­this­task­should­not­be­understood­as­an­attempt­to­accommodate­the­
scientific­image­according­to­man’s­psychological­needs.­Explanatory­integra-
tion­should­not­be­confused­with­conceptual­commensuration.­For­as­was­just­
emphasized­in­the­discussion­of­Brassier’s­work,­and­as­Sellars­himself­saw,­
there­is­something­fundamentally­counterintuitive­about­the­scientific­image­
in that it presents an image of man that is completely alien to common sense 
reasoning.­It­is­consequently­at­this­particular­juncture—at­the­traumatic­clash­
between­the­manifest­and­scientific­images—where­dialectical­enlightenment­
must be reversed into thanatropic enlightenment and thinking rehabilitated 
with the edge of speculative reason.1
Recently,­the­trauma­generated­in­the­manifest­order­through­its­encounter­
with­scientific­reasoning­has­been­given­a­particularly­incisive­formulation­
by­the­neurophilosopher­Thomas­Metzinger,­whose­magnum­opus­Being No-
One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity (2006)­is­a­comprehensive­study­of­
the­notion­of­phenomenal­selfhood­and­the­first-person­perspective­which­
1­ Undoubtedly,­much­more­needs­to­be­said­about­the­quest­for­explanatory­integra-
tion­of­the­manifest­and­scientific­image,­and­its­consequences­for­a­genuinely­modern­
form­of­nihilism.­In­particular,­it­is­important­to­recognize­that­the­commitment­to­the­
manifest order qua normative reasoning does not index a regression from nihilistic dis-
enchantment­to­yet­another­version­of­conservative­humanism—as­Brassier­sometimes­
has been accused of—since what is crucial about the manifest image is its normative 
infrastructure, rather than its purely contingent instantiation in the medium sapiens. In 
other words, there is nothing intrinsically human about the manifest image insofar as 
it is medium-independent and in principle could be instantiated in other systems than 
biological­ones­(see­Brassier­and­Malik­2015).­This­is­the­fundamental­speculative­import­
of the Sellarsian model and of the functionalist school of thought to which it belongs. 
Thanks­to­Ray­Brassier­and­Pete­Wolfendale­for­clarifying­these­points.
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is­firmly­grounded­in­the­emerging­intellectual­resources­provided­by­mod-
ern­neuroscience.­According­to­Metzinger,­the­most­fundamental­feature­of­
phenomenal selfhood qua­conscious­first-person­experience­is­a­peculiar­form­
of epistemic darkness, which emerges in-between the phenomenological and 
neurobiological levels of description. This darkness is centered on the fact that 
the phenomenal self is unable to experience the underlying neurobiological 
processes­that­are­constitutive­of­the­first-person­perspective­as­such,­and­
consequently­does­not­recognize­the­latter­as­an­ongoing­representational pro-
cess within the functional architecture of the biological information-processing 
system that is the body. 
In­other­words,­for­Metzinger,­the­notion­of­an­authentic­self,­which­is­in­
immediate contact with itself and the world around it, is a myth rooted in 
complex representational processes in the brain, whose central function is to 
maintain­the­phenomenal­transparency­that­is­necessary­for­a­stable­first-
person perspective. In technical terms this means that it is only the content 
properties­(qua­phenomenological­data)­that­is­accessible­to­the­system,­but­
not­the­vehicle­properties­(qua­underlying­neurodynamics),­which­is­how­
the­system­comes­to­experience­itself­as­a­self­(rather­than­as­the­biological­
data-system­it­actually­is)­by­failing­to­recognize­that­phenomenal­selfhood­is­
a­particular­form­of­representational­modeling.­This­is­what­Metzinger­refers­
to­as­the­phenomenal­self-model­(PSM),­which­has­been­generated­through-
out­the­courses­of­evolution­in­order­to­maximize­cognitive­and­behavioral­
flexibility­strictly­for­the­purposes­of­survival.2­But­evolutionary­efficacy­is­not­
the­same­as­epistemic­clarity,­and­one­of­the­major­virtues­of­the­PSM­theory­
is that it circumvents a common problem with many philosophies of mind, 
experience, and embodiment, which is the tendency to reify non-pathological 
waking states while disregarding phenomenal state classes which fall outside 
the­framework­constituted­by­default­first-person­experience.­
Accordingly,­one­of­the­most­interesting­aspects­of­Metzinger’s­work­is­that­
it is built around so-called deviant phenomenal models: experiential states 
wherein­the­transparency­of­the­default­first-person­experience­loses­some­
of its consistency and parts of the PSM become opaque to various degrees. 
In that regard, deviant phenomenal models such as psychedelic experiences, 
hallucinations,­lucid­dreams,­and­various­neurological­deficiencies­such­as­
agnosia­(the­inability­to­recognize­faces,­sometimes­including­one’s­own),­
2­ Another­more­non-technical­way­to­conceive­of­the­PSM­is­to­think­of­it­as­a­highly­
advanced­virtual­reality­model,­for­just­as­in­VR­the­major­objective­of­the­PSM­is­to­
make­the­user­unaware­of­the­fact­that­he­is­operating­in­a­medium.­Yet­with­the­PSM­
we­need­to­go­one­step­further­with­this­metaphor,­since­unlike­in­VR­there­is­no­user­
that precedes the interaction with the system because it is only the system that exists 
to­begin­with­(see­Metzinger­2004,­553–58).­In­other­words,­it­is­the­system’s­ability­to­
generate a world-model on the one hand, and a self-model on the other that produces 
the notion of a strong sense of self in immediate contact with the world.
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phantom­limbs,­and­blindsight­(the­experience­of­a­blind-spot­in­the­phe-
nomenal­world-model),­are­all­examples­of­such­experiential­states.­They­are­
characterized­by­a­lack of transparency and thereby explicate the representa-
tional nature of phenomenal self-consciousness by making the fact that the 
latter is a representational process globally available to the system. It is in this 
sense that deviant phenomenal states foreground the compelling speculative 
implications of modern neuroscience for philosophy, cultural production, and 
critical theory, since they point to the fact that our default phenomenal inter-
facing with cognitive interiority and non-cognitive exteriority is only one out 
of many possible experiential states—as opposed to the bedrock of humanity 
it­is­sometimes­mistaken­for.­And­once­the­neural­correlates­of­consciousness­
(NCC)­that­underlie­these­various­modes­of­experience­have­been­identified­by­
modern neuroscience, they could in principle be activated at will with the help 
of various neurotechnologies and cognitive enhancers. 
According­to­Metzinger,­the­proliferation­of­devices­for­exteriorizing­and­con-
trolling the brain, as well as the emergence of a modern science of cognition, 
will­form­the­bedrock­of­what­he­refers­to­as­Enlightenment­2.0­(i.e.,­the­inter-
nalization­of­Enlightenment­disenchantment—whereby­scientific­rationality­
comes to investigate its own cognitive basis—along with the gradual integra-
tion­of­neurotechnologies­into­everyday-life,­see­Metzinger­2009,­189–219).
There­is­no­denying­that­Enlightenment­2.0­has­somewhat­of­a­horrific­ring­
to it.3­Yet­it­is­my­firm­belief­that­theorists­and­cultural­producers­should­
embrace­its­disenchanting­vectors,­rather­than­follow­the­trajectory­main-
tained­by­the­Frankfurt­School­and­reject­them­for­moralistic­reasons,­since­
their­speculative­resources­promise­nothing­less­than­a­major­reconsideration­
of what it means to be human. Included in this remarkable intellectual shift 
will­be­the­cultural­import­of­the­scientific­image,­which­not­only­would­allow­
us to further diagnose the cultural deadlock of the present but also provide us 
with much needed resources to construct alternate cultural futures. 
In­fact,­processes­indexed­by­the­scientific­image­are­already­at­work­in­culture­
and have played central roles within important cultural movements such as 
nineties­rave­culture,­which­Simon­Reynolds­has­described­as­a­remarkable­
cultural and neurological event, thanks to the positive feedback-loops con-
stituted by technology and abstract digital sounds on the one hand and the 
neurobiological­effects­of­various­psychedelic­drugs­(ecstasy­in­particular)­on­
the other. Indeed, what was exciting about rave culture was the fact that the 
neurochemical­modifications­brought­about­by­the­excessive­use­of­drugs­did­
3­ This­side­of­Enlightenment­2.0­has­already­been­dramatized­in­various­science-fiction­
novels which depict the implications of the proliferation of neurotechnologies on a 
mass-scale—see­for­instance­Bakker­2009­and­Sullivan­2010—yet­in­contrast­to­these­
mainly­dystopic­scenarios­it­is­the­aim­of­this­essay­to­elaborate­on­its­(equally­impor-
tant)­potential­positive­implications.
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not­just­play­a­peripheral­role,­but­constituted­one­of­its­major­driving­forces.­
In­that­regard,­it­formed­one­pole­of­what­Reynolds­has­named­rave’s­“drug/
tech-interface,” which refers to the progressive unfolding of culture through 
neurotechnological experimentation and rave as an enclave of modernism—
a­cultural­component­of­what­Nick­Srnicek­and­Alex­Williams­recently­have­
characterized­as­an­alternative modernity—within an emerging postmodern 
cultural­landscape­(see­Srnicek­and­Williams­2013;­Fisher­and­Reynolds­2010).­
Accordingly,­if­Adorno­and­Horkheimer­argued­that­modernity­had­failed­to­
fulfill­the­promises­of­the­Enlightenment,­my­contention­is­that­the­trajectories­
toward an alternative modernity must be constructed through a renewed 
engagement­with­the­legacy­of­the­Enlightenment­(whether­construed­as­
“thanatropic”­or­2.0)­and­its­fundamental­speculative­implications—neu-
robiological experimentation, complex technological systems, impersonal 
models of reason, cosmic exploration, and so on—which harbor the key to 
the­rehabilitation­of­man’s­progressive­unfolding­toward­the­unknown.­I­will­
consequently­end­this­essay­with­a­few­initial­remarks­on­this­major­specula-
tive­project.
Conclusion: Promethean Futures
In­his­recent­work­on­the­hyperstasis­of­popular­culture,­Simon­Reynolds­
links the decline from modernist exploration to postmodern malaise with the 
disappearance of questions concerning the future from the cultural agenda 
(Reynolds­2012).­Whereas­rave­culture­(and­other­twentieth­century­musical­
subcultures­which­preceded­it)­was­steeped­in­the­notion­of­a­progressive­
unfolding across an extensional axis—a sort of future-rush driven by techno-
logical and cognitive navigation via the medium of sound—what is lacking in 
culture­today,­according­to­Reynolds,­is­any­meaningful­notion­of­the­future­
at­all.­Instead,­popular­culture­today­is­driven­by­what­Reynolds­has­referred­
to as retromania:­An­obsession­with­its­own­immediate­past­in­the­form­of­
remakes,­re-issues,­pastiche,­and­nostalgia.­And,­as­Mark­Fisher­has­pointed­
out­(again­following­Jameson),­this­widespread­cultural­deceleration­must­be­
understood as a symptom of the current neoliberal order: Capitalism has not 
only taken over the notion of modernity, but also that of the future—yet is 
unable to deliver anything beyond marginal changes within what ultimately 
must­be­characterized­as­a­terrestrial­status­quo­(Fisher­2009).­The­result­is­
a political left­paralyzed­by­the­deadlocks­of­the­present and unable to even 
imagine­a­future­beyond­the­confines­of­the­neoliberal­order.­Instead, what 
we­have­are­paltry­turns­toward­organicism,­local­areas­of­justice­and­equal-
ity, and laments over the decline of our humanity in the face of cybernetic 
capitalism.­This­is­now­the­default­position­not­just­among­many­anti-capitalist­
groups, but also in the tradition of critical theory, which may be traced back 
to­the­Frankfurt­School,­as­well­as­the­agenda­of­much­postmodern­critique.­
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It­is­consequently­at­this­particular­juncture­where­the­current­essay­must­
be situated, since I believe that what is needed today is a radical re-invention 
of critique which once again takes up the Marxist dictum of critical theory as 
a means for changing the world. Indeed, over the last decades it seems that 
this forward-looking aspect of critique has gradually faded away and been 
replaced­by­a­desire­to­go­backwards­by­restoring­what­we­once­were.­Yet­my­
contention­is­that­the­major­objective­of­critique­today­is­to­speculate­on­what 
we could become;­that­is,­to­operate­from­the­perspective­of­the­future­rather­
than from that of the past. It is in this context where the speculative integra-
tion­of­the­scientific­image­emerges­as­a­decisive­resource­for­modern­critical­
theory, since it provides thinking with a crucial component for orienting itself 
toward­the­future­in­the­form­of­a­major­reconsideration­of­what­it­means­
to­be­human.­In­that­regard,­it­must­be­understood­as­part­of­what­Brassier­
(2013)­has­defined­as­the­rehabilitation­of­Enlightenment­Prometheanism­as­
the means for collective self-mastery and active participation in the remak-
ing­of­mankind­and­the­world.­Far­from­being­the­dangerous­totalitarianism­it­
is often accused of being, Prometheanism must rather be understood as the 
speculative program necessary for the re-orientation of mankind toward the 
future qua the­unknown.­While­the­many­ambitions­of­this­massive­project­
certainly need to encompass much more than merely the cultural, I will con-
clude this essay with a few remarks on the latter since it is at the heart of my 
own research.
A­culture­steeped­in­Promethean­ambitions­needs­to­be­based­on­the­legacy­
of­thanatropic­Enlightenment,­rather­than­its­mainstream­dialectical­version,­
since it is only the former that will provide man with a proper intellectual con-
text­for­orienting­himself­toward­the­future.­Against­postmodernist­relativism­
and­blatant­anti-rationalism­it­must­uphold­the­intellectual­significance­of­the­
scientific­image­on­the­one­hand,­and­the­emancipatory­vectors­of­impersonal­
reason­on­the­other­(see­note­1­above).­At­the­heart­of­this­position­is­the­
rejection­of­what­was­earlier­referred­to­as­the­fictional­humanism­that­consti-
tutes­the­core­of­Adorno­and­Horkheimer’s­dialectical­thinking,­and­which­has­
reappeared numerous times in postmodern critical theory. In particular, con-
cepts such as nihilism, disenchantment, and alienation must not be thought 
of as mere cultural pathologies that need to be overcome, but as speculative 
instruments which must be re-invented through the emancipation from their 
confinement­within­the­postmodern­critical­context.­Indeed,­a­culture­operat-
ing­according­to­the­current­version­of­Enlightenment­Prometheanism­must­
take the latter as starting points, rather than dead ends, for its ventures into 
speculative­futures.­According­to­the­latter,­the­current­diagnosis­of­nihilism,­
alienation,­and­disenchantment­is­based­on­a­by­now­common­reification­of­
the­manifest­image­at­the­cost­of­its­scientific­counterpart;­yet­the­cultural­
integration of the latter under the aegis of a Promethean program will turn 
these concepts on their heads by forcing them to be cracked open by the vista 
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of­scientific­rationality.­In­that­regard,­it­is­important­to­once­again­emphasize­
that the cognitive and technological malaise maintained by neoliberalism 
must­not­just­be­understood­as­a­problem­of­mental­health,­but­also­(as­can­
be­seen­in­the­work­of­Jameson­and­Reynolds)­as­a­problem­of­the­relation-
ship between anthropic interiority and non-anthropic exteriority. Surely, the 
former­is­a­significant­problem­which­requires­its­own­particular­solutions,­
yet­to­think­of­the­social­and­cultural­implications­of­the­scientific­image­as­
purely an issue of mental health—which indeed seems to be the common 
response by analytic philosophers when confronted with scepticism and anti-
scientific­moralism­(see­for­instance­Churchland­2007­and­Ladyman­2009)—is­
to disregard its wider Promethean ambitions and potentially decisive role 
within­a­major­cultural­and­cognitive­shift.­The­latter­would­be­based­upon,­
amongst­other­things,­extensive­cognitive­experimentation,­which­utilizes­the­
speculative opportunities provided by neuroplasticity, advanced technologi-
cal­systems,­NBIC­(nanotechnology,­biotechnology,­information­technology,­
and­cognitive­science),­and­so­on,­and­would­be­realized­by­cultural-scientific­
resources such as the drug-tech interface, which thereby would need to be 
repurposed for post-capitalist ends.4 Indeed, the drug-tech interface has not 
so­much­disappeared­from­culture­since­the­decline­of­the­rave­ethos­(which,­
ironically,­also­took­the­turn­toward­revivalism­and­retrospection),­but­has­
rather been appropriated by capital in the form of the cultural and cognitive 
agenda­diagnosed­by­Rosen­and­Fisher­(i.e.,­ecstasy­and­alien­sound­systems­
have­been­substituted­by­anti-depressants­and­social­media).­What­there-
fore­is­necessary­is­a­major­re-appropriation­of­such­resources­in­the­form­
of cultural programs, which, once again, would up the ante of cognitive and 
cultural ambitions by re-orienting mankind towards the wonders of boundless 
exteriority.
References
Adorno,­Theodor­W.,­and­Max­Horkheimer.­1997.­Dialectic of Enlightenment. London: Verso 
Books.
Bakker,­Scott.­2009.­Neuropath. London: Orion Publishing Group.
Brassier,­Ray.­2007.­Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction.­Basingstoke:­Palgrave­
MacMillan.
Brassier,­Ray.­2013.­“On­Prometheanism­(And­Its­Critics).”­Speculations­conference,­New­York.­
Talk.­http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7W3KJGof2SE.
Brassier,­Ray,­and­Suhail­Malik.­2015.­“Reason­is­Inconsolable­and­Non-Conciliatory.”­In­Realism 
Materialism Art,­edited­by­Christoph­Cox,­Jenny­Jaskey,­and­Suhail­Malik,­213–30.­Berlin:­
Sternberg Press.
4­ In­that­regard,­the­current­project­must­also­be­thought­of­as­part­of­the­wider­politi-
cal­program­which­recently­has­been­referred­to­as­“accelerationism.”­For­the­best­
assessment­to­date­of­the­accelerationist­impetus­and­its­many­links­to­Enlightenment­
Prometheanism,­see­Srnicek­and­Williams­2013,­and­Williams­2013.
122 Alleys of Your Mind
Churchland,­Paul.­2007.­“Demons­Get­Out!”­Interview.­In­Collapse II: Speculative Realism, edited 
by­Robin­Mackay,­207–34.­Falmouth:­Urbanomic.
Fisher,­Mark.­2009.­Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative?­Winchester:­Zero­Books.
Fisher,­Mark,­and­Simon­Reynolds.­2010.­“You­Remind­Me­of­Gold.”­Transcript­
of­public­dialogue.­http://markfisherreblog.tumblr.com/post/32185314385/
you-remind-me-of-gold-dialogue-with-simon-reynolds.
Jameson,­Fredric.­1992.­Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. Durham: Duke 
University Press.
Ladyman,­James.­2009.­“Who’s­Afraid­of­Scientism?”­Interview.­In­Collapse V: The Copernican 
Imperative,­edited­by­Damian­Veal,­137–88.­Falmouth:­Urbanomic.
Metzinger,­Thomas.­2004.­Being No-One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.­Cambridge,­MA:­
MIT Press.
Metzinger,­Thomas.­2009.­“Enlightenment­2.0.”­Interview.­In­Collapse V: The Copernican Imper-
ative,­edited­by­Damian­Veal,­189–218.­Falmouth:­Urbanomic.
Reynolds,­Simon­2012.­Retromania: Pop Culture’s Addiction to Its Own Past.­London:­Faber­and­
Faber.
Rosen,­Larry­D.­2012.­iDisorder: Understanding Our Obsession with Technology and Overcoming Its 
Hold on Us.­Basingstoke:­Palgrave­Macmillan.
Sellars,­Wilfrid.­1963.­“Philosophy­and­the­Scientific­Image­of­Man.”­In­Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind,­1–40.­London:­Routledge­&­Keagan­Paul­.
Srnicek,­Nick,­and­Alex­Williams.­2013.­“#Accelerate:­Manifesto­for­an­Accelerationist­Politics.”­In­
Dark Trajectories: Politics of the Outside, edited by Joshua Johnson. Miami: Name.
Sullivan,­Tricia.­2010.­Lightborn: Seeing is Believing. London:­Orbit­Books.
Williams,­Alex.­2013.­“Escape­Velocities.”­E-flux 46.­http://www.e-flux.com/journal/
escape-velocities.

  INCOMPUTABILITY  
  AUTOMATION  
  GREGORY CHAITIN  
  INSTRUMENTAL RATIONALITY  
  TURING MACHINE  
In Alleys of Your Mind: Augmented Intellligence and Its Traumas, edited by Matteo Pasquinelli, 
125–37. Lüneburg: meson press, 2015.  
DOI: 10.14619/014 
[ 7 ]
Instrumental Reason, 
Algorithmic Capitalism, 
and the Incomputable 
Luciana Parisi 
Algorithmic cognition is central to today’s capitalism. 
From the rationalization of labor and social relations 
to the financial sector, algorithms are grounding a 
new mode of thought and control. Within the context 
of this all-machine phase transition of digital capital-
ism, it is no longer sufficient to side with the criti-
cal theory that accuses computation to be reducing 
human thought to mere mechanical operations. As 
information theorist Gregory Chaitin has demon-
strated, incomputability and randomness are to be 
conceived as very condition of computation. If techno-
capitalism is infected by computational randomness 
and chaos, the traditional critique of instrumental 
rationality therefore also has to be put into question: 
the incomputable cannot be simply understood as 
being opposed to reason.
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In­the­September­2013­issue­of­the­journal­Nature, a group of physicists from 
the­University­of­Miami­published­the­article­“Abrupt­rise­of­new­machine­
ecology­beyond­human­response­time.”­In­the­article,­they­identified­a­transi-
tion to “a new all-machine phase”­( Johnson­et­al.­2013)­of­financial­markets, 
which coincided with the introduction of high frequency stock trading after 
2006.­They­argued­that­the­sub-millisecond­speed­and­massive­quantity­of­
algorithm-to-algorithm interactions exceeds the capacity of human interac-
tions.­Analyzing­the­millisecond-scale­data­at­the­core­of­financial­markets­in­
detail, they discovered a large number of sub-second extreme events caused 
by­those­algorithms,­whose­proliferation­they­correlated­with­the­financial­
collapse­of­2008.­
In this new digital environment of trading, algorithmic agents make decisions 
faster than humans can comprehend. While it takes a human at least one full 
second­to­both­recognize­and­react­to­potential­danger,­algorithms­or­bots­
can make a decision on the order of milliseconds. These algorithms form “a 
complex­ecology­of­highly­specialized,­highly­diverse,­and­strongly­interact-
ing­agents”­(Farmer­and­Skouras,­2011),­operating­at­the­limit­of­equilibrium,­
outside of human control and comprehension.
The argument I develop here takes this digital ecology of high-frequency 
trading­algorithms­as­a­point­of­departure.­Thus,­my­text­is­not­specifically­
concerned­with­the­analysis­of­the­complex­financial­ecology­itself,­but­aims 
more directly to discuss a critique of automated cognition in the age of algo-
rithmic­capitalism.­For­if­financial­trading­is­an­example­of­a­digital­automation­
that is increasingly autonomous from human understanding, this system has 
become a second nature. Therefore it seems to be urgent today to ask: What is 
the­relation­between­critical­thought­vis-à-vis­those­digital­ecologies?
My question is: Can the critique of instrumental rationality—as addressed 
by Critical Theory—still be based on the distinction between critical thinking 
and­automation?­Can­one­truly­argue­that­algorithmic­automation­is­always­
already­a­static­reduction­of­critical­thinking?­By­answering­these­questions,­
we­cannot­overlook­an­apparent­dilemma:­Both, philosophical thought and 
digitality, rely on principles of indetermination and uncertainty while featuring 
these principles in­their­core­complexity­theories.­As­such,­both­challenge and 
define­the­neoliberal­order­at­the­same­time—a­paradox.­
To question this paradox, I will turn to the notion of incomputability as theo-
rized­by­computer­scientist­Gregory­Chaitin,­who­contributed­to­the­field­of­
algorithmic information theory in his discovery of the incomputable number 
Omega.­This­number­has­a­specific­quality:­it­is­definable­but­not­comput-
able.­In­other­words,­Omega­defines­at­once­a­discrete­and­an­infinite­state­of­
computation­occupying­the­space­between­zero­and­one.­From­a­philosophi-
cal perspective, the discovery of Omega points to a process of determination 
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of indeterminacy involving not an a priori structure of reasoning but more 
importantly­a­dynamic­processing­of­infinities­in­which­results­are­not­con-
tained in the logical premises of the system.
This centrality of the incomputable in information theory, I suggest, brings 
not­only­the­philosophical­critique­of­technical­rationalization­into­question,­
but­also­the­instrumentalization­of­reason.­Thus,­in­the­following­text­I­argue­
that­it­is­no­longer­sufficient­to­side­with­the­critical­view­of­technoscience­
on the basis that computation reduces human thought to mere mechanical 
operations. Instead, the paradox between realist philosophy and the realism 
of technocapital can be read as a symptom of an irreversible transformation 
in the history of critical thought in which the incomputable function of reason 
has entered the automated infrastructure of cognition. 
The Algorithms of Cognitive and Affective Capital
Capital has been said to have entered all aspects of personal and social life. 
Before­explaining­the­question­of­the­incomputable­in­algorithmic­automa-
tion, it is important to point out that with the so-called technocapitalist phase 
of real subsumption, digital automation has come to correspond to cognitive 
and­affective­capital.­With­this,­the­logic­of­digital­automation­has­entered­the­
spheres­of­affects­and­feelings,­linguistic­competences,­modes­of­cooperation,­
forms­of­knowledge,­as­well­as­manifestations­of­desire.­Even­more,­human­
thought itself is said to have become a function of capital. Our contempo-
rary understanding of this new condition in terms of “social capital,” “cultural 
capital,” and “human capital” explains that knowledge, human intelligence, 
beliefs, and desires have only instrumental value and are indeed a source of 
surplus­value.­In­this­automated­regime­of­affection­and­cognition,­capacities­
are­measured­and­quantified­through­a­general­field­defined­by­either­money­
or­information.­By­gathering­data­and­quantifying­behaviors,­attitudes,­and­
beliefs,­the­neoliberal­world­of­financial­derivatives­and­big­data­also­provides­
a­calculus­for­judging­human­actions,­and­a­mechanism­for­inciting­and­direct-
ing those actions. 
Paradoxically, in the time when “immaterial labor” is privileged over mate-
rial­production­(Hardt­and­Negri­2000),­and­when­marketing­is­increasingly­
concerned­with­affective­commodities­such­as­moods,­lifestyles,­and­“atmos-
pheres”­(Biehl-Missal­2012),­capitalist­realism­seems­to­be­fully­expressed­
(Fisher­2009),­guided­by­the­findings­of­cognitive­psychology­and­philosophy­of­
mind.­Central­to­these­findings­is­the­plasticity­of­the­neural­structure­as­well­
as the extension of cognitive functions—from perception to the capacity to 
choose­and­to­judge—through­algorithm-based­machines.­It­is­not­difficult­to­
see that nowadays the social brain is nothing else than a machine ecology of 
algorithmic agents. 
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A­different­aspect­is­discussed­by­Stiegler’s­view­of­technocapital.­He­sees­
thinking­and­feeling­as­the­new­motors­of­profit,­which­are­repressed­or­cap-
tured by capital and transformed into mere cognitive and sensory functions 
(2014).­In­other­words,­technocapital­is­what­denies­desire­and­knowledge,­
reason and sensation. Instead, it reduces these potentialities to mere prob-
abilities­determined­by­the­binary­language­of­yes­and­no,­zero­and­one.­
Exploring­this­further,­Lazzarato­(2012)­has­argued­that­a­critique­of­techno-
capital­can­focus­neither­on­the­capitalization­of­cognition­nor­its­automation.­
In The Making of the Indebted Man,­Lazzarato­(2012)­maintains­that­knowledge­
exercises­no­hegemony­over­the­cycle­of­value,­because­knowledge­(and­thus­
thought)­is­primarily­subject­to­the­command­of­financial­capital.­Here,­the­
neoliberal form of capital in its current phase of real subsumption corre-
sponds to the production of a new condition: the general indebtedness. This 
form of neoliberalism governance has entered all classes, even those that do 
not own anything. Hence, the most universal power relationship today is that 
of debtor and creditor. Debt is a technology of government sustained by the 
automated­apparatus­of­measuring­and­evaluation­(credit­reports, assess-
ments, databases,­etc.).­Lazzarato­understands­this­axiomatic­regime­in­terms­
of­a­semiotic­logic,­whose­core­scientific­paradigm­and­technological­appli-
cations­are­always­already­functioning­to­capture­(by­quantifying­in­values)­
primary aesthetic potentials. 
From­this­perspective,­automation­is­the­semiotic­logic­par­excellence,­which­
does­not­simply­invest­labor­and­its­cognitive­and­affective­capacities,­but­
more­specifically­becomes­a­form­of­governmentality,­which­operates­algorith-
mically to reduce all existence to a general form of indebtedness. This algorith-
mic­form­of­governability­is­also­what­has­given­way­to­a­diffused­financializa-
tion­of­potentialities­through­which­aesthetic­life­is­constantly­quantified­and­
turned into predictable scenarios.
Not­only­Lazzarato,­also­Massumi­(2007)­has­noted­the­diffused­ecological­
qualities of this new form of algorithmic governmentality, which he describes 
in terms of pre-emption, a mode of calculation of potential tendencies instead 
of existing possibilities. The calculation of potentialities that describe this 
dynamism is no longer based on existing or past data. Instead it aims at 
calculating the unknown as a relational space by measuring the interval 
between one existing data and another. This form of pre-emptive calculus 
indeed­transforms­the­limit­point­of­this­calculation—infinities—into­a­source­
of­capitalization.­
From­this­standpoint,­one­can­suggest­the­following:­Contrary­to­the­logic­of­
formal subsumption, which corresponds to the application of unchanging sets 
of rules, whose linearity aimed to format the social according to pre-ordained 
ideas, the logic of real subsumption coincides with the interactive compu-
tational paradigm. This paradigm is based on the responsive capacities of 
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learning,­openness,­and­adaptation­defining­human-machine­interaction­as­
well as distributed­interactive­systems.­With­the­extension­of­quantification­
to the indetermination of the environments—and thus to contingency—an 
intrinsic transformation of the logic of calculation has happened. In fact, the 
development of this interactive approach has been crucial to the now domi-
nant form of real subsumption. 
Historically, interactive algorithms were invented to circumvent the algo-
rithmic constraints of the Turing Machine. The concept of this machine was 
insufficient­or­unable­to­cope­with­the­complexity­of­the­empirical­world—a 
complexity that one could say, philosophically speaking, has its own nonrep-
resentational logic. Here, the advance of real subsumption cannot be isolated 
from the emergence of a dynamic form of automation, which constitutes a 
historical­development­in­computer­science­from­Turing’s­algorithmic­mod-
eling.­Back­then,­Turing’s­conceptualization­of­a­mechanism,­which­is­based­on­
a­priori­instructions,­strongly­resonated­with­a­mechanism­as­defined­by­first­
order­cybernetics­(a­closed­system­of­feedback).­Today,­the­combination­of­
environmental inputs and a posteriori instructions proposed by the inter-
active paradigm embrace second order cybernetics and its open feedback 
mechanisms. The goal of this new dynamic interaction is to include variation 
and­novelty­in­automation­to­enlarge­the­horizon­of­calculation,­and­to­include­
qualitative factors as external variables within its computational mechanism.
Contrary­to­Lazzarato’s­critique,­it­seems­important­not­to­generalize­auto-
mation as being always already a technocapitalist reduction of existential 
qualities. The task is rather to address the intrinsic transformation of the auto-
mated form of neoliberal governability and to engage closely with the ques-
tion of the technical. However, rather than arguing that the technical is always 
already a static formal frame, delimited by its binary logic, I suggest that 
there is a dynamic internal to the system of calculation. If so, it is necessary 
to engage with the real possibility of a speculative question that according 
to­Isabelle­Stengers­(2010­and­2011)­is­central­to­the­scientific­method:­What­
if automation already shows that there is a dynamic relation intrinsic to 
computational processing between input data and algorithmic instructions, 
involving­a­non-linear­elaboration­of­data?­What­if­this­dynamic­is­not­simply­
explainable in terms of its a posteriori use, i.e., once it is either socially used or 
mentally­processed?­
The interactive paradigm concerns the capacity of algorithms to respond and 
to adapt to its external inputs.­As­Deleuze­(1992)­already­foresaw,­an­interac-
tive system of learning and continuous adaptation is at the core of the logic 
of governance driven by the variable mesh of continuous variability. Here, the 
centrality of capitalism in society forces axiomatics to open up to external out-
puts,­constituting­an­environment­of­agents­through­which­capital’s­logic­of­
governance increasingly corresponds to the minute investment in the socius 
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and ultimately life variations. The question of the undecidable proposition 
is­important,­because­it­defines­an­immanent­and­not­transcendent­view­of­
capital,­as­Deleuze­and­Guattari­(1987)­remind­us.­This­is­the­case­in­so­far­as­
the extension of capital to life requires its apparatus of capture to be open to 
contingencies, variations and unpredictable change.
It­is­here­that­the­organizational­power­of­computation­needs­to­be­more­
closely investigated to clarify the transformation that automation itself has 
undergone­with­the­re-organization­of­capital­from­formal­to­real­subsump-
tion.­Interactive­automation­of­cognition­and­affection­should­be­examined­
anew. Whether we are faced with the critical conception of cognitive capital, 
or with the critical view of an automated governance based on a general 
indebtedness, we risk overlooking what can be considered the most radical 
process­of­artificialization­of­intelligence­that­human­history­has­ever­seen;­
this involves the conversion of organic ends into technical means, whose con-
sequences are yet to become unpacked. 
Although­my­thoughts­are­still­in­an­early­phase,­I­want­to­consider­the­pos-
sibility­of­theorizing­that­algorithmic­automation­heralds­the­realization­of­a­
second nature, in which a purposeless and impersonal mode of thought tends 
to­supplant­the­teleological­finality­of­reason,­echoed­by­Kant’s­conception­
of reason in terms of motive—i.e., the reason behind the action—that sub-
stantiates the­difference­between­understanding­and­reason.­This­is­also­a­
proposition, which more importantly works to challenge the theory that there 
is a mutual relation or undecidable proposition between philosophy and tech-
nology as well as between thought and capital. Instead of the idea that the 
refuge of thought and of philosophy from an increasingly dynamic technocapi-
talism­lies­in­the­ultimate­appeal­to­intellectual­intuition­and­affective­thought­
as the safe enclaves of pure uncertainty and singularity, I want to pursue the 
possibility that algorithmic automation—as rule-based thought—may rather 
be­indifferent­to­these­all­too­human­qualities,­whilst­actively­encompassing­
them all without representing philosophical and or critical thought. This is a 
proposition for the emergence of an algorithmic mode of thought that cannot 
be­contained­by­a­teleological­finality­of­reason,­which­characterizes­both­
capitalism and the critique of technocapitalism. 
The Turing Experiment and the Omega Number
As­we­know,­algorithmic­automation­involves­the­breaking­down­of­continuous­
processes into discrete components, whose functions can be constantly re-
iterated without error. In short, automation means that initial conditions can 
be­reproduced­ad­infinitum.­The­form­of­automation­that­concerns­us­here­
was born with the Turing Machine: an absolute mechanism of iteration based 
on step-by-step procedures. Nothing is more opposed to pure thought—or 
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“the­being­of­the­sensible”­as­Deleuze­(1994:­68)­called­it—than­this­discrete-
based machine of universal calculation. The Turing architecture of pre-
arranged units that could be interchangeably exchanged along a sequence is 
effectively­the­opposite­of­an­ontogenetic­thought­moving­through­a­differen-
tial­continuum,­through­intensive­encounters­and­affect.
Nevertheless,­since­the­1960s­the­nature­of­automation­has­undergone­
dramatic changes as a result of the development of computational capacities 
of storing and processing data. Previous automated machines were limited 
by the amount of feedback data. Now algorithmic automation is designed to 
analyze­and­compare­options,­to­run­possible­scenarios­or­outcomes,­and­
to perform basic reasoning through problem-solving steps that were not 
contained­within­the­machine’s­programmed­memory.­For­instance,­expert­
systems draw conclusions through search techniques, pattern matching, and 
web data extraction, and those complex automated systems have come to 
dominate our everyday culture, from global networks of mobile telephony to 
smart­banking­and­air­traffic­control.
Despite this development, much debate about algorithmic automation is still 
based­on­Turing’s­discrete­computational­machine.­It­suggests­that­algorith-
mic automation is yet another example of the Laplacian view of the universe, 
defined­by­determinist­causality­(see­Longo­2000­and­2007).­But­in­compu-
tational­theory,­the­calculation­of­randomness­or­infinities­has­now­turned­
what­was­defined­as­incomputables­into­a­new­form­of­probabilities,­which­
are­at­once­discrete­and­infinite.­In­other­words,­whereas­algorithmic­automa-
tion­has­been­understood­as­being­fundamentally­Turing’s­discrete­universal­
machine,­the­increasing­volume­of­incomputable­data­(or­randomness)­within­
online,­distributive,­and­interactive­computation­is­now­revealing­that­infinite, 
patternless data are rather central to computational processing. In order 
to appreciate the new role of incomputable algorithms in computation, it is 
necessary to make a reference to the logician Kurt Gödel, who challenged the 
axiomatic method of pure reason by proving the existence of undecidable 
propositions within logic. 
In­1931,­Gödel­took­issue­with­Hilbert’s­meta-mathematical­program.­He­
demonstrated that there could not be a complete axiomatic method, not a 
pure mathematical formula, according to which the reality of things could 
be­proven­to­be­true­or­false­(see­Feferman­1995).­Gödel’s­incompleteness­
theorems explain that propositions are true, even though they cannot be veri-
fied­by­a­complete­axiomatic­method.­Propositions­are­therefore­deemed­to­
be ultimately undecidable: They cannot be proven by the axiomatic method 
upon­which­they­were­hypothesized.­In­Gödel’s­view,­the­problem­of­incom-
pleteness, born from the attempt to demonstrate the absolute validity of pure 
reason­and­its­deductive­method,­instead­affirms­the­following:­No­a­priori­
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decision,­and­thus­no­finite­sets­of­rule,­can­be­used­to­determine­the­state­of­
things before things can run their course. 
Turing­encountered­Gödel’s­incompleteness­problem­while­attempting­to­
formalize­the­concepts­of­algorithm­and­computation­through­his­famous­
thought experiment, now known as the Turing Machine. In particular, the 
Turing Machine demonstrates that problems are computable, if they can 
be decided according to the axiomatic method.1 Conversely, those proposi-
tions, which cannot be decided through the axiomatic method, will remain 
incomputable.
By­proving­that­some­particular­functions­cannot­be­computed­by­such­a­
hypothetical machine, Turing demonstrated that there is not an ultimate deci-
sion­method­of­the­guise­that­Hilbert­had­wished­for.­The­strength­of­Turing’s­
proposition­is­that­his­Turing­Machine­offered­a­viable­formalization­of­a­
mechanical procedure. Instead­of­just­crunching­numbers, Turing’s­computing­
machines—and indeed contemporary digital machines that have developed 
from­them—can­solve­problems,­make­decisions,­and­fulfill­tasks;­the­only­
provision­is­that­these­problems,­decisions,­and­tasks­are­formalized­through­
symbols­and­a­set­of­discrete­and­finite­sequential­steps.­In­this­respect,­
Turing’s­effort­can­be­seen­as­a­crucial­step­in­the­long­series­of­attempts­in­
the­history­of­thought­geared­towards­the­mechanization­of­reason. 
However, what is more important is how the limit of computation and thus of 
the­teleological­finality­of­reason—automated­in­the­Turing­machine—have­
been transformed in computer science and information theory. Here, the work 
of­mathematician­Gregory­Chaitin­(2004,­2006,­and­2007)­is­particularly­symp-
tomatic of this transformation as it explains what is at stake with the limits of 
computation and the development of a dynamic form of automation. Distin-
guishing this transformation from the centrality of the interactive paradigm in 
technocapitalism is crucial. This paradigm, born from the necessity to include 
environmental contingencies in computation, mainly works to anticipate or 
pre-empt­response­(as­Massumi­2007­has­clearly­illustrated).­Instead,­and­
more importantly for me and my proposition of algorithmic automation as a 
mode of thought, it is a serious engagement with the function that incomput-
able data play within computation. To make this point clearer, I will have to 
explain­Chaitin’s­theory­in­greater detail. 
Chaitin’s­algorithmic­information­theory­combines­Turing’s­question­of­the­
limit­of­computability­with­Shannon’s­information­theory­demonstrating­the­
productive capacity of noise and randomness in communication systems, 
to discuss computation in terms of maximally unknowable probabilities. In 
every computational process, he explains, the output is always greater than 
1­ See­Turing­1936.­For­further­discussion­of­the­intersections­of­the­works­between­Hilbert,­
Gödel­and­Turing,­see­Davis­2000.
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the­input.­For­Chaitin,­something­happens­in­the­computational­process-
ing of data, something that challenges the equivalence between input and 
output, and thus the very idea that processing always leads to an already 
pre-programmed result. This something is, according to Chaitin, algorithmic 
randomness. The notion of algorithmic randomness implies that information 
cannot be compressed into a smaller program, insofar as between input and 
output an entropic transformation of data occurs, which results in a tendency 
of­these­data­to­increase­in­size.­From­this­standpoint,­the­output­of­the­
processing does not correspond to the inputted instructions, and its volume 
tends in fact to become bigger than it was at the start of the computation. The 
discovery of algorithmic randomness in computational processing has been 
explained by Chaitin in terms of the incomputable: increasing yet unknown 
quantities­of­data­that­characterize­rule-based­processing.
Chaitin­calls­this­algorithmic­randomness­Omega­(the­last­letter­of­the­Greek­
alphabet­refers­to­the­probability­that­this­number­is­infinite).­Chaitin’s­inves-
tigation of the incomputable reveals in fact that the linear order of sequen-
tial­procedures­(namely,­what­constitutes­the­computational­processing­of­
zeros­and­ones)­shows­an­entropic­tendency­to­add­more­data­to­the­existing­
aggregation of instructions established at the input. Since this processing 
inevitably includes not only a transformation of existing data into new inputs, 
but also the addition of new data on top of what already was pre-established 
in the computational procedure, it is possible to speak of an internal dynamic 
to computation. 
From­this­point­of­view,­computational­processing­does­not­mainly­guaran-
tee the return to initial conditions, nor does it simply include change derived 
from an interactive paradigm based on responsive outputs. This is because 
Chaitin’s­conception­of­incomputability­no­longer­perfectly­matches­the­notion­
of­the­limit­in­computation­(i.e.,­limit­for­what­is­calculable).­Instead,­this­limit­
as the incomputable is transformed: It becomes the addition of new and maxi-
mally unknowable algorithmic parts to the present course of computational 
processing; these parts are algorithmic sequences that tend to become bigger 
in volume than programmed instruction and to take over, hereby irreversibly 
transforming­the­pre-set­finality­of­rules.­Chaitin’s­re-articulation­of­the­incom-
putable is at once striking and speculatively productive. What was conceived 
to­be­the­external­limit­of­computation­(i.e.,­the­incomputable)­in­Turing,­has­
now­become­internalized­in­the­sequential­arrangement­of­algorithms­(ran-
domness­works­within­algorithmic­procedures).
At­Chaitin’s­own­admission,­it­is­necessary­to­see­algorithmic­randomness­as­
a­continuation­of­Turing’s­attempt­to­account­for­indeterminacy­in­computa-
tion.­Whereas­for­Turing­there­are­cases­in­which­finality­cannot­be­achieved,­
and thus computation—qua­automation­of­the­finality­of­reason—stops­when­
the incomputable begins, for Chaitin computation itself has an internal margin 
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of incomputability insofar as rules are always accompanied and infected by 
randomness. Hence, incomputability is not simply a break from reason, but 
rather reason has been expanded beyond its limits to involve the processing 
of­maximally­unknown­parts­that­have­no­teleological­finality.­To­put­it­in­other­
terms, automation is now demarcated by the incomputable, the unconditional 
of computation. Importantly, however, this challenges the view that computa-
tional processing corresponds to calculations leading to pre-programmed and 
already known outputs. Instead, the limits of automation—that is the incom-
putable—have become the starting point of a dynamism internal to computa-
tion,­which­exceeds­the­plan­for­technocapital’s­instrumentalization­of­reason.­
From­this­standpoint,­relating­Chaitin’s­findings­to­the­positioning­of­critical­
thought and technocapitalism reveals a new aspect: the incomputable cannot 
be simply understood as being opposed to reason. In other words, it is not 
an expression of the end of reason and cannot be explained according to the 
critical­view­that­argues­for­the­primacy­of­affective­thought.­
According­to­Chaitin,­the­incomputable­demonstrates­the­shortcomings­of­the­
mechanical view of computation, according to which chaos or randomness 
is­an­error­within­the­formal­logic­of­calculation.­But­incomputables­do­not­
describe the failure of intelligibility versus the triumph of the incalculable—on 
the contrary. These limits more subtly suggest the possibility of a dynamic 
realm­of­intelligibility,­defined­by­the­capacities­of­incomputable­infinities­
or randomness, to infect any computable or discrete set. In other words, 
randomness­(or­the­infinite­varieties­of­infinities)­is­not­simply­outside­the­
realm of computation, but has more radically become its absolute condition. 
And­when­becoming­partially­intelligible­in­the­algorithmic­cipher­that­Chaitin­
calls Omega, randomness also enters computational order and provokes an 
irreversible revision of algorithmic rules­and­of­their­teleological­finality.­It­is­
precisely this new possibility for an indeterminate revision of rules, driven by 
the inclusion of randomness within computation, that reveals dynamics within 
automated system and automated thought. This means the following: While 
Chaitin’s­discovery­of­Omega­demonstrates­that­randomness­has­become­
intelligible within computation, incomputables cannot, however, be synthe-
sized­by­an­a­priori­program­or­set­of­procedures­that­are­in­size­smaller­than­
them.­According­to­Chaitin,­Omega­corresponds­to­discrete­states­that­are­
themselves­composed­of­infinite­real­numbers­that­cannot­be­contained­by­
finite­axioms.­
What­is­interesting­here­is­that­Chaitin’s­Omega­is­at­once­intelligible­yet­non-
synthesizable­by­universals,­or­by­a­subject.­I­take­it­to­suggest­that­computa-
tion—qua­mechanization­of­thought—is­intrinsically­populated­by­incomput-
able data, or that discrete rules are open to a form of contingency internal 
to algorithmic processing. This is not simply to be understood as an error 
within the system, or a glitch within the coding structure, but rather as a part 
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of­computation.­Far­from­dismissing­computation­as­the­evil­incarnation­of­
technocapitalist­instrumentalization­of­reason,­one­realizes­that­incomputable­
algorithms­emerge­to­defy­the­superiority­of­the­teleological­finality­of­reason,­
but­also­of­sensible­and­affective­thought.­
Speculative Computation 
It­would­be­wrong­to­view­this­proposition­that­incomputables­define­the­
dynamic form of automation with naïve enthusiasm. Instead, it is important 
to address algorithmic automation without overlooking the fact that the com-
putation­of­infinity­is­nonetheless­central­to­the­capitalization­of­intelligible­
capacities—even in their automated form. My insistence that incomputables 
are­not­exclusively­those­non-representable­infinities,­which­belong­to­the­
being of the sensible, is indeed a concern, with the ontological and episte-
mological transformation of thought in view of the algorithmic function of 
reason.­Incomputables­are­expressed­by­the­affective­capacities­to­produce­
new thought, but more importantly reveal the dynamic nature of the intel-
ligible. Here, my concern is not an appeal to an ultimate computational being 
determining­the­truth­of­thought.­On­the­contrary,­I­have­turned­to­Chaitin’s­
discovery of Omega, because it radically undoes the axiomatic ground of truth 
by­revealing­that­computation­is­an­incomplete­affair,­open­to­the­revision­
of­its­initial­conditions,­and­thus­to­the­transformation­of­truths­and­finality.­
Since­Omega­is­at­once­a­discrete­and­infinite­probability,­it­testifies­to­the­
fact that the initial condition of a simulation—based on discrete steps—is and 
can­be­infinite.­In­short,­the­incomputable­algorithms­discovered­by­Chaitin­
suggest­that­the­complexity­of­real­numbers­defies­the­grounding­of­reason­in­
finite­axiomatics­and­teleological­finality.­
From­this­standpoint,­several­thoughts­unfold.­I­agree­that­the­interactive­par-
adigm of technocapitalism already points to a semi-dynamic form of automa-
tion,­which­has­enslaved­the­cognitive­and­affective­capacities­and­established­
a­financial­governmentality­based­on­debt.­But­beyond­this,­there­still­remain­
further­questions­regarding­the­significance­of­algorithms.­
If we risk confusing the clear-cut opposition between digitality and philoso-
phy­(Galloway­2013),­what­and­how­are­algorithms?­For­now,­I­want­to­point­
out that algorithms, this dynamic form of reason, rule-based and yet open 
to­be­revised,­are­not­defined­by­teleological­finality,­as­impersonal­func-
tions­transform­such­finality­each­time.­This­is­not­to­be­conceived­as­a­mere­
replacement or extension of human cognitive functions. Instead, my point is 
that­we­are­witnessing­the­configuration­of­an­incomputable­mode­of­thought­
that­cannot­be­synthesized­into­a­totalizing­theory­or­program.­Nonetheless,­
this thought exposes the fallacy of a philosophy and critical thought, which 
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reduces­computation­to­an­inferior­mechanization­of­reason,­destined­to­mere­
iteration­and­unable­to­change­its­final­directions. 
Here, my argument was mainly concerned with the critique of computation as 
the­incarnation­of­the­technocapitalist­instrumentalization­of­reason.­It­was­
an attempt at suggesting the possibility that algorithmic automation coincides 
with a mode of thought, in which incomputable or randomness have become 
intelligible,­calculable­but­not­necessarily­totalizable­by­technocapitalism.­
Despite­all­instrumentalization­of­reason­on­behalf­of­capitalism,­and­despite­
the repression of knowledge and desire into quantities, such as tasks, func-
tions, aims, there certainly remains an inconsistency within computation. This 
is­the­case­insofar­as­the­more­it­calculates,­the­more­randomness­(pattern-
less­information)­it­creates,­which­exposes­the­transformative­capacities­of­
rule-based functions. In the algorithm-to-algorithm phase transition that most 
famously­characterizes­the­financial­trading­mentioned­at­the­beginning­of­
this essay, it is hard to dismiss the possibility that the automation of thought 
has exceeded representation and has instead revealed that computation itself 
has become dynamic. 
To conclude I want to add this: dynamic automation cannot be mainly 
explained in terms of a necessary pharmacological relation between philoso-
phy and technology, knowledge, and capital, or the conditional poison allow-
ing­for­a­mutual­reversibility­defined­by­a­common­ground­as­Stiegler­(2014)­
does. Similarly, one has to admit that the dynamic tendencies at the core of 
algorithmic automation are not simply reducible to the technocapitalist logic 
of­semiotic­organization­declared­by­Lazzarato­(2012)­or­to­the­exploitation/
repression of the cognitive-creative functions of thought. 
The challenge that automated cognition poses to the post-human vision—that 
thought and technology have become one, because of technocapitalism—
points to the emergence of a new alien mode of thought, able to change its 
initial­conditions­and­to­express­ends­that­do­not­match­the­finality­of­organic­
thought. This also means that the algorithm-to-algorithm phase transition 
does not simply remain another example of the technocapitalist instrumen-
talization­of­reason,­but­more­subtly­reveals­a­realization­of­a­second­nature­
in the form of a purposeless and automated intelligence. If algorithmic 
automation no longer corresponds to the execution of instructions, but to the 
constitution of a machine ecology infected with randomness, then one can 
suggest that neither technocapitalism nor the critique of technocapitalism can 
contain the tendency of the automated processing of randomness to over-
come axiomatic truths. 
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Revolution Backwards: 
Functional Realization 
and Computational 
Implementation 
Reza Negarestani 
Functionalist theories of mind come from heterogeneous 
directions and address an array of problems ranging from 
metaphysical to epistemic-semantic and engineering ones. 
Similarly, computational theories of mind cover different 
classes of computational complexity. The first part of this 
text examines what it means to combine the functional 
description of the human mind with the computational 
one. The second part addresses the ramifications of a 
computationalist-functionalist account of the mind as 
exemplified in Alan Turing’s proposal for realizing intel-
ligent machinery. The implementation of a computational-
ist-functionalist account of the human mind in machines is 
depicted as a program that deeply erodes our capacity to 
recognize what human experience manifestly is. In doing 
so, it fractures the historical experience of what it means 
to be human. Yet this is a rupture that marks a genuine 
beginning for the history of intelligent machines.
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Function, Computation, and their Alliance
Traditionally a thesis in the philosophy of mind, functionalism is a view of the 
mind­as­a­functional­organization.­It­attempts­to­explicate­what­the­mind­does­
and how it does it by reference to functional roles and properties that can 
be­causal­or­logical-conceptual.­In­this­sense,­functionalism­conjoins­(a)­the 
metaphysical problem of describing causal relations between explanans and 
explanandum­in­functional­terms­of­selection­and­purpose-attainment­(i.e.,­
the­function­as­what—according­to­specific­and­relevant­selection­criteria—
makes­a­difference­in­explanandum)­with­(b)­an­epistemic-semantic problem 
concerning­how­to­differentiate­semantic­content­from­physical­information­
and how to view the semantic intercontent in terms of functions as logico-
conceptual­roles­with­(c)­an engineering problem­regarding­the­realization­of­
functional properties in relation to or in isolation from structural properties.
Computationalism­is­a­view­that­the­functional­organization­of­the­brain­is­
computational or implements computation, and neural states can be viewed 
as computational states. In this context, computation can refer to either 
intrinsic computation­(i.e.,­computation­detached­from­the­semantics­of­utility­
implicit­in­algorithms),­or­logical computation­(in­which­processes­implicitly­
implement­algorithms­to­yield­specific­outputs).­While­analysis­in­terms­of­
intrinsic computation attempts to detect and measure basic spatio-temporal 
information processing elements without reference to output states or the 
information produced, analysis in terms of algorithmic computation is based 
on­the­identification­of­output­states­and­then­singling­out­processes­which­
algorithmically­map­input­to­that­specific­output.­
Intrinsic computation is about how structures actually support and constrain 
information processing, how regularities are formed and how structures move 
between one internal state to another, and in doing so, oscillate between 
randomness­and­order­(i.e.,­the­inherent­association­between­structural­
complexity­and­intrinsic­computational­capabilities­of­processes).­Whereas­
algorithmic computation is concerned with the mapping between input states 
and­output­states­(or­states­and­actions),­and­how­this­mapping­relation­can­
be seen as a pattern or a compressed regularity that can be captured algorith-
mically. Hence, from the perspective of algorithmic computation, a machine or 
a brain computes a function by executing a single or a collection of programs 
or algorithms.
In reality, neither functionalism nor computationalism entails one another. 
But­if­they­are­taken­as­implicitly­or­explicitly­related,­that­is,­if­the­functional­
organization­(with­functions­having­causal­or­logical­roles)­is­regarded­as­
computational either intrinsically or algorithmically, then the result is compu-
tational functionalism. 
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Depending­on­what­is­meant­by­function­(causal­or­logico-conceptual)­and­
depending­on­what­is­meant­by­computation­(intrinsic-structural­or­algorith-
mically­decomposable),­bridging­functionalism­with­computationalism­leads­
to varieties of positions and approaches: rational or normative functional-
ism­with­structural­constraints­(Sellars­2007),­strongly­mechanistic/causal­
functionalism­(Bechtel­2008),­rational­functionalism­with­a­level­of­algorithmic­
decomposability­(Brandom­2008),­normatively­constrained­functionalism­
with­intrinsic­computational­elements­(Craver­2007),­strongly­logical­func-
tionalism­with­algorithmic­computationalism­(classical­variations­of­artificial­
intelligence),­causal­functionalism­with­intrinsic­computationalism­(Crutchfield­
1994),­weak­logical­functionalism­with­intrinsic­computationalism­and­strong­
structural­constraints­(artificial­intelligence­programs­informed­by­embodied­
cognition)­and­so­on.­
Even­though­this­might­be­a­controversial­claim,­in­recognizing­thinking­as­
an activity that ought to be theoretically and practically elaborated, philoso-
phy­turns­itself­into­an­implicitly­functionalist­project.­A­philosopher­should­
endorse at least one type of functionalism insofar as thinking is an activity and 
the­basic­task­of­the­philosopher­is­to­elaborate­the­ramifications­of­engag-
ing in this activity in the broadest sense and examine conditions required for 
its­realization.­Pursuing­this­task­inevitably­forces­philosophy­to­engage­with­
other disciplines, and depending on its scope and depth, it demands philoso-
phy to rigorously acquaint itself with social and natural sciences, political 
economy as well as neuroscience, computational linguistics as well as evolu-
tionary biology.
The mind is what it does. While this mental or noetic doing can be taken as 
constrained by the structural complexity of its material substrate, it should be 
described in the functional vocabulary of activities or doings. The mind—be 
it taken as an integration of distinct yet interconnected activities related to 
perception,­thinking,­and­intention­or­seen­as­a­cognitive-practical­project­
whose­meanings­and­ramifications­are­still­largely­unknown­(à la Hegel and 
Mou­Zongsan)—has­primarily­a­functional­import­(see­Mou­2014).­
Identifying­the­mind­as­a­thing­is­a­move­toward­rendering­the­mind­ineffa-
ble,­since­it­flattens­the­specific­conditions­and­constraints­(whether­material­
or­logico-conceptual)­necessary­for­the­realization­of­the­mind,­and­thereby,­
confers primordial and perennial qualities on it. The mind becomes the given. 
But­characterizing­the­mind­in­terms­of­role-specific­activities­or­functions­is­
the­first­step­for­preventing­the­mind­from­becoming­ubiquitous­to­such­an­
extent­that­it­turns­ineffable.­This­is­because­by­defining­the­mind­in­terms­of­
activities,­we­are­forced­to­explain­how­these­activities­are­realized,­what­sorts­
of processes and structures constrain and support them, and what roles these 
activities play. 
142 Alleys of Your Mind
This functional decomposition or analysis then provides us with additional 
information regarding if what the mind appears to be doing is indeed a single 
activity or is in fact comprised of diverse and qualitatively distinct activities 
with­specific­roles­and­domains­in­or­outside­of­what­we­previously­viewed­as­
a unitary picture of the mind. In other words, seeing and examining the mind 
in­terms­of­function­not­only­forestalls­ineffability­but­also­leads­to­a­system-
atic­destruction­of­a­reified­picture­of­the­mind.­In­this­sense,­the­functional­
description of the mind is at once a critical and a constructive gesture. It is crit-
ical­because­it­subjects­whatever­we­understand­as­the­mind­to­a­functional­
analysis­or­methodical­decomposition.­Abilities­are­distinguished­by­activities­
which­realize­them­and­activities­are­differentiated­by­their­roles­and­inves-
tigated­in­light­of­conditions­required­for­their­realization:­distinct­processes­
with their own pattern-uniformities, hierarchies of structural complexity with 
their intralevel and interlevel constraints and dependency relations between 
constituents,­different­classes­and­types­of­function,­etc.­
Accordingly,­the­functional­description­is­able­to­reveal­not­only­what­those­
activities we associate with the mind are and which roles they play, but also 
how­they­are­organized­and­realized.­Looking­deep­into­the­functional­organi-
zation­and­conditions­of­realization,­what­was­previously­deemed­as­a­single­
activity may turn out to be multiple qualitatively distinct activities or multiple 
activities may turn out to be a single one. Therefore, the analytical research 
launched by the functional description leads to a fundamental reevaluation 
of the nature of cognitive activities and thus, culminates in a drastic change in 
what­we­mean­by­mind-specific­activities­including­thinking.­
Now­insofar­as­this­analytical­investigation­identifies­and­maps­conditions­
required­for­the­realization­of­mind-specific­activities,­it­is­also­a­program­for­
the­functional­realization­and­construction­of­cognitive­abilities.­The­extended­
functional­map­is­a­blueprint­for­realization.­In­other­words,­the­functional­
description has a constructive import. It is in the context of functional descrip-
tion­and­functional­realization­that­the­role­of­computationalism­and­its­
connection with functionalism become explicit. If there is a computational 
description for a function, that function can—in principle and within the 
framework of the right paradigm of computation—be reconstructed through 
a machine or a system of interacting agents capable of implementing the 
relevant computation. In this sense, computational description is not the 
same­as­functional­description,­it­is­an­account­of­functional­realizability­in­
computational­terms­combined­with­the­different­conditionals­regarding­the­
computability­or­incomputability­of­functions­for­a­specific­computational­
class as well as the paradigm of computation under which the computational 
complexity­is­defined.1 
1­ Even­though­the­choice­of­the­paradigm­of­computation­is­seldom­discussed­in­the­
computational­theory­of­mind­or­orthodox­approaches­to­artificial­intelligence,­it­is­a­
Revolution Backwards 143
Combining functionalism with computationalism requires a carefully con-
trolled­merger.­Based­on­their­hierarchies,­roles,­and­attachments­with­
specific­structures,­different­realizability­conditions­implement­different­types­
or classes of computation, some of which are computationally intractable to 
others. If by computationalism, we mean a general view of computation in 
which computation at the level of causal mechanisms and computation at the 
level­of­logico-conceptual­functions­are­indiscriminately­joined­together­and­
there­is­no­distinction­between­different­classes­of­computational­functions­
or computational models with their appropriate criteria of applicability to 
algorithmic­and­non-algorithmic­(interactive)­behaviors,­then­nothing­except­a­
naïve bias-riddled computational culture comes out of the marriage between 
functionalism and computationalism. Within this culture, the prospects and 
ramifications­of­computational­reconstruction­of­complex­cognitive­abilities­
are­always­polarized­between­an­uncritical­optimism­and­a­dogmatic­cynicism,­
claims of inevitability and impossibility. 
Functional­realization­of­cognition—whether­viewed­through­the­lens­of­
embodiment or semantic complexity—may, in fact, be captured and recon-
structed computationally. The analytic-constructive prospects of computa-
tional functionalism are open to examination and experimentation. However, 
criterion that is particularly consequential for describing and modeling functions. Gen-
erally,­computation­is­defined­by­reference­to­the­Church-Turing­paradigm­of­computa-
tion where the emphasis is put on how computation is sequentially executed and what is 
computable. However, the Church-Turing paradigm has been challenged in the past few 
decades in computer science by proponents of the interactive paradigm of computation 
such­as­Samson­Abramsky­and­Peter­Wegner­among­others.­One­of­the­main­motiva-
tions behind this divergence was precisely the debates concerning what computation 
is as opposed to what is computable. Developed through intersections between proof 
theory, linguistics, foundational logic, physics and computer science, these debates have 
led­to­the­theory­of­fundamental­duality­of­computation­where­computation­is­defined­
as a confrontation between actions or processes. These interactions can be logically 
expressed­by­sets­of­axioms­for­elementary­acts­(for­example,­in­the­context­of­linguistic­
practices, these axiomatic actions can be elementary speech acts such as assertion, 
query,­permission,­etc).­In­the­Church-Turing­paradigm­of­computation,­for­a­given­sys-
tem­the­influences­of­the­external­environment­are­represented­by­an­average­behavior.­
Any­unpredictable­behavior­of­the­environment­is­registered­as­a­perturbation­for­the­
system.­A­Turing­machine­shuts­out­the­environment­during­the­computation,­and­inter-
action­is­rudimentary­represented­through­sequential­algorithms.­But­interaction­as­in­
concurrent processes and synchronous or asynchronous actions between agents is irre-
ducible to the sequential interaction as it is represented by distributed parallel systems. 
In contrast to the Church-Turing paradigm, the interactive paradigm considers computa-
tion to be the natural expression of the interaction itself. The behavior of the system 
evolves in response to and in interaction with the inputs from the external environment. 
This­duality­that­is­intrinsic­to­computation­can­be­exemplified­in­games­or­collaborative,­
neutral­and­adversarial­engagements­between­agents.­Each­move,­strategy­or­behavior­
evolves in accordance with synchronous or asynchronous moves or behaviors of other 
parties. In other words, the computational operation is the interaction between agents 
which­represent­different­strategies­of­action.­For­discussions­surrounding­the­interac-
tive­paradigm­of­computation,­see­Goldin,­et­al.­2006.­
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this­is­only­possible­if­conditions­of­realization­are­carefully­differentiated­
and examined with reference to distinct modes and classes of computation. 
If­the­activities­that­count­as­thinking­are­taken­as­purely­symbolic­(cf.­the­
investment­of­classical­program­of­AI­on­symbolic­algorithmic­computation)­or­
purely­causal­(cf.­structural­theories­of­the­mind­focused­on­intrinsic­compu-
tation),­the­result­will­most­likely­be­either­an­evidence­of­the­impossibility­
of­functional­realization­or­the­intractability­of­functional­properties­of­the­
mind­to­computation­(or­it­could­even­be­both).­But­these­evidences­do­not­
stem­from­the­intrinsic­resistance­of­the­mind-specific­activities­to­functional­
and computational descriptions. They are rather the results of improper and 
incompatible­functional­and­computational­descriptions­(not­having­the­cor-
rect computational description in the context of the adequate computational 
paradigm­for­the­right­functional­description).­Therefore,­they­cannot­be­
treated­as­proofs­against­the­functional­realization­of­the­mind­(i.e.,­the­idea­
that­the­mind­can­be­reconstructed­by­different­sets­of­realizers)­or­the­com-
putational­description­of­its­realizability­(i.e.,­the­idea­that­mind-specific­activi-
ties­can­be­realized­by­computational­functions­which­can­be­implemented­in­
artifacts).­
Intrinsic computational modeling is suitable for causal-structural conditions of 
realization,­whereas­symbolic­logical­computation­is­pertinent­to­language­at­
the­level­of­syntax.­But­semantic­complexity­associated­with­conceptual­and­
rule-following­activities­requires­a­different­kind­of­algorithmic­decomposabil-
ity­and­that­is­specific­to­the­social­or­interactive­dimension­of­linguistic­discur-
sive practices through which the pragmatic mediation of syntactical expres-
sions­yield­different­layers­of­semantics­and­grades­of­concepts.­Complex­
semantic abilities are acquired through dialogical aspects of language which 
involve interaction between agents or language-users.2 Given that the logic 
and the evolving structure of the interaction itself is a fundamental aspect 
of­computation­and­necessary­for­the­realization­of­conceptual­functions­or­
concept-roles, complex cognitive abilities which involve semantic richness, 
2­ In traditional approaches to semantics, even though the semantic content is under-
stood in terms of inference, the inference is only viewed with reference to the relation 
between the premise and the conclusion, or the monological relation between propo-
sitional­contents.­An­approach­to­meaning­via­monological­processes,­however,­does­
not capture the multilayered complexity of the semantic content. Content-richness or 
semantic­complexity­can­only­be­obtained­via­dual­interacting­(arguing)­processes­when­
dynamically contrasted to each other. These dual interacting-contrasting processes 
describe the dialogical dimension of inference which is required for the dynamic 
appraisal­and­determination­of­semantic­content­as­well­as­the­generation­of­different­
semantic layers and grades of concept. The dialogical dimension of inference adds an 
interpersonal angle to the intercontent aspect of inference. It is this interpersonal or 
dialogical aspect that is expressed by the social discursive scope of reasoning and can 
be­elaborated­as­a­form­of­multi-agent­computation.­For­a­detailed­study­of­dialogical­
approaches to meaning and inference especially in light of new advances in interactive 
logics­and­computational­semantics,­see­Lecomte­2011.
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resource-sensitive inference and dynamic structures require a paradigm shift 
in­computational­modeling.­This­shift­should­satisfactorily­reflect­the­interac-
tion itself as an integral and indispensable element of computation. 
It is this irreducible and fundamental interactive-social dimension of the core 
components of cognition such as concept-use, semantic complexity and mate-
rial­inferences­that­the­classical­program­of­artificial­intelligence­in­its­objec-
tive to construct complex cognitive abilities has failed to address and investi-
gate.­Is­the­Church-Turing­paradigm­of­effective­computation­with­its­widely­
discussed­implications­for­algorithmic­mechanizability­a­suitable­candidate­
for­modeling­the­interactive-social­dimensions­of­cognition?­Or­is­it­inherently­
inadequate­when­its­definition­of­computation­is­extended­to­include­interac-
tion in its evolving and non-monotonic sense that occurs in open systems, in 
dialogues or between asynchronous processes or collaborative and adver-
sarial­agents.­But­even­more­generally,­can­social­linguistic­discursive­prac-
tices­responsible­for­the­semantic­complexity­be­computationally­described?­
Can computational descriptions of social-pragmatic dimensions of semantics 
and inferences be algorithmically captured considering that the computa-
tional­description­is­not­the­same­as­the­algorithmic­description?­­And­if­they­
can­indeed­be­algorithmically­expressed,­then­what­kinds­of­algorithms?­If­
by computation we mean symbolic algorithms, then the answer is negative. 
But­insofar­as­language­is­a­form­of­computation­and­compression—albeit­
one­in­which­compression­is­modified­for­communal­sharing­and­interaction­
between­agents­and­where­different­computational­classes­are­combined­and­
integrated—even the semantic complexity or meaning-relations of language 
can be “in principle” computationally generated.3­­An­emphatic­rejection of 
this­possibility­risks­replacing­the­ineffability­of­the­mind­and­its­activities­with­
the­ineffability­of­the­social­and­its­discursive­practices.­However,­in­order­to­
find­and­develop­the­appropriate­computational­models­and­algorithms­of­
concept-formation­and­meaning-use,­first­we­have­to­determine­what­sorts­of­
activities a group of agents—be they animals or artifacts—have to perform in 
order to count as engaging in linguistic discursive practices. 
The alliance between functionalism and computationalism takes the construc-
tive implications of the former one step further—but a step that is in every 
respect a leap. If the functionalist account of the mind is already a blueprint 
for­the­realization­and­reconstruction­of­the­mind,­the­functionalist­and 
computational­account­of­the­mind­is­a­program­for­the­actual­realization­of­
the mind outside of its natural habitat, its implementation in contexts that 
we­have­yet­to­envisage.­But­this­openness­to­implementation­suggests­a­
functional evolution that is no longer biological or determined by an essential 
structure.
3­ For­more­details­on­computational­compression­and­the­social­environment,­see­Dowe­
et­al.­2011.­
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The history of functionalism has deep philosophical roots going back to Plato, 
to­the­Stoics­(the­functional­account­of­emotions)­and­extending­to­Kant,­
Hegel,­Sellars,­Brandom,­and­Wimsatt.­Similarly,­computationalism­has­also­
a long history passing through scholastic logicians, the early mechanistic 
philosophy,­the­project­of­mathesis universalis, and in the wake of revolutions 
in mathematics and logics leading to modern computation and ultimately, 
the current advances in computational complexity theory and computational 
mechanics­(as­represented­by­figures­such­as­Charles­Bennett­and­James­
Crutchfield).­However,­computational­functionalism—at­least­its­rigorous­elab-
oration—is­a­recent­alliance.­Among­its­forerunners,­one­name­particularly­
stands­out,­Alan­Turing.­The­significance­of­Turing’s­computationalist­project­is­
that it simultaneously pushes the boundaries of theory and experimentation 
away. Computational functionalism is presented by Turing as a theory that 
gestures­toward­its­own­realization­and­in­fact,­it­is­the­theory­that­has­to­keep­
up­the­pace­with­the­escalating­rate­of­its­concrete­realization.­­
A Revolution that Writes Its Own Past
To­continue­and­conclude­this­essay,­I­intend­to­briefly­address­the­significance­
of­the­functionalist­account­of­the­human­mind,­and­more­specifically,­Turing’s­
computational-functionalist­project­as­an­experimentation­in­the­realization­
of­the­thinking­agency­or­the­cognitive-practical­subject­in­machines.­As­it­will­
be argued, it is an experiment whose outcomes expunge the canonical por-
trait­of­the­human­backwards­from­the­future.­It­originates­a­project­in­which­
humanity elaborates in practice a question already raised in physical sciences: 
“To­what­extent­does­the­manifest­image­of­the­man-in-the-world­survive?”­
(Sellars­2007,­386).
To­this­extent,­I­shall­discuss­the­ramifications­of­Turing’s­response­to­to­what­
are known as the “arguments from various disabilities”­(henceforth,­AVD)­as­
an­assault­upon­the­canonical­portrait­of­the­human­no­less­significant,­in­
its­theoretical­and­practical­consequences,­than­the­Copernican­Revolution­
was­in­terms­of­shaking­our­firm­views­concerning­the­world­and­ourselves­in­
it. In his groundbreaking essay Computing Machinery and Intelligence, Turing 
(1950)­responds­to­and­challenges­a­number­of­oft-repeated­objections­against­
the implicit albeit fundamental assumption of computational-functionalism, 
namely,­the­possibility­of­the­realization­of­a­machine­that­is­able­to­computa-
tionally implement functions we regularly associate with human experience 
such as perception, cognition, and intention. 
Machines cannot think, machines cannot have emotions, machines cannot 
be­purposeful,­they­cannot­be­proactive­and­so­forth:­Turing­(1950)­enumer-
ates­these­under­what­he­calls­AVD.­It­is­a­sort­of­straw machine argument that 
is baseless and precarious. It is more a fruit of our psychological fears and 
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residual theological approaches to the world and ourselves than the result of 
sound arguments.
As­a­supporter­of­arguments­against­machines’­abilities,­the­mind-preserva-
tionist­is­a­person­who­believes­that­the­mind­cannot­be­functionally­realized­
and­implemented­in­different­substrates.­The­mind-preservationist­not­only­
rejects­the­functionalist­realization­of­the­mind­but­also,­as­a­result,­adopts­a­
form­of­vitalism­or­ineffability­of­the­human­mind.­The­mind-preservationist­
always­attempts­to­see­the­machine’s­abilities­from­the­perspective­of­an­
endemic­disability.­But­if­what­the­mind-preservationist­really­dismisses­is­not­
the­machine­as­such­but­instead­the­functional­realization­of­the­mind­imple-
mented in the machine, then what he actually denies is not the machine per se 
but the mind itself. Or more accurately, what the mind-preservationist ends 
up­rejecting­is­the­possibility­of­mapping­the­mind’s­functions,­the­possibility­
of­modeling­and­defining­it­as­an­object­of­a­thoroughgoing­scrutiny.­In­short,­
the mind-preservationist resists seeing the mind as what it really is.
The mind-preservationist turns an epistemic quandary regarding identify-
ing­conditions­required­for­the­realization­of­the­mind­(what­makes­the­mind­
mind)­into­an­ontological­position­concerning­the­impossibility­of­realization.­If­
the mind-preservationist simply says that we do not know how these sorts of 
abilities we associate with the mind—or more generally, the human experi-
ence—are­realized,­he­then­can­not­strictly­deny­the­possibility­of­the­realiza-
tion­of­these­abilities­in­a­machine.­Why?­Because­that­would­be­simply­a­form­
of­provisional­agnosticism­that­does­not­warrant­rejection;­he­then­has­to­yield­
and agree to the possibility of a future—even though a very distant one—
where both epistemic requirements and technical criteria of the machine-
implementation­are­fulfilled.­Consequently,­the­mind-preservationist­has­to­
lend an ontological status to this epistemic uncertainty so that he can turn a 
tentative­reaction­into­a­decisive­negation,­crushing­a­future­plausibility­(the­
possibility­of­an­adequate­functional­picture­and­means­of­implementation)­in­
favor of an everlasting implausibility.
In this sense, machine-denialism is simply an excuse for denying what the 
mind is and what it can be. Correspondingly, disavowing the pursuit of 
understanding the mind coincides with acting against the evolution of the 
mind, since from a pragmatic-functional viewpoint the understanding of the 
meaning­of­the­mind­is­inseparable­from­how­the­mind­can­be­defined,­recon-
structed,­and­modified­in­different­contexts.­Therefore,­if­we­lack­the­defini-
tion­of­the­mind­which­is­itself­a­map­for­its­realization­and­implementation,­
then how can we so eagerly rule out the possibility of a machine furnished 
with­a­mind?­The­mind-preservationist,­accordingly,­has­a­double­standard­
when­it­comes­to­recognizing­the­mind­as­both­the­measure­and­the­object­of­
his critique. He says the machine cannot engage in mental activities as if he 
knows­what­the­mind­really­is­and­how­it­is­realized.­However,­if­he­does­not­
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know­the­answers­to­these­questions,­then­he­cannot­approach­the­realizable-
implementable account of the mind from the perspective of an intrinsic dis-
ability or impossibility.4 
If you do not know what the mind is then how can you claim that the machine 
cannot­possibly­have­a­mind?­With­the­understanding­that­the­“what”­posed­
in­this­question­is­the­very­map­of­the­mind’s­functional­realizability­that­can­
be implemented in machines. Here, “what” can be described functionally as 
those activities­that­define­what­the­mind­is.­The­mind­is­therefore­described­
as­a­functional­item,­in­terms­of­its­capacities­for­mentation­(i.e.,­engaging­in­
mental­activities).­From­a­functionalist­perspective,­what makes a thing a thing 
is not what a thing is but what a thing does. In other words, the functional item 
is not independent of its activity.
The activities of the mind are indeed special in the sense that they are not 
ubiquitous.­But­as­Bechtel­(2008,­3)­suggests­it­is­not­in­spite­of­being­com-
prised of mechanisms but in virtue of the right kind of mechanisms that the 
mind is special and its activities have distinctive characteristics. This specialty 
is­not­the­result­of­some­sort­of­ineffability­or­exorbitant­uniqueness:­It­is­a­
corollary­of­a­proper­organization­of­right­kind­of­realizers.
For­this­reason,­if­the­argument­from­the­perspective­of­disabilities­is­adopted­
as a standard strategy toward machines, or if it is exercised as a pre-deter-
mined­reaction­to­the­possibility­of­the­realization­of­the­mind­in­different­sub-
strates,­then­it­does­not­have­a­genuine­critical­attitude.­Why?­Because­such­
a critical strategy then has implicitly subscribed to a preservationist view of 
the­mind­as­something­inherently­foreclosed­to­mapping­and­(re)construction.­
The mind that it safeguards has a special status because it is indescribably 
unique at the level of mapping and constructability. It cannot be constructed, 
because it cannot be fully mapped. It cannot be mapped because it cannot be 
defined.­It­cannot­be­defined­because­it­is­somewhere­ineffable.­If­it­is­some-
where­ineffable,­then­it­is­everywhere­ineffable.­Therefore,­the­singularity­of­
the­mind­is­the­effect­of­its­ineffability.­If­we­buy­into­one­ineffable­thing­and­if­
that thing happens to be central to how we perceive, conceive, and act on the 
4­ An­early­proponent­of­functionalism,­Hillary­Putnam­later­repudiates­his­earlier­posi-
tion in his work Representation and Reality­(1988).­Putnam­simultaneously­rejects­the­
functional and computational aspects of computational functionalism by constructing 
an­argument­that­draws­on­Gödel’s­incompleteness­theorem­against­the­computational­
description of rational activities as well as demonstrating the triviality condition implicit 
in­the­multiple­realizability­thesis.­The­latter­part­of­the­argument­has­been­criticized­
as being only an attribute of what is now called a standard picture of function. In Gödel, 
Putnam, and Functionalism,­Jeff­Buechner­(2008)­presents­a­meticulous­refutation­of­
Putnam’s­argument­from­the­perspective­of­the­incompleteness­theorem,­both­with­ref-
erence­to­the­application­of­Gödel’s­theorem­and­the­conclusions­drawn­from­it.­And­for­
criticisms of the argument from the perspective of the triviality condition, see Huneman 
2013.
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world and ourselves, then we are also prepared to regard many other things 
in­the­world­as­ineffable.­We­have­thus­committed­ourselves­to­a­full-blown­
mysticism.
Turing’s­program­signals­a­consequential­phase­in­the­historical­develop-
ment­of­the­human­and­defining­the­project­of­humanity­in­the­sense­of­both­
determining­the­meaning­of­being­human­and­updating­its­definition.­Its­
importance lies in how it grapples with the most fundamental question posed 
by­Kant­(1885,­15):­“What­is­Man?”­or­what­does­it­mean­to­be­human?
Unlike­the­Copernican,­Darwinian,­Newtonian,­and­Einsteinian­revolutions­
in which we witness the consequences of a radical theoretical reorientation 
immediately manifesting itself in the present, the site of the Turingian revolu-
tion­is­always­in­the­future.­Put­differently,­the­Turingian­revolution­does­not­
happen here and now in that it is, properly speaking, a constructive theory 
of­the­mind­as­implicit­in­computational­functionalism.­It­incrementally­(from­
the­perspective­of­here­and­now)­and­catastrophically­(from­the­perspective­
of­the­future)­alters­both­the­meaning­of­the­mind­and­the­conditions­of­its­
realizability­by­implementing—step­by­step,­function­by­function,­algorithm­
by­algorithm—the­functional­picture­of­the­mind­in­machines.­For­this­reason,­
the­concept­of­revolution­that­Turing’s­project­elaborates­fundamentally­
differs­from­the­trajectory­of­the­Copernican­revolution­as­the­harbinger­of­
modern theoretical sciences.
The Turingian revolution suggests that the future will not be a varied exten-
sion of the present condition. It will not be continuous to the present. 
Whatever arrives back from the future—which is in this case, both the mind 
implemented in a machine and a machine equipped with the mind—will be 
discontinuous to our historical anticipations regarding what the mind is and 
what the machine looks like. In a sense, the relation between what we take 
as­the­mind­and­the­machine-realizable­account­of­the­mind­is­akin­to­what­
René­Thom­describes­as­the­catastrophic­time-travelling­relation­between­
the­image­and­its­model,­the­signifier­and­the­signified,­the­descendant­and­
the­parent.­In­the­signified-signifier­interaction,­the­dissipative­irreversibility­
of­time­disguises­a­principle­of­reversibility­(conservation)­that­is­operative­
behind it:   
The formation of images from a model appears as a manifestation of the 
universal dynamic having irreversible character. There is a self-ramifying 
of­the­model­into­an­image­isomorphic­to­itself.­Yet­very­often­this­process­
utilizes­an­interaction­of­reversible­character.­.­.­.­The­signified­generates­
the­signifier­in­an­uninterrupted­burgeoning­ramification.­But­the­signifier­
regenerates­the­signified­each­time­that­we­interpret­the­sign.­.­.­.­For­the­
signifier­(the­descendant)­to­become­the­signified­(the­parent)­again,­the­
time-lapse­of­a­generation­is­sufficient.­(Thom­1983,­264)­
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The relation between the human and its computational image becomes that of 
the­signified­qua­the­parent­and­the­signifier­qua­the­descendant.­It­illustrates­
a process whereby the future, time and time again, baits the present: The 
image­of­a­mollusk­is­engraved­on­a­rock­and­soon­supersedes­it.­An­embryo­
grows and develops a structure that is isomorphic to its parent organism but 
one­that­has­undergone­extensive­time-space­translations.­As­the­human­
imprints and proliferates its image in machines, the machine reinvents the 
image of its creator, re-implements, and in the process revises it. 
To the extent that we can not adopt a mind-preservationist ideology without 
undermining ourselves and to the extent that the computational-functionalist 
account of the mind is open to further epistemic and technical achievements, 
our­pursuits­for­the­realization­of­the­mind­in­machines­has­a­future­import­
and a plausible possibility in light of which association of the mind with any 
given­natural­or­fixed­constitution­becomes­highly­implausible­and­biased.­­­
But­why­is­the­Turingian­revolution­in­cognitive­and­computer­sciences­a­revo-
lution­that­is­conceived­in­and­takes­place­in­the­future?­Because­what­Turing­
proposes is a schema or a general program for a thorough reconstruction and 
revision of what it means to be human and, by extension, humanity as a col-
lective­and­historical­constellation.­Turing’s­underlying­assumption­is­that­the­
significance­of­the­human­can­be­functionally­abstracted­and­computationally­
realized.­This­significance­is­the­mind­as­a­set­of­activities­that­span­percep-
tion, thinking and intention—that is, the ability to turn sense data into percep-
tual impressions by mapping them to language as the domain of conceptual 
functions and then converting thoughts into intentional action.
The­adequate­functional­abstraction­and­realization­of­this­account­of­the­
human­significance­means­that­“what­makes­the­human­significant”­can­
be­realized­by­different­individuating­properties­or­realizers.­But­also­what­
constitutes­the­human­significance­can­be­implemented­in­different­modes­of­
organization.­The­new­context­or­environment­of­realization­can­then­modify­
and update this functional schema drastically. In other words, the meaning of 
the mind will be changed in the course of its re-implementation in artifacts. 
Since implementation is not simply the relocation of a function or an abstract 
protocol from one supporting structure to another. It is the re-introduction 
of­a­(functional)­role­into­a­new­context­that­will­subsequently­confer­a­new­
meaning­to­that­role­by­providing­it­with­different­determining­relations.­To­
put­it­differently,­implementation­is­the­execution­of­a­functional­schema­in­a­
new­context­or­environment­with­its­specific­sets­of­demands­and­purposes.­
Accordingly,­re-implementation­is­the­contextual­repurposing­and­refashion-
ing­of­a­function­that­diversifies­its­content.
Realizing­the­mind­through­the­artificial­by­swapping­its­natural­constitution­
or­biological­organization­with­other­material­or­even­social­organizations­is­a­
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central­aspect­of­the­mind.­Being­artificial,­or­more­precisely,­expressing­itself­
via the artifactual is the very meaning of the mind as that which has a his-
tory­rather­than­an­essential­nature.­Here­the­artificial­expresses­the­practi-
cal elaboration of what it means to adapt to new purposes and ends without 
implying a violation of natural laws. To have a history is to have the possibility 
of­being­artificial—that­is­to­say,­expressing­yourself­not­by­way­of­what­is­
naturally given to you but by way of what you yourself can make and organ-
ize.­Denouncing­this­history­is­the­same­as­rejecting­freedom­in­all­its­forms.­
Denying­the­artificial­truth­of­the­mind­and­refusing­to­take­this­truth­to­its­
ultimate­conclusions­is­to­antagonize­the­history of the mind, and therefore, to 
be an enemy of thought.
The functionalist understanding of the mind is a historical moment in the 
functional evolution of the mind: In making sense of the mind in terms of 
its activities and their roles, the functional account gestures toward a mind 
constructed­by­different­sets­of­realizers­and­in­a­different­domain.­Exploring­
the­meaning­of­the­mind­coincides­with­artificially­realizing­it,­and­the­artificial­
realization­changes­the­very­conditions­by­which­this­meaning­used­to­be­
determined. 
Once­the­real­content­of­the­human­significance­is­functionally­abstracted,­
realized­and­implemented­outside­of­its­natural­habitat,­the­link­between­the­
structure­in­which­this­function­is­embedded­and­the­significance­qua­function­
is­weakened.­Up­to­now,­the­influence­of­the­structure­(whether­as­a­specific­
biological­structure­or­a­specific­social­stratum)­over­the­function­has­been­
that of a constitution determining­the­behaviors­or­activities­of­the­system.­But­
with­the­abstraction­and­realization­of­those­functions­that­distinguish­the­
human—that­is­to­say,­by­furnishing­the­real­significance­of­the­human­with­a­
functional­autonomy—the­link­between­the­structure­(or­manifest­humanity)­
and­the­function­(all­activities­that­make­the­human­human)­loses­its­deter-
mining­power.­The­human­significance­qua­a­functional­set­of­specific­activi-
ties­evolves­in­spite­of­conditions­under­which­it­has­been­naturally­realized.
If­the­determining­influence­of­the­constituting­structure­(in­this­case,­the­
specific­biological­substrate)­over­the­function­is­sufficiently­weakened,­the­
image­of­the­functional­evolution­can­no­longer­be­seen­and­recognized­in­the­
structure that supports it. The evolution at the level of function—here the 
expansion of the schema of the mind—is asymmetrical to the evolution of the 
structure, be it the evolution of the biological structure that once supported it 
or­a­new­artificial­habitat­in­which­it­is­implemented.­It­is­akin­to­a­shadow­that­
grows to the extent that it eclipses the body that once cast it.
In this fashion, what constituted or presently constitutes the human no 
longer­determines­the­consequences­of­what­it­means­to­be­human.­Why?­
Because,­the­functional­realization­of­“the­meaning­of­being­human”­implies­
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the departure of this meaning from the present condition or the image with 
which­we­identify­the­human.­To­put­it­differently,­the­function­is­able­to­
reconstitute itself by perpetually reconstructing and revising itself, by evolv-
ing asymmetrically with regard to the structure and by revising its meaning 
through­re-implementation­in­new­substrates.­By­being­re-implemented­or­
introduced­into­a­new­context­of­realization,­the­function­is­able­to­change­the­
overall­schema­of­the­mind.­­A­project­that­in­theory­and­practice­articulates­
the­possibility­of­realization­and­implementation­of­the­human­experience­in­
machines­is­a­project­that­concretely­undermines­what­the­human­experience­
is and how it looks.
A­program­committed­to­the­multiple­realizability­of­the­human­mind­can­no­
longer­be­simply­defined­in­terms­of­reflection­on­past­and­present­conditions­
of the mind.5­By­attempting­to­realize­the­human­mind­in­the­machine,­such­
a­program­realizes­a­mind­that­shatters­the­canonical­picture­of­the­mind­we­
use­to­recognize­ourselves,­distinguishing­ourselves­from­the­machine­we­
regard as inherently disabled. What the mind was and what it is, how it was 
originally­realized­and­how­it­is­presently­constituted­no­longer­bear­any­deter-
mining­significance­on­the­multiply­realizable­mind.­Such­a­program­genuinely­
belongs to the future, its present theoretic-practical dimension elaborates a 
discontinuity that we do not have the cognitive means to fathom.    
The­constructive­and­revisionary­dimension­of­Turing’s­functional­realization­
of the human cannot be seen from the perspective of the present because 
the implications of construction and revision as the forces of reconstitution 
and reconception unfold from the future. In short, what Turing does is to 
provide the blueprint of a program through which the consequences of being 
distinguished­as­human­(or­having­human­experience)­are­discontinuous­and­
irreconcilable with what we currently identify as the human.
5 According­to­the­multiple­realizability­thesis,­the­realization­of­a­function­can­be­satis-
fied­by­different­sets­of­realizing­properties,­individuating­powers­and­activities.­There-
fore,­the­function­can­be­realized­in­different­environments­outside­of­its­natural­habitat­
by­different­realizers.­Multiple­realizability­usually­comes­in­strong­and­constrained­
varieties.­The­strong­version­does­not­impose­any­material-structural­or­organizational­
constraints­on­the­realizability­of­a­specific­function,­therefore­the­function­is­taken­to­
be­realizable­in­infinite­ways­or­implementable­in­numerous­substrates.­The­constrained­
variety,­however,­sees­the­conditions­required­for­the­realizability­of­a­function­through­
a­deep­or­hierarchical­model­comprised­of­different­explanatory-organizational­levels­
and­qualitatively­different­realizer­properties­which­impose­their­respective­constraints­
on­the­realization­of­the­function.­Accordingly,­in­the­weak­or­constrained­version­of­
multiple­realizability,­the­criteria­for­the­realization­of­a­function­are­characterized­as­
dimensionally varied and multiply constrained. The function is then described as multiply 
realizable­while­multiply­constrained.­The­constraints­on­the­realization­of­function­are­
dimensionally­varied­because­they­are­determined­by­different­organizational­levels,­
which orchestrate or explain that function.
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Turing’s­thesis­on­computational-functional­realizability­of­the­human­mind­
is a thesis about constructability, its consequences take shape in the realm 
of­manifest­realization.­It­suggests­there­is­no­essentialist­limit­to­the­recon-
structability­of­the­human­or­“what­human­significance­consists­in.”­However,­
it goes even further by highlighting the consequence of constructing the mind 
outside of its natural habitat: The reconstruction of the mind is tantamount to 
the reconstitution of its meaning.­It­is­in­this­sense­that­Turing’s­project­marks­a­
rupture in the truth of humanity, between the meaning of being human and 
its­ramifications.­In­practice­and­through­construction,­it­elaborates­that­to­
be human does not entail the understanding of the consequences of what it 
means­to­be­human.­Indeed,­these­two­couldn’t­be­further­apart.­To­be­human­
is­neither­a­sufficient­condition­for­understanding what is happening to the 
human­by­becoming­part­of­a­program­that­defines­and­elaborates­the­mind­in­
computational-functional­terms,­nor­is­it­a­sufficient­condition­for­recognizing 
what the human is becoming as the result of being part of this program. It can 
neither apprehend the consequences of revising the functional meaning of 
the human nor the scope of constructing the machine according to a computa-
tional-functional picture of the human mind.
By­aiming­at­the­realization­of­the­human­mind­outside­of­its­natural­habitat,­
Turing­draws­a­new­link­between­emancipation­(here­the­emancipation­of­
human­significance­at­the­level­of­activities­or­functions)­and­the­liberation­of­
intelligence­as­a­vector­of­self-realization.­Turing’s­computationalist-function-
alist­project­is­significant­because­its­ramifications—regardless­of­its­current­
state­and­setbacks­it­has­suffered—cannot­be­thought­by­its­present­implica-
tions.­In­this­sense,­by­definition,­humanity­as­we­identify­it­in­the­present­
cannot­grapple­with­and­realize­the­scope­of­Turing’s­project.
In­continuation­of­the­project­of­the­radical­enlightenment,­Turing’s­project­
is in fact a program for amplifying the imports of enlightened humanism 
insofar as it fully conforms to the following principle: The consequentiality 
or­significance­of­the­human­is­not­in­its­given­meaning­or­a­conserved­and­
already­decided­definition.­Rather,­it­is­in­the­ability­to­bootstrap­complex­
abilities­from­primitive­abilities.­These­complex­abilities­define­what­the­
human­consists­in.­But­insofar­as­they­are­algorithmically­decomposable­(cf.­
different­types­of­computation­for­different­functions,­different­kinds­of­algo-
rithms­for­different­activities­and­abilities),­they­present­the­definition­of­the­
human­as­amenable­to­modification,­reconstruction,­and­implementation­in­
artifacts.­And­this­is­the­constructible­hypothesis­upon­which­Turing’s­project­
is­founded:­The­significance­of­the­human­lies­not­in­its­uniqueness­or­in­a­spe-
cial ontological status but in its functional decomposability and computational 
constructability through which the abilities of the human can be upgraded, 
its­form­transformed,­its­definition­updated­and­even­become­susceptible­to­
deletion.
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Turing’s­computational­project­contributes­to­the­project­of­enlightened­
humanism­by­dethroning­the­human­and­ejecting­it­from­the­center­while­
acknowledging­the­significance­of­the­human­in­functionalist­terms.­For­what­
is the expandable domain of computers if not the strongest assault upon 
the ratiocentricity of the human mind in favor of a view that the ratiocinating 
capacities of the human mind can be reconstructed and upgraded in the guise 
of­machines?
It is the understanding of the meaning of the human in functional terms that is 
a blueprint for the reconstruction of the human and the functional evolution 
of­its­significance­beyond­its­present­image.­The­knowledge­of­the­mind­as­a­
functional item develops into the exploration of possibilities of its reconstruc-
tion.­While­the­exploration­of­functional­realization­by­different­realizers­and­
for­different­purposes­shapes­the­history­of­the­mind­as­that­which­has­no­
nature­but­only­possibilities­of­multiple­realization­and­their­corresponding­
histories.
What used to be called the human has now evolved beyond recognition. 
Narcissus can no longer see or anticipate his own image in the mirror. The rec-
ognition­of­the­blank­mirror­is­the­sign­that­we­have­finally­left­our­narcissistic­
phase behind. Indeed, we are undergoing a stage in which if humanity looks 
into the mirror it only sees an empty surface gawking back.
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Loops of Augmentation: 
Bootstrapping, Time 
Travel, and Consequent 
Futures 
Ben Woodard
The essay examines the concept of bootstrapping as 
a model of augmentative reason in contemporary 
neorationalist philosophies. In particular, it examines 
the concept of bootstrapping, here meaning mental 
capacities or processes capable of self-augmentation. 
Well illustrated in numerous time-travel fictions, 
the genealogy of bootstrapping lies in the legacy 
of German Idealism and can be met in the figure of 
Münchhausen. Looking how the problem of origin, 
or of determining an ultimately stable ground, is 
replaced by horizon, or location, both determined 
through action, the essay proposes that the notions 
of embodiment and location prove troublesome for 
neorationalism. 
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One­of­the­core­concepts­of­the­contemporary­neorationalist­(and­more­
broadly­pragmatist)­camp­is­that­of­bootstrapping—that certain mental capaci-
ties or processes are capable of self-augmentation. While less often discussed 
in philosophical circles in terms of recursion­(invoking­a­functionalist­or­math-
ematical­context),­bootstrapping­indexes­the­material­consequence­of­self-
augmentation.­Whereas­recursion­is­an­instance­of­an­object­being­defined­
using­its­own­terms­(such­as,­to­define­recursion,­one­could­say:­look­up­the­
definition­of­recursion),­bootstrapping­assumes­that­there­is­an­augmenta-
tive capacity in the material performing the original act. One instance would 
be discussing thought as a process of thinking that produces thoughts: this 
process engenders a massively complex chain of consequences for everything 
including thought itself. Thinking about thinking can change our thinking.
Bootstrapping­bears­asking­what­makes­the­difference­between­augmentative­
and non-augmentative, or virtuous versus vicious causation—a question which 
entails further questions about locality and augmentation as neither merely 
a qualitative  nor quantitative treatment of the loop. Such a model of causa-
tion engenders in fact a navigational model: augmentation is neither a more 
nor a better, but an elsewhere.­Rational­augmentation­is­about­going­further­
with­thought­in­a­way­that­has­constructive­consequences­for­thought’s­future­
capacities­and­thought’s­future­navigations.­This­essay­attempts­to­outline­
and assess the importance of bootstrapping as a synthesis of recursion and 
augmentation, as well as its preferred illustration via time-travel narratives 
both­in­film­and­in­neorationalist­philosophy.­In­closing,­I­will­relate­the­boot-
strapping model of cognition to intelligence as time-manipulation found in 
Hegel and in more general conceptual aspects of German idealism taken up by 
Reza­Negarestani.
Recursion and Augmentation
Where­bootstrapping­indicates­a­mental­act­informing­a­self-affecting­physical­
act,­a­recursive­definition­seems­to­operate­in­one­abstract­realm.­Yet,­if­this­
were­the­case,­then­recursion­would­be­the­same­as­circularity.­But­even­in­
this abstract sense, circularity can be avoided in terms of adding values and 
rules.­Vicious­circularity,­or­ill-defined­self-recursion,­can­contain­these­ele-
ments but only produce nested recursion as in the case of a famous line by 
Douglas­Hofstadter­(1985,­26):­
This sentence contains ten words, eighteen syllables, and sixty-four 
letters. 
Recursion­begins­with­a­ground­or­base­case,­material, or world that then 
goes­through­a­recursive­step.­A­famous­example:­“Zero­is­a­natural­number,­
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and each natural number has a successor, which is also a natural number. 
Following­this­base­case­and­recursive­rule,­one­can­generate­the­set­of­all­
natural­numbers.”­Bootstrapping­then­is­of­course­not­just­self-reference­but­
the­utilization­of­the­base­case­or­ground­as­a­process—as­a­process­entailing­
consequences that it can be added to itself. Thus recursion, and augmentative 
recursion,­appeals­to­qualifications­or­rules­in­order­to­not­merely­be­repeti-
tions­of­the­same.­A­related­but­not­altogether­different­concern­is­that­of­
medium­or­location.­Recursion,­whether­vicious­or­virtuous,­has­a­different­set­
of consequences given the particularity of its medium or context. 
Because­of­the­nature­of­physical­systems,­and­the­particularity­of­instantia-
tion,­the­repetition­of­a­phrase­has­different­kinds­of­consequences,­at­least­
immediately, than the repetition of a physical gesture, for instance. This is 
not to trump recursion with the simple reply of “context matters therefore 
structure does not” but to plant a skeptical seed regarding how determinate 
augmentation is separable from contextual or environmental augmentation.
At­the­level­of­thought­however,­it­is­not­difficult­to­imagine­how­consciousness­
augments itself through the production of thoughts which do not simply add 
thoughts to those that have already been produced, but add thoughts that 
alienate the mind from itself. This alienation is productive in that it expands 
the capacities of the mind while devaluing the mind as an essence other than 
as a target of determination, as a thing or selection of content to be looped. 
Such an articulation appears as unhelpful as it is unavoidable. To ask the 
question “how­do­you­start­thinking?” would set you on a course partially of 
your choosing but which would have volition caused by an apparently exterior 
force.­Recursion­takes­place­before­it­is­recognized­and­thus­one­could­argue­
that augmentation is the turning of this process upon itself, i.e., augmentation 
is recursive recursion, or self-aware recursion. 
The­desire­to­appeal­to­fictions,­speculations­and­simulations­(that­will­be­
introduced­soon)­should­begin­to­become­clear.­Speculations­or­certain­exer-
cises­in­reflection­are­a­low-cost­means­of­practicing­augmentations­without­
concern­for­context,­medium,­and­minimizing­consequences.­But­since­this­is­
how recursion occurs, at what point does that very structure of augmentation 
shift­as­it­moves­across­scales?­Does­the­augmentative­recursive­structure­
of thought remain as context-independent in its simulations as it does once 
those­simulations­are­deployed­in­a­particular­medium?
Furthermore,­while­augmentative­recursion­positively­obliterates­the­shackles­
of origin, does this unnecessarily risk the veneration or obscuring of limits 
at­broader­scales­to­thinking?­Although­it­is­a­simplification,­one­can­take­
the well-known­story­of­Fichte’s­lectures­in­which­he­attempted­to­assert­
the irreducibility of the “I” as the necessary starting point of all philosophy. 
Fichte­(1796/99)­instructed­his­audience­to­look­at­the­wall,­then­the­floor,­then­
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to­look­at­the­thing­that­was­doing­the­looking.­In­illustrating­the­subject’s­
inability­to­get­behind­itself,­Fichte­hoped­to­cement­his­claim­that­the­“I”­was­
the primary point of access for all philosophy. While this is certainly the case 
for the speculative simulation engine, we can reduce our place in the creation 
of things in the world to constructively alienate that very capacity. This does 
not change the experience of that viewing,­but­it­questions­the­universaliza-
tion of the medium and location from which the augmentative recursion of 
self-reflection­occurs.
Fichte’s­example­demonstrates­the­stubbornness­of­philosophy­to­admit­that­
its modeling capacities may undo the very grounds that shelter that model 
from the impacts of its simulations. Time travel becomes a meta-abstraction 
of this problem with the timeline replacing consciousness in which, because of 
narrative­constraints,­self-reflective­consciousness­itself­remains­immune­to­
the manipulations made upon the stream of time.
Time Travel as Bootstrapping Simulator
The­strangeness­of­recursion­can­be­illustrated­(albeit­hyperbolically)­in­sto-
ries­of­time­travel­to­the­past.­Robert­Heinlein’s­story­“By­His­Bootstraps”­(1941)­
is one of the more famous examples of the bootstrap paradox. The paradox 
being­if­an­object­is­sent­to­the­past­and­received­and­brought­to­the­future­to­
where­it­was­sent,­then­the­origin­of­the­object­is­lost.­Similar­issues,­though­
not­as­drastic­arise­from­sending­information­back­(though,­one­could­argue,­
that both cases materially change the past in such a way that the second law 
of­thermodynamics­is­violated).­A­growing­amount­of­mainstream­films­have­
examined both stable and unstable time loops. These stable time loops­(or­
augmentative­recursions)­are­probably­best­known­in­the­movie­series­Termi-
nator­(1984–2015).­In­these­movies­each­attempt­to­stop­the­consequences­of­
the­future­(the­traveler’s­present)­actually­contribute­to­that­future­in­that­the­
film’s­protagonists­may­change­the­date­of­the­catastrophic­future­event,­but­
this event nevertheless always occurs. Otherwise put, the Terminator series 
is­ambiguous­as­to­whether­the­reason­why­judgment­day­or­the­rise­of­a­
malevolent­artificial­intelligence­has­always already happened because of the 
structure­of­time­(i.e.,­fate­can­only­be­postponed­not­canceled)­or­because­
such an event is a historical inevitability.
The past, taken as a process to be manipulated, is added to the future that 
always was but, from the perspective of the manipulator, events seem to 
occur in a generally novel way. In this sense, origin becomes a moot point at 
least when considered in a material sense. It is the exploration of the conse-
quences that ultimately matters in bootstrapping rather than determining the 
limits­of­the­capability­to­manipulate.­Exploration­would­require­determining­
the­coherent­limits­of­the­loop’s­boundary­or­the­field­of­manipulation­or,­the­
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degree to which one explores before turning onto that process of exploration 
to augment it. That is, at some point the time traveler has to decide what vari-
ables to take into account in order to change the future, changes the traveler 
can­only­then­register­by­going­back­to­the­future.­By­remaining­too­local,­the­
manipulation­of­the­processes­of­thought­is­safer­but­more­myopic­(such­as­in­
the­case­of­the­film­Primer, 2004)­and­altering­the­past­too­much­may­very­well­
lead to the opposite problem. In Primer, a group of friends discovers how to 
travel­twenty­minutes­back­in­time.­One­of­the­film’s­characters­decides­to­use­
this to socially engineer the present by recording conversations and by giving 
his past self-advantageous information.
The problem of origin, or determining an ultimately stable ground, is replaced 
by­horizon,­or­location,­which­are­determined­through­action.­Hence,­this­is­
why­Schelling,­who­studied­under­Fichte­but­broke­away­from­him­over­the­
latter’s­dismissal­of­material­nature,­denies­that­there­is­any­singular­material­
origin as such: There­is­no­seed­corn­from­which­all­things­spring.­What’s­inter-
esting here is that in stories of time loops, whether stable or unstable, thought 
is an exception or a process which is minimally material in such a way that the 
recording­of­past­loops­is­not­seen­as­a­thermodynamic­violation.­In­the­film­
Edge of Tomorrow (2014),­the iterations of the loops is retained even after it is 
closed­(because­of­an­absorption­of­alien­biology).­In­the­film,­a­military­officer­
is exposed to the blood of a temporally-altering alien species and relives the 
same day of a doomed battle over, and over again. His death resets the day, 
and he alone retains the memories of what happened, in order to attempt 
various­strategies­to­end­the­war.­But­an­interesting­tension­of­the­film,­
despite and because of its repetition, is in the question of how many iterations 
the protagonist has gone through before the iteration we see treated as if it 
is­novel.­The­film­constantly­shifts­the­parameters­of­self-augmentation­while­
it openly displays the repetition of certain events as leading to the main char-
acter’s­honing­of­his­combat­abilities.­At­other­times­it­is­obfuscated­whether,­
and how many times, painful or banal scenes have already occurred to him.
The­film­Source Code­(2011) isolates consciousness in a similar fashion, which 
is­why­it­was­discussed­by­Grant­(2011)­at­the­opening­of­his­talk­entitled­“The­
Natural History of the Mind.”­In­the­film,­the­creators­of­a­time­travel­device­
believe­they­are­sending­a­consciousness­back­in­time­(into­another­person’s­
body)­when­they­are­in­fact­creating­an­alternate­universe­as­the­addition­
or supplanting of the consciousness alters the actuality into another future. 
In this sense, it is somewhat ambiguous whether they are stating that time 
travel is impossible or if even the addition of consciousness to a past leads to 
a branching theory of time travel, and the universe is redirected. Grant takes 
this­as­an­illustration­of­idealism’s­advantage­over­realism,­namely,­that­ideal-
ism­is­not­opposed­to­realism­but­emphasizes­the­reality­of­the­idea.
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But how do these speculative exercises relate to neorationalism? If there is a 
binding theme between the pragmatism of Charles S. Pierce, Robert Bran-
dom, Mark Wilson etc. and the futural or accelerationist tendencies of Reza 
Negarestani, Nick Srnicek, Alex Williams, Peter Wolfendale and others, it is the 
willingness to treat the past as material to be transformed and augmented 
to create a future. While pragmatism is often decried for being insufficiently 
radical, accelerationism, is decried for forgetting the present for the sake of 
the future. A certain amount of philosophical discomfort arises following both 
projects’ admitting the open manipulation of the past in constructing a future. 
All philosophy is grave-robbery but while some projects display these spoils as 
already relevant consequences in and of themselves, for neorationalism and 
accelerationism, it is far better to play Dr. Frankenstein, to treat the past as 
materials for something else altogether.
The playing out of consequences takes on a different function, since we 
have no knowledge of the future but only meta-cognitive rules and opera-
tions to check our explorations and navigations according to our capacities 
and wagers (as opposed to origins and ends). The interesting tension is how 
conceptually determined capacities and wagers are from the point at which we 
find ourselves, a point which is of course arbitrary but only before we admit 
that our self-augmentation took serious hold of its place. This strange place, 
this alienated home, is how Reza Negarestani recently opened his talk “What 
Philosophy Does to the Mind”: 
The ideal aim of philosophizing is to become reflectively at home in the 
full complexity of the multi-dimensional conceptual system in terms of 
which we suffer, think, and act. I say “reflectively” because there is a sense 
in which, by the sheer fact of leading an unexamined, but conventionally 
satisfying life, we are at home in this complexity. It is not until we have 
eaten the apple with which the serpent philosopher tempts us, that we 
begin to stumble on the familiar and to feel that haunting sense of aliena-
tion which is treasured by each new generation as its unique possession. 
This alienation, this gap between oneself and one’s world, can only be 
resolved by eating the apple to the core; for after the first bite there is 
no return to innocence. There are many anodynes, but only one cure. We 
may philosophize well or ill, but we must philosophize. (Sellars 1975, 295) 
Time travel, as a genre, attempts to reconcile the arrow of time and our non-
linear experiences of time or, what appear as asymmetrical forces of causa-
tion, our ignorance of those causes, and our powers of manipulation over the 
future and the past. Nick Land’s short piece Templexity argues that this recon-
ciliation demonstrates that the very notion of travel is a misnomer, and states 
that one should focus on templexity. Templexity is indistinguishable from real 
recursion and is the auto-productive nature of time as general entropic dissi-
pation (Land 2014, 4). However, as Land notes, negentropic exceptions appear 
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as local productivities; life for instance is a highly complex and productive 
instance of chaos which would seem to run against the general wave of cos-
mological decay or statistic flattening. But, as Land emphasizes, negentropy 
is just a case of uneven distribution and not physical exception. Though, as is 
evident in both his past and present works, Land is less concerned with trac-
ing the physical consequences of loops and more interested in how loops as 
fictions come to have a life of their own. Land is less interested in the kind of 
augmentation that takes place and more in how loops or recursion pass from 
an ideal to a real state (if such division can be held to begin with, i.e., if the 
ideal can be taken to be the future, which has not yet returned to the present).
One must be careful in establishing a correlation between positive and nega-
tive feedback and virtuous and vicious circles too quickly. Since both virtuous-
ness and viciousness are augmentative, they can both be viewed as having 
positive feedback qualities: in that both are additive it is only that viciousness 
and virtuousness are qualitative judgments made from a position exterior to 
the cycles themselves. It is this making real that manifests as a problem for 
neorationalism, albeit in a different register, one that the simulations of time 
travel hyperbolically illustrate (particularly given the destruction of origin and 
the importance of self-manipulation as augmentation).
Consequent Futures
The philosophical and political relevance of a future to be constructed is 
central to the work of neorationalism as well as its more recent political and 
theoretical alliances (whether accelerationist, transmodernist, Promethean, 
or xenofeminist). Instead of an equivocation of futurity and inevitability, 
Negarestani and Wolfendale assert that the future is a positive project in the 
sense that one should neither admit to a present merely of better failures, nor 
to a past of genealogical guilt, but to an operable progressiveness. Given this 
it is not unsurprising that for Negarestani (2014) and Wolfendale (2010), Hegel’s 
model of history and of the development of self-consciousness as a historical 
project, is central to pursuing a universalist notion of reason that attempts to 
be directed towards the future.
As Rory Jeffs (2012) notes, the importance of temporality in Hegel has been 
repeatedly emphasized, particularly in its early French reception (by Kojève 
and Koyre) through the present with figures such as Catherine Malabou and 
Slavoj Žižek. Across these readings a tension exists between the restlessness 
or productivity of time, and the thinkability of time, requiring its stoppage or 
flattening out via “the end of history.” As Jeffs demonstrates, Hegel’s temporal-
ity is taken to be ontological primordial for Koyre, whereas it is collective and 
anthropological for Kojève. Malabou attempts to navigate between con-
structed time and flatly navigated history in highlighting plasticity, as a means 
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of attempting to discern the present import of the to come, or what we will see. 
However, I would argue that in The Future of Hegel, Malabou (2004) repeats 
the strange dualism that Kojève constructed with Hegel’s system in order to 
separate the human from nature or philosophy from science.
In many senses Negarestani’s reading of Hegel maintains a duality but in a 
methodological or non-absolute sense following his Sellarsian commitments. 
Thus while Negarestani takes up the socially constructed aspect of Kojève’s 
reading as determining the path of time, Negarestani would not locate this 
determination primarily in terms of mutual recognition but in the augmenta-
tion or inhumanization of time via reason. Negarestani de-phenomenologizes 
the Kojèvean reading and reforms it to resemble a more Koyrean or Wahlian 
perspective. In essence Negarestani re-subjectifies the Hegelian construction 
of reason but via an inhuman notion of the subject.1 Negarestani approaches 
this version of Hegelianism in his text “Labor of the Inhuman” by arguing for a 
particular reading of destiny. He writes:
Destiny expresses the reality of time as always in excess of and asymmet-
rical to origin; in fact, as catastrophic to it. But destination is not exactly 
a single point or a terminal goal, it takes shape as trajectories: As soon as 
a manifest destination is reached or takes place, it ceases to govern the 
historical trajectory that leads to it, and is replaced by a number of newer 
destinations which begin to govern different parts of the trajectory, lead-
ing to its ramification into multiple trajectories. (Negarestani 2014a, 451)
In further articulating the functional aspect of this revisable destiny, Negar-
estani examines his own relation to Hegel (as well as Kant and Sellars). Fol-
lowing Hegel, Negarestani (2014a, 454) argues that reason requires its own 
constitutive self-determination. Contrary to Hegel, he states that normativity 
is not composed of explicit norms from the bottom up (Negarestani 2014a, 
455). To follow Hegel too closely in regards to explicit norms (as opposed to 
the utilization of interventional norms) would be to ignore the regress in the 
setting up of norms as self-standing, of being the norm “just because.” Thus 
Negarestani points out another layer of recursive loops, that of question beg-
ging versus non-question begging. Hegel’s reliance on explicit norms begs the 
question since the proper augmentation which would distance the premise 
from the conclusion is absent. Generally, the difficulty for Negarestani and the 
neorationalist project is how to grant reason its “proper autonomy” without 
appearing to be making reason immune from non-reasonable egress in such 
a way that is, at its root, unreasonable or question begging. Negarestani’s 
answer is to combine pragmatism and functionalism, arguing that the linguis-
tic decomposition of thought, and the rational decomposition of nature, lead 
1 One can also observe similarities between Negarestani’s emphasis on the future operat-
ing on the past in Hegel and Jean Hyppolite’s discussion of the future healing the past 
(see Hyppolite 1974, 525).
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to a relation of thinking and doing that is gradual yet universally revisionary 
(Negarestani 2014a, 456).
While Negarestani argues that philosophy invents its own history in a par-
ticularly Hegelian vein, the essential difference between Hegel and Schell-
ing’s model of time, is that the act of invention, the act of self-augmentation, 
uproots in a way that the view, the new horizon viewed, cannot be separated 
from history materialized. This is not to suggest, pace Žižek’s (1997) reading of 
Schelling, that thought or will interrupts the ontological structure of the world 
or of nature. Instead, the act made possible through that particular material 
world never fundamentally interrupts it, but re-orients it from that particular 
view. That is, the unknowability of the ultimate source of the re-orientation 
does not destroy reason. It indicates that experience is not the base of reason 
but that experience always escorts reason. As Schelling puts it in The Ground-
ing of Positive Philosophy: 
Reason wants nothing other than its original content. This original con-
tent, however, possesses in its immediacy something contingent, which is 
and is not the immediate capacity to be; like-wise, being—the essence—as 
it immediately presents itself in reason, is and is not being. It is not being 
as soon as it moves, since it then transforms itself into a contingent being. 
(Schelling 2007, 134)
Nature is not a solid ground or that which trumps self-augmentation for 
Schelling, but a slower and more stubborn effect on the horizon viewed from 
the perspective of the thinker. The difference between Hegel and Schelling 
becomes that of setting the formers’ confidence in the amount of conceptual 
determination possible from one perspective, whereas for the latter, change 
in a position requires more attention to the ground one is standing (admit-
ting that ground’s synthesis) as well as recognizing the high cost of shifting 
positions. 
Otherwise put, Schelling errs on the side of analyzing the non-predicative 
weight of predication by which it functions, whereas Hegel further solidi-
fies the future perspective and risks over-conceptually determining the past 
and the present. As Negarestani put it in the talk quoted above, philosophy 
refuses to close the loop of its revenge against belief, against over-grounding. 
Again, Schelling worries about the labor of keeping the loop open where Hegel 
attempts to hold the circle (the loop) open till the last instance. 
In this regard, and to return to self-augmentation, the essential difference 
between Schelling and Hegel is the height from which both descend to redraw 
the perspective from which reason is working. Hegel reaches perhaps greater 
heights with the assistance of conceptual certainty (powered by negativ-
ity) before descending in order to redraw the reasoner; whereas in keeping 
experience alongside reason, Schelling makes structural wagers leaving 
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experience to judge conceptual ones in that particular view. In other words, 
Schelling emphasizes the local extrapolation, whereas Hegel emphasizes the 
global decomposition. If philosophy is a time-travel device (as Negarestani 
puts it), then the different approaches to the relation of past to future, or the 
pragmatic and the speculative, is the locality chosen when one steps into the 
time machine. 
Conclusion
At a dinner party in early nineteenth century Berlin, Madame du Stael was 
speaking to Fichte. Fichte was hurriedly attempting to explain his philosophy 
of the “I” to her in a language that was not his own. After outlining his philoso-
phy, Stael responded that she completely understood, and that his philoso-
phy of the absolute “I” could be explained through the figure of Baron von 
Münchhausen. In one story, in order to cross a river, Münchhausen grabbed 
his own sleeve and jumped over himself to cross the water (see Biennerhas-
sett 2013, 82). 
The image of bootstrapping, on the other hand, is often tied to the episode 
in which Münchhausen famously pulled himself out of the swamp by his own 
hair. Furthermore, the Münchhausen or Agrippean trilemma has been put 
forward by Paul Franks (2007) as the central philosophical problem to which 
German Idealism responds. 
The trilemma consists of three problems of justifying reason’s capacities 
(or more generally any kind of knowledge) with three equally unsatisfactory 
options: circularity (or that every consequent leads back to its antecedent), 
regression (that for every step, every consequent requires infinitely more 
proofs) and axiom (we make a common sense justification to what we are 
claiming to know as an axiom). This trilemma centers on the justification 
theory of knowledge, and it articulates thought as a disembodied and dema-
terialized activity. But just as an explicit notion of norms functioning from the 
bottom up begs the question, a notion of materiality or embodiment threat-
ens to be even more vague, and this is why embodiment should be thought 
of in terms of location, of the local interpretation of deeper nested levels of 
materiality.
In the same way, the figure of Münchhausen is not merely a critique of all 
appeal to bootstrapping as ideal or non-embodied; it points out that even 
virtuous circularity often elides the question of embodiment by relegating 
it to the space of nature as determined by the sciences alone. However, this 
dismissal of the space of reason leads often to a reliance upon the given over 
against any notion of augmentation (scientific or rational or otherwise). As 
Brassier writes in “Prometheanism and its Critics”:
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Since cognitive objectivation is conditioned by human existence, human 
beings cannot know themselves in the same way in which they know 
other objects. Doing so would require objectivating the condition of 
objectivation, which would be, as Arendt says, like trying to jump over our 
own shadow. (Brassier 2014, 476)
Following Arendt’s Heideggerian trajectory, Brassier goes on to argue that 
anti-Prometheanism attempts to defend an unalterable human essence: 
Those who would claim that the human is alterable are, like Fichte, erasing the 
difference between the made and the given (or more widely between the ideal 
and the real) to beg skeptical reproach. In questioning but not destroying or 
deconstructing the bootstrap logic here, I am—against Arendt—stressing the 
importance of the embodiment that accompanies the leap, and not the impos-
sibility of the leap itself away from the given.
Here, it is not the augmentative capacities of looping that are in question, 
but how one explains and understands the ramifications of the point of entry 
(what in the fictional stories and films mentioned above would be the seem-
ingly impossible advent of the machine as well as the egregious amounts of 
energy needed to generate the beginning of the temporal journey). Thus, 
while I agree to the limitations of instrumentality, which Heidegger himself 
endorsed, these are not due to a particular limit of human access to the 
human, but due to a skeptical and naturalistic monism; whereas constraints 
of location and energetic expenditure are not human specific, i.e., not a form 
of particular human finitude. At the same time, the bootstrap logic applies a 
particular form of skepticism to the skeptical response, specifically to human 
capacities: Our location, or perspectival “closeness” to our own capacities, 
blinds us destructively and constructively, as we attempt to explain our rare (if 
not unique) cognitive capabilities, this explanation itself actively unfolds those 
capacities.
Schelling’s focus on the measuring of consequents or on futures by their 
consequents is an attempt to de-relativize context which, viewed from the 
other side, could be taken as naturalizing the trans-, of attempting to identify 
the cost of navigation, and of having perspectives. This cost is not to be taken 
as either ontological finitude or as a reason to halt all constructive movement, 
but as an endorsement of the necessity and instability of ground, and the 
necessity and insufficiency of navigation. By Schelling’s account, and against 
much contemporary dogma, idealism is the simultaneous simulation and 
deployment of the consequences of bootstrap logic that is fully embodied in a 
material nature.
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Brain Theory Between 
Utopia and Dystopia: 
Neuronormativity Meets 
the Social Brain 
Charles T. Wolfe
The brain in its plasticity and inherent “sociality” can 
be proclaimed and projected as a revolutionary organ. 
Far from the old reactions which opposed the authen-
ticity of political theory and praxis to the dangerous 
naturalism of “cognitive science” (with images of men 
in white coats, the RAND Corporation or military LSD 
experiments), recent decades have shown us some of 
the potentiality of the social brain (Vygotsky, Negri, 
and Virno). Is the brain somehow inherently a utopian 
topos? If in some earlier papers I sought to defend 
naturalism against these reactions, here I consider 
a new challenge: the recently emerged disciplines of 
neuronormativity, which seek in their own way to over-
come the nature-normativity divide. This is the task of 
a materialist brain theory today. 
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The Setup: Horns of a Dilemma 
There­is­a­lingering­zone­of­what­one­might­think­of­as­sore­cognitive­muscle­
tissue in the area of materialism. It is an area of both contested territory and 
in­some­cases,­a­kind­of­pathos­of­distance­of­the­“Ugh!­Keep­that­thing­away­
from­me!”­sort.­I­have­in­mind­the­combination­of­materialism­as­an­emanci-
patory­socio-political­project­(which­need­not­be­construed­in­strictly­Marx-
Engels­terms,­if­we­think­of­Lucretius­et­al.)­and­as­a­cold-hearted­“spontane-
ous philosophy of the men in white coats,” e.g., nefarious neurophilosophers. 
Faced­with­this­rather­massive­alternative,­this­choice­between­two­projects,­
I have stubbornly been saying since some discussions with Negri in the late 
90s,1­we­should­choose:­both!­And­for­people­steeped­in­a­Germanic­tradition,­
I can push the following familiar button and say, “this is also about ceasing 
to take for granted a distinction between Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften 
(i.e.,­the­natural­sciences­and­the­humanities).”­If­the­brain­is­always­already­
social,­as­even­Marx­states­(Virno­2001),­this­implies,­although­not­with­neces-
sary implicature, that knowledge of the brain is not irrelevant to knowledge 
of the social world.2 No absolute divide between a hermeneutical world of 
free,­self-interpreting­subjects­with­their­values,­norms,­and­struggles,­and­a­
natural world of quantities, electroencephalograms, “men in white coats” and 
so-called “science.”
But­even­this­choice­of­both,­in­which­the­brain­is,­now­a­naturalistic­object­
of­study­like­a­liver­or­a­lung,­now­a­political­object­(dual-aspect?),­leads­us,­
like a gamer-agent in a virtual world, into further pathways with further 
choices­of­which­doors­to­go­through.­For­the­brain­is­frequently­presented­
both as a potential site and substance of radical transformation—a utopian 
form­of­“wonder­tissue,”­a­“difference­machine,”­an­“uncertain­system,”­and,­
quite symmetrically, as the focus and resource of consumer neuroscience, 
semiocapital3­or­neurocapitalism.­It’s­a­bit­like­the­old­chestnut­about­the­
saving power lying where the greatest danger is,4 except the other way round. 
Indeed,­regarding­the­fields­of­neuronormativity,­Slaby­and­Gallagher­have­
recently observed that “the particular construal of self currently championed 
by social neuroscience—with a focus on social-interactive skills, low-level 
empathy­and­mind-reading—neatly­corresponds­with­the­ideal­skill­profile­of­
today’s­corporate­employee”­(Slaby­and­Gallagher­2014).
1­ See­Negri’s­rather­subtle­comments­on­forms­of­materialism,­from­the­more­naturalistic­
to the more political, in the original Italian preface to Alma Venus­(Negri­2000).
2­ See­Wolfe­2010.­The­“general­productive­forces­of­the­social­brain”­appears­in­Marx’s­
Grundrisse,­notebooks­VI-VII,­a­text­known­as­the­“Fragment­on­Machines”­(Marx­1973,­
694)­which­has­had­particular­influence­on­the­Italian­Autonomist­tradition­(see­also­
Virno­2001).­
3­ Franco­Berardi’s­term­for­our­world­of­“post-Fordist­modes­of­production”­(see­Terra-
nova­2014).
4 “Wo­aber­Gefahr­ist,­wächst/Das­Rettende­auch”­(Hölderlin,­“Patmos,”­1803).
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This brain dilemma is not exactly the opposition between the natural and the 
normative, with natural as a loose association of positions which have a lack of 
fear of “science” or “naturalism” in common, since they consider a continuum 
of­theorizing­social­and­political­action,­for­instance,­in­light­of­knowledge­of­
the­structure­of­the­affects:­a­conglomerate­in­which­Vygotskyan­conceptions­
of­brain­and­society,­Negri’s­conceptions­of­general­intellect­and­social­brain,­
and loosely political versions of neurophilosophy come together. Here, the 
naturalist­position­asserts­that­the­brain­is­social­and­material­(and­that­this­
combination­is­potentially­emancipatory),­whereas­the­normative­position,­like­
Cassandra, warns of danger.5­For­this­kind­of­denunciation­can­come­not­from­
old­style­humanistic­Marxism,­but­from­farther­left,­as­with­Tiqqun’s­piece­
of learned, paranoid critique of the dangers of “the cybernetic hypothesis” 
(Tiqqun­2001).6 
Faced­with­this­kind­of­knee-jerk,­or­is­it­die-hard,­anti-cognitivism,­one­could­
respond by reassuring the interlocutor: no, tovarich, I may read the neurophi-
losophers­Churchlands­(1986,­2002)­but­my­heart­is­in­the­right­place.­One­can­
also suggest that such a critique is a kind of paleo-Marxism, not up to date 
with immaterial and cognitive turns. I might suggest more broadly a clas-
sic “divide and conquer” move: what would the anti-cognitivist say about a 
thinker like Guattari, who denied, “as opposed to a thinker such as Heidegger,” 
that­“the­machine­is­something­which­turns­us­away­from­being”?­
I think that the machinic phyla are agents productive of being. They make 
us enter into what I call an ontological heterogenesis. . . . The whole ques-
tion is knowing how the enunciators of technology, including biological, 
aesthetic, theoretical, machines, etc., are assembled, of refocusing the 
purpose­of­human­activities­on­the­production­of­subjectivity­or­collective­
assemblages­of­subjectivity.­(Guattari­2011,­50)
Biological,­aesthetic­and­we­might­add,­cerebral machines are constitutive 
parts­of­the­production­of­subjectivity,­rather­than­its­“other.” 
Yet­perhaps­the­suspicion­towards­cognitivism­is­not­just­dogmatic,­1950s­
humanist Marxism, even if it has its “knee-jerk” moments. We can see this if 
we now turn to a new case, that of the emergent but already popular dis-
ciplines of neuronormativity. If we seek to achieve some critical distance 
towards these disciplines, it does not mean we are reverting to the anti-
naturalism­I­have­discussed­above.­That­is,­we­are­no­longer­in­a­1980s-style­
opposition­between­humanists­like­Ricoeur­or­Habermas,­and­neuroscientists/
5 On the anecdotal level, I recall some people warning the Multitudes mailing list in the 
early­2000s­that­I,­the­moderator,­was­a­danger­(perhaps­a­RAND­Corporation­agent?)­
because I was participating in a meeting on brains!
6 Those who attended the Psychopathologies of Cognitive Capitalism conference at the ICI in 
Berlin­in­March­2013­could­hear­Maurizio­Lazzarato’s­denunciation­of­“cognitivism”­and­
“science.”
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propagandists­like­Changeux­(see­e.g.,­Changeux­and­Ricoeur­2002);­we­are­
now faced with the rise of the “neuro”-disciplines.
Neurohumanities and Neuronormativity
The­prefix­neuro-­has­become­ubiquitous­in­numerous­scientific­and­loosely­
scientific­disciplines,­offering­as­it­does­a­surplus­of­concrete,­supposedly­
experimentally substantiated brain explanations for various hotly debated 
phenomena­(from­punishment­and­free­will­to­gender­and­economic­deci-
sion-making).­But­as­Jan­De­Vos­has­observed,­this­trend­has­led­to­a­doubly­
unfortunate­effect:­the­weakening­of­the­relation­of­any­of­these­projects­to­
actual neuroscience, and the weakening of the discipline of which they are the 
“neuro”­version­(De­Vos­2014;­see­also­Ortega­and­Vidal­2011).­De­Vos­quotes­
Matthew­Taylor,­a­British­Labour­Party­activist­and­government­adviser­under­
Tony­Blair,­who­claimed­that­insights­from­neurological­research­offered­a­
more solid base “than previous attempts to move beyond left and right” 
(Taylor­2009).­To­the­1980s-type­fascination­with­“my brain is my self,” the last 
decade has responded with a particularly vacuous version of a social turn, 
conveyed in a variety of expressions, from “neurocapitalism” and “neuropol-
itics” to the possibility of neuro-enhanced individuals possessing a “neuro-
competitive advantage”­(Lynch­2004;­Schmitz­2014).­
One problem would be the potentially illusory character of such promised 
developments.­But­another­problem­is­in­a­sense­the­exact­opposite,­namely,­
if neuro-enhancement is real, what about “the freedom to remain unen-
hanced”­in­a­context­where­schools,­in­a­country­we­don’t­need­to­name,­are­
coercing­parents­to­medicate­their­children­for­attention­dysfunction­(Farah­
2005,­37)?­Or,­to­mention­a­different­example,­treatments­for­dementia­will­
most likely lead to drugs that increase mnemonic recollection or recall in nor-
mal brains as well: would using this drug cross an ethical line from acceptable 
medical treatments to unacceptable cognitive enhancements if given to mem-
bers­of­the­general­population­(Bickle­and­Hardcastle­2012)?­An­even­stronger­
embrace of “neurolaw” is, for instance, in a recent essay on “The significance­
of­psychopaths­for­ethical­and­legal­reasoning”­by­Hirstein­and­Sifferd­(2014).­
If positron­emission­tomography­(PET)­studies­have­already­shown­that­
some­convicted­murderers­have­significantly­attenuated­functioning­in­their­
prefrontal­cortex­(a­region­known­to­be­involved­in­cognitive­control­and­plan-
ning),­it­is­an­open­book­for­jurists­to­plead­attenuated­responsibility­in­terms­
of­prior­cerebral­dispositions.­But­they­take­the­reasoning­one­step­further,­
focusing­on­the­specific­case­of­psychopaths­and­their­diminished­sense­of­
moral­empathy­or­responsibility.­Hirstein­and­Sifferd­effectively­argue­that­
the courts need to be practicing “neurolaw” in order to monitor psychopathic 
prisoners more closely. Somewhere here there is also the danger of so-called 
brain-realism.­As­per­Dumit­(2003,­see­also­De­Vos­ms.­and­Schmitz­2014),­our­
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society seems to place increased weight on brain data compared with other 
kinds­of­data.­A­legal­concern­is­that­brain­scans­and­other­pieces­of­such­
information­will­somehow­trump­other­evidence­in­legal­proceedings­(Gordijn­
and­Giordano­2010,­discussed­in­Bickle­and­Hardcastle­2012).
So,­thinking­back­to­my­embracing­answer­“both!”­at­the­beginning­to­the­
question: emancipatory materialism or handing ourselves over to men or 
robots­in­white­coats?­­Must­this­“both!”­bear­the­combined­masks­of­the­
neuro-adviser­to­Tony­Blair­and­that­of­the­philosophers­recommending­that­
courts­practice­“neurolaw”?­As­you­may­guess,­my­answer­is­“no,”­or­rather­
“niet,” with Soviet accent.
Two Materialisms = Two Brain Theories
Brains­are­culturally­sedimented, permeated in their material architecture by 
our culture, history,­and­social­organization; and this sedimentation is itself 
reflected­in­cortical­architecture,­as­first­clearly­argued­perhaps­by­the­brilliant­
Soviet­neuropsychologist­Lev­Vygotsky­in­the­early­twentieth­century.­A­major­
figure­in­fields­including­social­psychology,­developmental­psychology­and­a­
kind­of­heretical­Marxism­(but­one­not­afraid­to­invoke­the­brain),­Vygotsky­
strongly­emphasized­the­embeddedness­of­the­brain­in­the­social­world,­
arguing that there may even be evidence of consequences in our central 
nervous system derived from early social interaction, so that past experience 
is­embodied­in­synaptic­modifications.­As­his­younger­collaborator­Alexan-
der Luria put it, “Social history ties the knots that produce new correlations 
between­certain­zones­of­the­cerebral­cortex”­(Luria­2002,­22).7 Less dramati-
cally stated, in a recent summary by the cognitive archaeologist Lambros 
Malafouris:­“Our­minds­and­brains­are­(potentially)­subject­to­constant­change­
and alteration caused by our ordinary developmental engagement with 
cultural­practices­and­the­material­world”­(Malafouris­2010):­a­good­definition­
of cultural-cerebral plasticity. Notice that this is materialism sensu stricto, as 
it­is­a­description­of­the­properties­of­brains;­but­it­is­not­on­the­restrictively­
naturalist­side­of­the­Churchland-type­neurophilosophical­program­(natural-
ism is a fairly open-ended set of programs, some of which are more open 
onto­the­social­than­others).­In­this­more­restrictive­picture,­naturalism­begins­
to resemble scientism, in the sense that the promise is made for science to 
replace philosophy: 
It would seem that the long reign of the philosopher as the professional in 
charge­of­the­mind-body­problem­is­finally­coming­to­its­end.­Just­as­has­
happened in the lifetime of most of us in the case of the origins of the uni-
verse which used to be a theological problem and is now an astronomical 
7­ Iriki­2009­is­a­recent­comparable­illustration­of­this.
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one, so the mind-body problem is about to pass from the grasp of the 
philosopher­into­that­of­the­neuropsychologist.­(Place­1997,­16)
Instead, the mind-brain materialism of Vygotsky is both less passive and less 
mechanistic.­For­him,­“History,­changing­the­human­type,­depends­on­the­
cortex;­the­new­socialist­man­will­be­created­through­the­cortex;­upbringing­is­
in­general­an­influence­upon­the­cortex.”8 In this sense it is not a scientism or a 
denial­of­the­symbolic­and­valuative­dimensions­of­life.­Following­the­helpful­
and­suggestive­response­of­John­Sutton­and­Lyn­Tribble­to­Hawkes’­claims­that­
materialism will destroy the symbolic, valuative, representational content in 
literature, materialism need not claim that “only matter exists,” but that it is 
instead­“firmly­pluralist”­in­its­ontologies.­
Even­if­all­the­things­that­exist­supervene­on­or­are­realized­in­matter,­the­
materialist can still ascribe full-blown reality to tables and trees and ten-
dons­and­toenails­and­tangos­and­tendencies”;­an­account­including­the­
brain­need­not­exclude­“memories,­affects,­beliefs,­imaginings,­dreams,­
decisions, and the whole array of psychological phenomena of interest to 
literary,­cultural,­and­historical­theorists.­(Sutton­and­Tribble­2011)
The materialism of the “cultured brain”­(as­in­Vygotsky­or­recent­work­in­cogni-
tive­archaeology­on­tools­and­cognition,­Iriki­2009)­is­very­much­of­this­sort:­it­
integrates­the­brain­and­the­affects,­cerebral­architecture, and our aptitude 
to­produce­fictions, etc.­But­notice­that­it­is­not­enough­to­rebut­these­visions­
of­a­cold,­dead­materialism­seizing­living­value,­sentiment­and­meaning­in­its­
embrace­and­reducing­them­to­piles­of­inert­matter.­For­just­as­there­is­bad­
neuronormativity and a more positive sense of the social brain, we must be 
careful to separate the cultured brain concept from “neuro-aesthetics” which 
claims­to­integrate­materialism,­brain­science­and­art­but­in­the­flattest­way:­
I picture a future for writing that dispenses with mystery wherever it can, 
that embraces the astounding strides in thought-organ research. Ideally, 
a future where neuroimaging both miniaturizes and becomes widespread, 
augmenting the craft of authors, critics, agents and publishing houses. 
(Walter­2012)
Note­that­I­have­slipped­into­discussion­of­forms­of­materialism­(and­their­rela-
tion­to­brains),­perhaps­unconsciously­adopting­the­posture­of­the­philoso-
pher.­A­different­but­complementary­way­of­evaluating­the­more­restrictive­
version of the neurophilosophical claims would be to look at precisely their 
twenty-first century outcomes, namely, claims from cognitive neuroscience 
and its extensions to deal with new areas like ethics, the law and the rest of 
8 Vygotsky, Pedologija Podrotska.­Moscow,­1929.­Quoted­in­van­der­Veer­and­Valsiner­1991,­
320.­Further­discussion­in­Wolfe­2010.
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“neurohumanities.” This is what “critical neuroscience”­does­(see­Choudhury­
and­Slaby­2012).
As­its­name­indicates,­the­critical­neuroscience­program­aims­in­part­to­
criticize­current­developments,­particularly­in­cognitive­neuroscience­(Choud-
hury, Nagel,­and­Slaby­2009,­73).­This­can­include­the­already-familiar­social­
critique­of­our­fascination­with­brain­imaging­(fMRI,­etc.),­the­newer­critique­of­
“brain-centric” explanations of personhood, agency, and moral life, and also, 
scientifically­informed­challenges­to­exaggerated,­perhaps­even­ideological­
reports­of­neuroscientific­findings­in­popular­media­(including­in­the­neuropo-
litical­sphere,­as­discussed­below),­but­also­in­fields­such­as­the­“neurohuman-
ities.”­Just­as­we­are­often­confronted­with­bogus­neuroscientific­explanations­
in political decision-making or religious belief, similarly, certain current forms 
of neuro-aesthetic discourse will seek to augment literary scholarship by tell-
ing us that in­reading­literary­prose,­“the­line­‘he­had­leathery­hands’­has­just­
stimulated­your­sensory­cortex­in­a­way­‘he­had­rough­hands’­can­never­hope­
to”­(Walter­2012). 
Conclusion
We have witnessed a series of tensions, most classically between a kind of 
Marx-Heidegger humanism and a purported brain science, and more interest-
ingly, between two visions of socially embedded, plastic brains, namely that of 
Tony­Blair’s­advisor­versus­the­Vygotskian­“socialist cortex,” i.e., the brain as 
potential Communist caisse de résonance. Similar but not identical to the latter 
opposition would be that between current discourses of neuronormativity, 
and the Vygotsky-Negri line in which brain science is not merely facilitating a 
state­of­socio-political­status­quo,­but­is­potentially­destabilizing.
The same applies to the opposition between types of materialism, in which 
the latter, more plastic variety also embraces “cultured brain” materialism. 
One­can­think­of­the­Baldwin­effect­(in­which­cultural/linguistic­evolution­com-
bines­with­Darwinian­evolution).­The­Baldwin­effect­is­very­close,­in­fact,­to­the­
promise of the social brain, namely, that “the human cerebral cortex [is] an 
organ­of­civilization­in­which­are­hidden­boundless­possibilities”­(Luria­2002,­
22)9­and­of­course­also­to­Deleuze’s­“neuroaesthetic” vision in which “creating 
new­circuits­in­art­means­creating­them­in­the­brain”­(1995,­60).­This­Baldwin-
Vygotsky-Deleuze­vision­is­tantamount­to­saying,­to­use­Negri’s­words,­that­
“Geist is the brain.” Negri is deliberately being provocative with regard to the 
9­ ­Luria­is­glossing­on­Vygotsky­(1997),­whose­last,­posthumously­published­work,­“Psy-
chology­and­the­Localization­of­Mental­Functions”­explicitly­aimed­to­investigate­the­
functional­organization­of­the­brain­as­the­organ­of­consciousness­(Luria­2002,­23).­
The development of new “functional organs” occurs through the development of new 
functional systems, which is a means for the unlimited development of cerebral activity 
(Luria­2002­19,­22).­
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German “hermeneutical” tradition, although his interests lie less in the realm 
of­the­social­brain,­and­more­towards­a­politics­of­affects­(Negri­1995,­98).­That­
properties of Geist­such­as­its­interpretive­capacity,­its­social­and­intersubjec-
tive dimension, are in fact properties of the brain means—and I wish to insist 
on this point—that­these­are­not­just­accounts­of­interaction between two 
distinct­entities­or­fields­of­activity­(e.g., brain and society, brain and symbolic 
relations, nature and freedom,­etc.), nor an insistence that what matters is 
strictly the world of language in which we live, irreducible to the brain under-
stood as a passive machine.
A­question­left­unspoken,­but­somehow­present­here,­is:­does­the­“social 
brain”­materialist­have­to­grant­special­ontological­status­to­the­brain?­Does­
she have to hold, in the terms of “brain theorists”­Thomas­Metzinger­and­Vitto-
rio­Gallese­(2003,­549)­that­“the­brain­possesses­an­ontology­too”?­In­the­sense­
that,­just­as­a­theorist­of­cultural­plasticity­integrates­more­levels­of­analysis­
than a theorist of plasticity of the neural networks of the young rat, similarly, 
the­social-brain­materialist­might­allow­for­a­richer­account­of­what­is­specific­
about the brain in a materialist universe, compared to a mechanistic material-
ist­or­other,­flatter­forms­of­ontology,­where­there­can­be­no­“special zones.” 
For­materialism­sensu­the­identity­theorist­Place­(1997)­or­his­colleague­Smart­
(1959),­the­brain­does­not­have­an­ontology.­There­is­physics,­and­anything­
above­(both­biology­and­neuroscience)­is like a special kind of radio engineer-
ing­(Smart­1959,­142).­In­contrast,­in­Sutton’s­(2011)­fluidity­of­animal­spirits­or­
Diderot’s­description­of­the­brain­as­“the book which reads itself,”­it­does.­But­
how can materialism maintain that the brain has an ontology without reintro-
ducing “kingdoms within kingdoms”­(in­Spinoza’s­celebrated­way­of­describing­
the belief he challenged, that there were special laws and properties of human 
nature,­different­from­the­laws­of­nature­as­a­whole)?­One­eloquent­statement­
of how an interest in such plasticity can support an occasionally excessive 
claim­for­a­kind­of­special­ontological­status­is­Victoria­Pitts-Taylor’s­critique­
of such a “wonder tissue” vision of the brain, as transcendental potentia or 
biopolitical­monster­(to­use­a­phrase­of­Negri’s):­
The­brain­not­only­appears­to­us­(through­neuroscientific­revelations)­to­
be­ontologically­open­to­shaping,­but­(if­the­theory­is­right)­it­is­always­
already actively shaped and shaping. Thus plasticity cannot be seen as an 
ontological condition captured, or not, by capital, or as a biological fact to 
be­freed­from­social­and­cultural­ones.­(Pitts-Taylor­2010,­648)10 
10­ Pitts-Taylor’s­more­general­observation­about­the­appeal­of­the­concept­of­plasticity­is­
worth­citing:­“For­a­number­of­scholars­in­a­range­of­fields,­plasticity­offers­the­possibil-
ity of taking up the biological matter of the body while defying biological determinism. 
For­sociologists­of­the­body­and­medicine­who­have­been­looking­for­ways­to­overcome­
the limitations of social constructionism, brain plasticity appears to present the material 
body in a way that opens up, rather than closes down, sociocultural accounts of embod-
ied­subjectivity.­In­psychology,­plasticity­may­offer­those­opposed­to­materialist­views­
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If­we­over-ontologise­the­brain­in­order­to­not­be­mystical­dualists­or­knee-jerk­
anti-scientists,­we­may­also­run­the­risk­of­reconfiguring­humanity­as­just­“a­
cerebral­crystallization”­(Deleuze­and­Guattari­1991,­197),11 not unlike the way 
recent continental mystagogies of the brain in which “the frontier between the 
empirical and the transcendental is “deconstructed” within the materiality of 
the­brain”­(Williams­2013).
The other remaining question, which I have mentioned several times, is: if 
brain and politics are not two opposed spheres, does this have an emanci-
patory­potential?­The­brain’s­potentia against the rule-concept of potestas 
(the­immanent­and­constitutive­essence­of­a­living­being­that­desires­what­
is good for its being, versus power as the transcendent power of command 
assumed­by­rulers).­In­similar­tones­Pasquinelli­(2014,­298)­approvingly­cites­
Metzinger’s­neuropedagogy­and­Consciousness­Revolution­as­the­“response­
of contemporary living labor to the regime of cognitive capitalism.” In fact, I 
like­the­sobering­way­Lazzarato­puts­it:­art­and­culture­are­“neither­more­nor­
less integrated” into the society of control and security than any other activ-
ity, and they have “the same potential and ambiguities as any other activity” 
(2008,­174).­There­is­little­to­be­gained­by­investing­either­a­substance­(brain,­
frontal­cortex,­organism)­or­a­potentiality­with­an­absolute­saving power. This, 
however,­does­not­change­the­way­in­which­a­Spinozist­politics­of­brain­and­
affects­(Wolfe­2014)­is­an­improvement­over­those­planifications­which­lay­out­
a blueprint for action, with a hierarchy of actors assigned to their unmoving 
roles, à la­DIAMAT­and­the­dictatorship­of­the­proletariat.
So, again: navigating between the Charybdis of apolitical neuronormativity, 
where Churchland becomes Philip K. Dick (.­.­.­neurolegal attempts to identify 
psychopaths­before­they­commit­crimes),­and­the­Scylla­of­comfortable­Marx-
ist­anti-naturalism,­I­find­support­in­Negri’s­provocative­affirmation,­Geist is 
the­brain.­But­which­brain?­Neither­the­brain­of­forceps­or­MRI-wielding­“men 
in white coats,” nor the brain of the bad neuro-aesthetic­theorization­of­the­
experience of reading literary prose, which we saw with Walter above. 
Against­static­materialism­I­oppose­the­combined­fervor­of­the­Bolshevik­
invocation of the socialist cortex—as if, contrary to present, tedious attacks 
on the “dangerous naturalism” of thinkers like Virno, the true radical Marxism 
of­both­normative­development­and­psychic­suffering­a­way­to­account­for­physiological­
aspects­of­both­without­endorsing­evolutionary­or­hard-wired­views.­For­postmodern-
ists,­poststructuralists,­and­others­interested­not­only­in­displacing­the­liberal­subject­
but­also­in­productive­alternatives,­plasticity­seems­to­offer­positive­chaos,­creativity,­
and­multisubjectivity.­For­those­pursuing­posthumanism­at­various­levels,­plasticity­
renders­the­world­as­an­infinite­source­of­“wideware” for the brain, and positions the 
individual brain as inherently connected to others—things, artifacts, other brains” 
(Pitts-Taylor­2010,­647).­
11­ In­response­to­the­phenomenologist­Erwin­Straus’s­“humanist” statement that “It is man 
who­thinks,­not­the­brain”­(in­Straus­1935,­183).­
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was in the brain­(Wolfe­2010,­Pasquinelli­2014)—and­Negri’s­incantatory­asser-
tion that “the brain is the biopolitical monster”­(cit.­in­Wolfe­2008).­Granted,­
we­might­take­a­dose­of­deflationary­realism­towards­such­utopias;­yet­they­
are­infinitely­more­sympathetic­than­the­melancholy­cynicism­of­the­déraciné 
architecture­theorists,­the­gleeful­naïveté­of­metaphysicians­of­the­prosthesis,­
or­(again)­the­reactive,­fearful­anti-naturalisms,­anti-cerebralisms­of­some­our­
fellow-travelers.
Acknowledgments: Thanks to Matteo Pasquinelli and Pieter Present for their comments.
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Post-Trauma: Towards a 
New Definition? 
Catherine Malabou
According to Žižek, contemporary approaches to 
trauma disregard Lacan’s most fundamental state-
ment: trauma has always already occurred. To state 
that trauma has already occurred means that it can-
not occur by chance, that every empirical accident 
or shock impairs an already or a previously wounded 
subject. In this text, I want to chance a thought that 
would definitely escape the always already’s author-
ity, which would give chance a chance. The chapter 
goes on to compare the Freudian/Lacanian view of 
brain trauma versus psychic trauma with contem-
porary neurobiological and socio-political views on 
trauma.
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In­his­article­“Descartes­and­the­Post-Traumatic­Subject,”­Slavoj­Žižek­(2009)­
develops a very insightful critique of the current neurobiological and neuro-
psychoanalytic approach of trauma.1 He challenges the way in which these 
approaches­tend­to­substitute­for­the­Freudian­and­Lacanian­definitions­of­
psychic­wounds.­Žižek’s­critique­may­be­summarized­in­the­following­terms:­
While­developing­its­own­critique­of­psychoanalysis,­namely­of­Freud­and­
Lacan, neurobiology would not have been aware of the fact that Lacan, pre-
cisely, has already said what they thought he has not said. They would thus be 
ventriloquized­by­Lacan­at­the­very­moment­they­thought­they­were­speaking­
from another point of view, one other than Lacanian psychoanalysis. 
Why­is­that?­How­is­it­possible­to­cite­Lacan­without­knowing­about­it?­Accord-
ing­to­Žižek,­contemporary­approaches­to­trauma­would­remain­unaware—out­
of­disavowal­or­of­desire—of­Lacan’s­most­fundamental­statement:­trauma­
has­always­already­occurred.­A­specific­trauma,­this­or­that­empirical­shock,­
may happen only because a more profound and originary trauma, understood 
as the real or as the “transcendental” trauma, has always already occurred. 
Trauma­had­always­already­happened.­Already­always­already.­Lacan­had­
already said always already. The new approach to trauma would only be a 
confirmation,­and­not­a­destitution,­of­the­always-already.­It­would­be­a­mere­
repetition of what has already occurred and been said. 
To state that trauma has already occurred means that it cannot occur by 
chance, that every empirical accident or shock impairs an already or a previ-
ously­wounded­subject.­There­is­an­obvious­rejection­of­chance­in­Freud­and­
Lacan.­Beyond­the­always-already principle. Something that Lacan had never 
said, to­the­extent­that­I­want­to­chance­a­thought­that­would­definitely­escape­
the­always­already’s­authority,­which­would­give­chance­a­chance. 
Before­I­focus­on­the­notion­of­chance,­I­want­to­state­that­the­possibility­
of­such­a­beyond­is­opened­by­current­neurobiology­and­its­redefinition­of­
both­the­unconscious­(named­neural­unconscious­or­neural­psyche)­and­the­
trauma, and­consequently­the­post-traumatic­subjectivity­(this­is­the­central­
thesis­of­Malabou­2007).­Neurobiology­and­neuropsychoanalysis­challenge­
the­Freudian­conception­of­the­psychic­accident­understood­as­a­meeting­
point between two meanings of the event: the event conceived as an internal 
immanent­determination­(Erlebnis)­and­an­encounter­that­occurs­from­outside­
(Ereignis).­In­order­for­an­accident­to­become­a­proper psychic event, it has 
to­trigger­the­subject’s­psychic­history­and­determinism.­The­Ereignis has to 
unite with the Erlebnis.­The­most­obvious­example­of­such­a­definition­of­the­
psychic event is the example, often proposed by­Freud,­of­the­war­wound.­
When a soldier on the front is traumatized­by­being wounded, or merely the 
fear of being wounded,­it­appears­that­the­current­real­conflict­he­is­involved­
1­ ­Žižek’s­article­is­a­review­of­Malabou­2007.
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in­is­a­repetition­of­an­internal­conflict.­Shock­is­always­a­reminder­of­a­previ-
ous­shock.­Freud­would­then­have­considered­PTSD­as­the­expression­of­the­
always-already­character­of­the­conflict­or­trauma.­
Neurobiologists hold, on the contrary, that severe trauma is,­first,­fundamen-
tally an Ereignis and as such something that happens by mere chance from 
the outside. Second, they thus maintain this dismantles the Ereignis/Erlebnis 
distinction­to­the­extent­that­it­disconnects­the­subject­from­her­reserves­of­
memory­and­from­the­presence­of­the­past.­After­severe­brain­damage,­which­
always produces a series of severed connections and gaps within the neural 
network,­a­new­subject­emerges­with­no­reference­to­the­past­or­to­her­previ-
ous­identity.­A­neural­disconnection­does­not­trigger­any­previous­conflict.­
Instead,­the­post-traumatized­subject­disconnects­the­structure­of­the always-
already.­The­post-traumatized­subject­is­the­nevermore of the always-already. 
We can then state that a neural disconnection cannot belong to either of the 
three terms that form the Lacanian triad of the imaginary, the symbolic, and 
the real, to the extent that this triad is rooted in the transcendental principle 
of the always-already. We propose to entertain a fourth dimension, a dimen-
sion­that­might­be­called­the­material.­From­a­neurobiological­point­of­view,­
the trauma would be taken to be a material, empirical, biological, and mean-
ingless interruption of the transcendental itself. This is why post-traumatic 
subjects­are­living examples of the death drive and of the dimension beyond the 
pleasure principle that­Freud­and­Lacan­both­fail­to­locate­or­to­expose.­Beyond­
the always-already principle is the true beyond-the-pleasure principle. 
Žižek­(2009)­affords­a­certain­credulity­to­these­ideas­but­rejects­them­out­of­
hand for three main reasons: 
1.­ These statements are seemingly ignorant of the Lacanian distinction 
between­pleasure­(plaisir)­and­enjoyment­( jouissance).­Enjoyment­in­itself­is­
precisely beyond pleasure. It is this painful surplus of pleasure that resists 
being­contained­within­the­framework­of­the­pleasure­principle.­Enjoy-
ment is the always-already confronting us with death, and without which 
we would be trapped in pleasure only. In other words, neurological trauma 
cannot­be­but­a­form­of­enjoyment.­Lacan­has­always­already­said­that­dis-
connection,­separation­from­the­past,­loss­of­memory,­and­indifference­are­
modalities­or­occurrences­of­enjoyment.­The­unconscious­is­always­already­
ready for its own destruction: “What is beyond the pleasure principle is 
enjoyment­itself,­it­is­drive­as­such”­(Žižek­2009,­136).­
2.­The­second­objection­concerns­destruction­itself­understood­as­the­pres-
ence­of­what­Lacan­calls­“the­Thing”­(la­Chose).­The­Thing­is­the­threat­
of­death.­Without­this­threat,­which­mainly­appears­to­the­subject­as­
the­threat­of­castration,­any­empirical­objective­danger­or­hazard­would­
remain meaningless to the psyche. Here comes the always-already again: 
“Castration­is­not­only­a­threat-horizon,­a­not­yet/always­to­come,­but,­
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simultaneously,­something­that­always­already­happens:­the­subject­is­not­
only­under­a­threat­of­separation,­it­is­the­effect­of­separation­(from­sub-
stance)”­(Žižek­2009,­141).­
3.­This­last­sentence­expresses­the­main­objection:­according­to­Žižek,­the­
subject­is,­since­Descartes,­a­post-traumatic­subject,­a­subject­structured­in­
such a way that it has to constantly erase the traces of its past in order to be 
a­subject.­Thus,­and­once­again,­the­experience­of­being­cut­off­from­one-
self is a very old one. Neurobiology does not teach us anything new on that 
point,­according­to­Žižek­it­rather­confirms­the­very­essence­of­the­subject:­
“The empty frame of death drive is the formal-transcendental condition” 
(2009,­27)­of­subjectivity:­“What­remains­after­the­violent­traumatic­intru-
sion­onto­a­human­subject­that­erases­all­his­substantial­content­is­the­pure­
form­of­subjectivity,­the­form­that­already­must­have­been­there”­(2009,­
144).­Further:­“If­one­wants­to­get­an­idea­of­cogito­at­its­purest,­its­‘degree­
zero,’­one­has­to­take­a­look­at­autistic­monsters­(the­new­wounded),­a­gaze­
that­is­very­painful­and­disturbing”­(2009,­146).­
From­Descartes­to­Damasio­via­Lacan,­there­would­be,­once­again,­one­and­
only one principle: trauma has always already happened. 
To­answer­these­objections­one­may­insist­that­the­motif­of­chance­and­
thought, elaborated in a certain way, deconstructs the always-already, which 
appears to be a barrier to what it is supposed to be—that is, a barrier to 
destruction. If destruction has always already happened, if there is anything 
such as a transcendental destruction, then destruction is indestructible. This 
is­what,­in­Freud­and­in­Lacan,­remains­extremely­problematic:­Destruction 
remains for them a structure, the repetition of the originary trauma. What 
if the always-already­might­explode?­What­if­the always-already were self-
destructive and able to disappear as the so-called fundamental law of the 
psyche?­
In­order­to­address­these­issues­more­specifically,­let us concentrate on the 
status­of­chance­in­a­dream­that­Freud­analyzes­in­chapter­7­of­The Interpreta-
tion of Dreams and that Lacan comments in turn with his seminar XI The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis­in­chapters­5­“Tuché and Automaton” 
and­6­“The­Split­between­the­Eye­and­the­Gaze.”­Freud­writes:­
A­father­had­been­watching­beside­his­child’s­sick­bed­for­days­and­nights­
on­end.­After­the­child­had­died,­he­went­into­the­next­room­to­lie­down,­
but left the door open so he could see from his bedroom into the room 
in­which­the­child’s­body­was­laid­out,­with­tall­candles­standing­round­it.­
An­old­man­has­been­engaged­to­keep­watch­over­it,­and­sat­beside­the­
body­murmuring­prayers.­After­a­few­hours­sleep,­the­father­had­a­dream­
that his child was standing beside his bed, caught him by the arm and 
whispered­to­him­reproachfully:­‘Father,­don’t­you­see­I’m­burning?’­He­
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woke up, noticed a bright glare of light from the next room, hurried into it 
and found that the old watchman had dropped out to sleep and that the 
wrappings­and­one­of­the­arms­of­the­beloved­child’s­dead­body­had­been­
burned­by­a­candle­that­had­fallen­on­them.­(1964, 5: 547–48)­
The­issue­immediately­addressed­by­Freud­is­to­know­whether­we­can­con-
sider such a dream as a wish fulfillment.­On the contrary, is it not an­objection,­
a counter example to the theory of dreams as wish fulfillment?­
Let us­consider­Lacan’s­answer­to­this­issue.­First­of­all,­after­having­reminded­
us of this dream, Lacan posits that psychoanalysis is “an encounter, an essen-
tial encounter—an appointment to which we are always called with a real that 
eludes­us”­(1978,­53).­This­essential­missed­encounter,­or­misencounter,­with­
the real is­the­encounter­with­the­trauma.­According­to­Lacan,­this­dream­
stages­such­an­encounter.­The­Freudian­question­comes­back­at­that­point:­If 
this dream stages the encounter with the trauma, how can we consider it as 
wish fulfillment,­as­fulfillment­of­a­desire?­
We need to understand more precisely what the very notion of “encounter 
with the real” means. The analysis of this formula—“encounter with the real”—
forms­the­content­of­Freud’s­chapters­5­and­6.­This­formula­is­contradictory­to­
the­extent­that­“encounter”­for­Freud­refers­to­something­contingent,­acciden-
tal,­to­something­that­may­or­may­not­happen.­For­Lacan­“real,”­on­the­other­
hand, designates the necessary and determined mechanism of repetition, the 
always-already of the trauma. How then can we encounter—contingently—
the­necessity­of­trauma?­Here,­the­notion­of­chance­is­emerging.­How­can­we­
encounter—by chance—the necessity of the trauma, which has been always 
already­here?­
It­is­on­this­point­that­Lacan­refers­to­Aristotle,­who­in­his­Physics distinguishes 
two­regimes­of­events­or­of­causality.­First­to­the­mode­of­“tuché”: which 
means­fortune,­contingency;­then­to­the­mode­of­“automaton,” the blind 
necessity of the repetition mechanism, the compulsion to repeat as such. With 
those to modes, we have chance on the one hand, determinism on the other. 
Furthermore,­according­to­Aristotle,­everything­that­comes­to­pass­is­due­to­
one of these two modes of temporality: Tuché will decide if you will meet by 
chance­a­friend­on­the­agora­today;­automaton governs the cycle of sunset 
and sunrise, or the seasons cycle, etc. Lacan comments on these two modes: 
“Tuché,­he­says,­is­good­or­bad­fortune”­(1978,­69).­“Automaton is the Greek 
version­of­the­compulsion­to­repeat”­(67).­Even­if­this­encounter­between­two­
regimes of events and two modes of causality is said to be a missed encoun-
ter,­it­is­nonetheless­an­encounter.­Again,­how­is­this­possible?­
Here is where the analysis of the dream of the father and his dead child can 
begin.­But­what­belongs to automaton and what to tuché in this dream?­Or­as­
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Lacan­puts­it:­“Where­is­the­reality­in­this­accident?”­(1978,­58)­and­where­is­the­
accident­in­this­reality?­
Obviously, what belongs to tuché is the falling of the candle and the burning of 
the­child’s­arm.­This­is­the­reality,­Lacan­says,­but­not­the­real.­The­real­is­the­
unreal­“resurrection”­of­the­child­and­the­words:­“Father,­can’t­you­see­I­am­
burning?”­Here,­Lacan­starts­to­analyze­tuché as a secondary kind of causality 
or­reality.­The­child’s­burned­arm­is­not­the­real­accident­in­this­dream,­it­is­
not­the­real.­The­real­comes­with­the­speech,­the­son’s­address­to­his­father.­
Tuché has­no­autonomy;­it­is­in­fact­only­a­means­for­the­real­or­the­automaton 
to emerge. Accordingly,­there­would only be one mode of happening, that of 
automaton, with a disguised version of it, a mask, tuché. 
Chance, or fortune, is only an appearance, an “as if.” What happens as if by 
chance is in fact always the automatism of repetition, the primary trauma: 
“What is repeated, in fact, is always something that occurs as if by chance,” 
states Lacan­(1978,­54).­Moreover, Lacan asks what is genuinely burning in the 
dream. Is it­the­child’s­arm,­or­the­sentence­uttered­by­the­child:­“Father,­can’t­
you­see­that­I’m­burning?”­Lacan explicates:
Does not this sentence, said in relation to fever suggest to you what, in 
one­of­my­recent­lectures,­I­called­the­cause­of­fever?­.­.­.­What­encounter­
can there be with that forever inert being—even now being devoured 
by­the­flames—if­not­the­encounter­that­occurs­precisely­at­the­moment­
when,­by­accident,­as­if­by­chance,­the­flames­come­to­meet­him?­Where­
is the reality in this accident, if not that it repeats something more fatal 
by means of reality, a reality in which the person who was supposed to 
be watching over the body still remains asleep, even when the father 
reemerges­after­having­woken­up?­(1978,­58)­
It is clear that if contingent reality is always a means for the real to come to 
light, it is then always secondary. When Lacan asks what is the reality in this 
accident, he means that there is something other, in the accident, than the 
accident: “Is there no more reality in this message than in the noise by which 
the­father­also­identifies­the­strange­reality­of­what­is­happening­in­the­room­
next­door?”­(1978,­58).­
The­contingent­external­encounter­of­reality­(the­candle­collapses­and­ignites 
the­cloth­covering­the­dead­child,­the­smell­of­the­smoke­disturbs­the­father)­
triggers the true real, the unbearable fantasy-apparition of the child reproach-
ing­his­father.­Again,­what­burns­are­the­words,­not­the­arm.­“Father,­can’t­
you­see­I’m­burning?­This­sentence­is­itself­a­fire-brand—or­itself­it­brings­fire­
where it falls,”­writes­Lacan­(1978,­69)­Further:­the­veiled­meaning­is­the­true­
reality, that of the “primal scene.” In other words, there is a split between real-
ity and the real.
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Now is the moment for approaching the problem of wish fulfillment.­Lacan­
writes: “It is not that, in the dream, the father persuades himself that the son 
is­still­alive.­But­the­terrible­version­of­the­dead­son­taking­the­father­by­the­
arm designates a beyond that makes itself heard in the dream. Desire mani-
fests itself in the dream by the loss expressed in an image at the cruel point of 
the­object.­It­is­only­in­the­dream­that­this­truly­unique­encounter­can­occur.­
Only a rite, an endlessly repeated act, can commemorate this . . . encounter” 
(1978,­59).­
This­dream­would­then­be­a­kind­of­fulfillment­to­the­extent­that­it­would­
render­the­encounter­with­jouissance,­enjoyment,­possible.­The­fulfillment­is­
not­always­linked­with­pleasure,­says­Lacan,­but­it­can­be­linked­with­jouis-
sance.­We­remember­that­jouissance­as­defined­by­Žižek­is­the­beyond­of­the­
pleasure principle, the excess or surplus of pleasure. It transforms itself in a 
kind­of­suffering­which­is­the­very­expression­of­the­death­drive.­Read­in­this­
way,­the­dream­is,­a­wish­fulfillment,­because­we­can­only­encounter­jouis-
sance in dreams.
Is it not properly inadmissible, the way in which Lacan distinguishes two kinds 
of­realities­in­this­dream,­a­true­one­and­a­secondary­one?­Can­we­not­think­
that­the­accident­of­the­candle­falling­on­the­child’s­arm­is­traumatizing­per­se,­
and as such does not necessarily trigger the repetition mechanism of a more 
ancient­trauma?­Then,­this­accident­would­be­as­real­as­the­words­it­provokes.­
If there is a beyond the pleasure principle, can we still understand it as a 
beyond­chance,­beyond­the­accident­or­beyond­contingency?­This­is­precisely­
what is no longer possible. When the victims of traumas are “burning,” we 
certainly do not have a right to ask: Where­is­the­reality­in­these­accidents?­
We certainly do not have a right to suspect contingency for hiding a more 
profound kind of event, for being the veiled face of the compulsion to repeat. 
We do not have a right to split reality from the real, contingency from neces-
sity,­the­transcendental­from­the­empirical,­good­or­bad­fortune­(tuché)­from­
necessity­(automaton).­Reading­this­Lacanian­interpretation,­we­cannot­help­
but­visualize­the­psychoanalyst­as­a­fireman­looking­at­the­catastrophe­and­
saying: “There must be something more urgent, I must take care of a more 
originary emergency.” 
The accident never hides anything, never reveals anything but itself. We need 
to think of a destructive plasticity, which is a capacity to explode, and cannot, 
by any means, be assimilated by the psyche, even in dreams. The answer we 
can­give­to­the­second­objection,­concerning­castration­as­something­which­
has always already occurred, is that the threat of castration is what helps 
Lacan to always see, even if he says the contrary, the symbolic at work within 
the real. 
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While­for­Freud­castration­is­the­phenomenal­form­of­the­threat­of­death,­
because­it­means­separation,­it­gives­death­a­figurative­content,­Lacan­
declares­about­separation:­“We­must­recognize­in­this­sentence­[‘Father­can’t­
you­see­I’m­burning­?’]­what­perpetuates­for­the­father­those­words­forever­
separated­from­the­dead­child­that­are­said­to­him”­(1978,­58).­Here,­we­find­
the­motive­of­separation:­the­child’s­death,­the­separation­from­the­child­is­the­
trauma, the automaton.­But­since­this­separation­can­be­expressed­by­another­
separation, that of words—words separating from the body—then the trauma 
encounters the symbolic and never escapes it. The real is separated from itself 
thanks to words, thanks to the symbolic. 
What challenges the idea that castration or separation has always already 
happened is precisely the fact that this always already is the presence of the 
symbolic in the real, consequently also a kind of erasure of the trauma. There 
is no “pure” real. 
What­brain­damage­allows­us­to­see­is­that­the­violence­of­the­traumatizing­
lesions is consistent with­the­way­they­cut­the­subject from his or her reserves 
of memory, as we have already seen.­The­traumatized­victim’s speech does 
not have any revelatory meaning. His or her illness does not constitute a 
kind of truth with regard to their ancient history. There is no possibility for 
the­subject­to be present to their own fragmentation or to their own wound. 
In contrast to castration, there is no representation, no phenomenon, no 
example­of­separation,­which­would­allow­the­subject­to­anticipate,­to­wait­
for,­to­fantasize­what­can­be­a­break­in­cerebral­connections.­One­cannot­even­
dream about it. There is no scene for this Thing. There are no words. 
We do not believe in the possibility of responding to the absence of meaning 
by reintroducing some kind of hidden repetition of the real. On the contrary, 
we have to admit that something like a total absence of meaning is the mean-
ing of our time. There is a global uniformity of neuropsychological reactions to 
traumas,­be­it­political,­natural,­or­pathological­traumas.­Žižek,­among­others,­
considers this new uniformed face of violence: 
First,­there­is­the­brutal­external­physical­violence:­terror­attacks­like­9/11,­
street violence, rapes, etc., second, natural catastrophes, earthquakes, 
tsunamis,­etc.;­then,­there­is­the­“irrational”­(meaningless)­destruc-
tion­of­the­material­base­of­our­inner­reality­(brain­tumors,­Alzheimer’s­
disease,­organic­cerebral­lesions,­PTSD,­etc.),­which­can­utterly­change,­
destroy­even,­the­victim’s­personality.­We­would­not­be­able­to­distinguish­
between natural, political and socio-symbolic violence. We are dealing 
today with a heterogeneous mixture of nature and politics, in which poli-
tics cancels itself as such and takes the appearance of nature, and nature 
disappears­in­order­to­assume­the­mask­of­politics.­(2009,­125)­
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What­Žižek­does­not­seem­to­admit­is­that­with­this­a­new­form­of­violence­
is emerging today, which is implying a new articulation of the concept of the 
real—we might also say the concept of what is burning, a concept that would 
give chance its chance, a chance that would never be an “as if,” an “as if by 
chance.” 
Let­us­turn­to­the­third­and­last­objection.­We­remember­that­for­Žižek,­post-
traumatic­subjectivity­is­nothing­other­than­the­classical­Cartesian­form­of­
subjectivity.­The­subject­is­an­instance­capable­of­erasing­all­substantial­con-
tent in order always to be new and present to itself and to the world. This is as 
true as the whole history of metaphysics. 
But­while­this­might­be­true,­it­is­difficult­to­believe­that­traumatic­erasure­
can­occur­without­forming­each­time­a­new­subject,­unaware­of­the­previous­
one.­Repetition­is­plastic,­it­gives­form­to­what­it­destroys.­We­have­to­think­
of a form created by destruction, the form of a new person, which is not the 
transcendental­subject,­but­what­undermines­it,­as­the­threat­of­its­explosion.­
The plasticity of contingency has the power to bestow its own form on the 
subjects­that­it­shocks.­A­subject­that­burns,­and­which­urges­us­to­see,­at­long­
last, that it is really burning. 
~
What­is­a­shock?­A­trauma?­Are­they­the­result­of­a­blow,­of­something­that­
cannot, by any means, be anticipated, something sudden that comes from 
outside­and­knocks­us­down,­whoever­we­are?­Or­are­they,­on­the­contrary,­
always­predestined­encounters?­Are­they­something­which­would­force­us­to­
erase the “whoever you are” from the previous sentence, to the extent that 
an encounter presupposes a destination, a predestination, something which 
happens­to­you,­to­you­proper,­and­to­nobody­else?­According­to­this­second­
approach,­a­shock­or­a­trauma­would­always­result,­as­Freud­states,­from­a­
meeting between the blow itself and a preexisting psychic destiny. 
Is­this­Freudian­conception­still­accurate­to­characterize­current­global­psychic­
violence?­Do­we­not­have­to­admit­that­blows,­or­shocks­strike­any­of­us­with-
out­making­any­difference,­erasing­our­personal­histories,­destroying­the­very­
notion of psychic destiny, of childhood, of the past, even of the unconscious 
itself?­For­Freud­and­for­Lacan,­it­seems­clear­that­every­external­trauma­
is “sublated,”­internalized.­Even­the­most­violent­intrusions­of­the­external­
real­owe­their­traumatic­effect­to­the­resonance­they­find­in­primary­psychic­
conflicts.­
When­it­comes­to­war­neuroses,­Freud­declares­in­his­introduction­to­Psy-
cho-analysis and the War Neuroses that the external accident, which causes 
the trauma, is not the genuine cause of it. It acts as a shock, or a blow, which 
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awakens­an­old­“conflict­in­the­ego.” The genuine enemy is always an “internal 
enemy”­(Freud­1964, 17:210).­
According­to­Freud,­there­is­only­one­possible­kind­of­“neurosis­aetiology”:­the­
sexual one. Some passages from “Sexuality” and from “My Views on the Part 
Played by Sexuality” in The Aetiology Of The Neuroses are clear in this respect. 
In­the­first,­Freud­states:­“The­true­aetiology­of­the­psychoneuroses­does­not­
lie­in­precipitating­causes”­(1964, 7:250).­In­the­second­text,­Freud­sums­up­
his whole theory of infantile trauma and recapitulates all the changes he has 
brought to it. He says that he was forced to give up the importance of the part 
played­by­the­“accidental­influences”­in­the­causation­of­trauma­(1964, 7:275).­
Traumas­are­not­caused­by­effective­events­or­accidents,­but­by­phantasms:­
Accidental­influences­derived­from­experience­having­receded­into­the­
background, the factors of constitution and heredity necessarily gained 
the upper hand once more.­(Freud­1964, 3:250)
For­Freud,­brain­injuries­and­brain­lesions­cannot­have­a­real­causal­power­
since they are regarded as merely external. In the course of our psychic life 
and­in­the­constitution­of­our­subjectivity­the­brain­has­no­responsibility.­It­
is not responsible, which also means that in general it cannot bring a proper 
response to the questions of danger, fragility, and exposure. It is exposed to 
accidents­but­not­to­the­symbolic­and/or­psychic­meaning­of­accidents.­For­
Freud,­sexuality­appears­to­be,­first­of­all,­not­only­the­“sexual­life,” but also 
a­new­specific­kind­of­cause,­which­alone­is­able­to­explain­the­constitution­
of our personal identity, our history, and our destiny. There is a wide gap 
between external and internal traumatic events, even if the frontier between 
inside and outside is being constantly redrawn by Freud.­Nevertheless,­it­is­
clear that none of the determinant events of our psychic life has an organic 
or physiological cause. In a certain sense, such events never come from the 
outside. Properly speaking, there are no sexual accidents.
In Beyond the Pleasure Principle,­Freud­goes­so­far­as­to­state­that­the­emer-
gence of a neurosis and the occurrence of a physical lesion are antithetic and 
incompatible: 
In the case of the ordinary traumatic neuroses two characteristics emerge 
prominently:­first,­that­the­chief­weight­in­their­causation­seems­to­rest­
upon­the­factor­of­surprise,­of­fright;­and­secondly,­that­a­wound­or­injury­
inflicted­simultaneously­works­as­a­rule­against the development of a 
neurosis.­(1964, 18:12)
Here,­Freud­recognizes­the­importance­of­surprise­and­terror,­and­he­seems­
to admit the power of chance and the absence of anticipation. However, this 
power­either­causes­a­physical­wound­or­a­psychic­wound.­In­the­first­case,­
there is a narcissistic bodily investment that takes care of the wound, as if 
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organic­injuries­were­able­to­cure­themselves­without­any­help­from psychic 
therapy. It is as if physical and psychic wounds have nothing in common, 
unless­the­first­can­be­translated­into­the­language­of­the­second­to­be­con-
sidered as “symptoms.”­This­means­that­for­Freud­people­suffering­from­brain­
diseases do not belong within psychoanalytic­jurisdiction.­And­that­is­why,­per-
haps,­we­do­not­encounter­any­kind­of­despondency­in­Freud’s­clinical­studies.­
But­we­then­emerge­with­the­idea­that­the­psychic­life­is­indestructible:­
The primitive mind is, in the fullest meaning of the word, imperishable. 
What are called mental diseases inevitably produce an impression in the 
layman that intellectual and mental life have been destroyed. In reality, 
the destruction only applies to later acquisitions and developments. The 
essence­of­mental­disease­lies­in­a­return­to­earlier­states­of­affective­
life­and­functioning.­An­excellent­example­of­the­plasticity­of­mental­life­
is­afforded­by­the­state­of­sleep,­which­is­our­goal­every­night.­Since­we­
have learnt to interpret even absurd and confused dreams, we know that 
whenever we go to sleep we throw out our hard-won morality like a gar-
ment, and put it on again the next­morning.­(Freud­1964, 24:285–6)­
Even­if­Lacan­displaces­many­Freudian­statements,­he­also­shares­many­on­the­
indestructibility of psychic life, which is another name for the always-already. 
Neurobiology puts the so-called psychic immortality into question. Our socio-
political reality imposes multiple versions of external intrusions, traumas, 
which­are­just­meaningless­brutal­interruptions­that­destroy­the­symbolic­tex-
ture­of­the­subject’s­identity­and­render­all­kinds­of­internalization/interioriza-
tion­impossible,­as­well­as­the­accident’s­re-appropriation­or­resubjectivation,­
because some regions of the brain have been destroyed. Nothing, in psychic 
life, is indestructible. 
At­some­point­in­his­review,­Žižek­evokes­the­possibility­that­neurobiologists­
would­only­project­their­own­desire,­in­their­account­of­neurobiological­victims­
and meaningless trauma, without mentioning it: do they “not forget to include 
[themselves],­[their]­own­desire,­in­the­observed­phenomenon­(of­autistic­
subjects)?”­(2009,­137).­
Here­comes­desire­again!­But­of­course,­we­might­reverse­the­objection:­Does­
not­Žižek­omit­to­include­his­own­desire­for­the­always-already?­Even­if­he­is­
one of the most accurate and generous readers of current neurobiology, as 
becomes manifest in his great text, we might interpret the meaning of such a 
desire­as­a­fear­of­the­trauma­of­being­definitely­separated­from­Lacan.­
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A P P E N D I X

Keyword: Augmented Intelligence
Matteo Pasquinelli
Augmented intelligence is an umbrella-term used in media 
theory, cognitive sciences, neurosciences, philosophy of mind, 
and political philosophy to cover the complex relation between 
human intelligence on one side, and mnemo-techniques and 
computational machines on the other—both understood to be an 
expansion (also to a social and political degree) of human cogni-
tive faculties. 
Main Synonyms
Synonyms include: augmented human intellect, machine augmented intel-
ligence,­and­intelligence­amplification.­Specifically,­extended­mind,­extended­
cognition, externalism, distributed cognition, and the social brain are concepts 
of cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind that do not necessarily involve 
technology­(Clark­and­Chalmers­1998).­Augmented­reality,­virtual­reality,­and­
teleoperation can be framed as a form of augmented intelligence, moreover, 
for­their­novel­influence­on­cognition.­Brain-computer­interfaces­directly­
record electromagnetic impulses of neural substrates to control, for instance, 
external devices like a robotic arm, and raise issues of the exo-self and exo-
body.­Augmented­intelligence­must­be­distinguished­from­artificial­intelligence,­
which implies a complete autonomy of machine intelligence from human intel-
ligence­despite­sharing­a­logical­and­technological­ground;­and­from­swarm­
intelligence,­which­describes­decentralized­and­spontaneous­forms­of­organi-
zation­in­animals,­humans,­and­algorithmic­bots­(Beni­and­Wang­1989).­In­the­
field­of­neuropharmacology,­nootropics­refers­to­drugs­that­improve­mental­
functions­such­as­memory,­motivation,­and­attention.­Like­artificial­and aug-
mented intelligence, the idea of collective intelligence also bred­(especially­in­
science­fiction)­a­family­of­visionary­terms­that­is­not­possible­to­summarize­
here­(for­example­Stapledon­1930).
History: Engelbart and Bootstrapping
The relation between cognitive faculties, labor, and computation was already 
present­in­the­pioneering­work­of­Charles­Babbage­(1832).­The­“division­of­
mental labor” was the managerial notion at the basis of his famous calculat-
ing engines, which aimed to improve industrial production. The concept of 
augmented­intelligence­itself­was­first­introduced­in­cybernetics­by­Engelbart­
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(1962),­who­was­influenced­by­the­works­of­Bush­(1945)­on­the Memex,­Ashby­
(1956)­on­intelligence amplification,­Licklider­(1960)­on­man-computer symbiosis, 
and­Ramo­(1961)­on­intellectronics, among others. In his seminal paper, “Aug-
menting­Human­Intellect:­A­Conceptual­Framework,”­Engelbart­(1962)­provides­
a­definition­of­augmented­intelligence­specifically­oriented­to­problem­solving:
By­“augmenting­human­intellect”­we­mean­increasing­the­capability­of­a­
man to approach a complex problem situation, to gain comprehension to 
suit his particular needs, and to derive solutions to problems. Increased 
capability in this respect is taken to mean a mixture of the following: 
more-rapid comprehension, better comprehension, the possibility of 
gaining a useful degree of comprehension in a situation that previously 
was too complex, speedier solutions, better solutions, and the possibil-
ity­of­finding­solutions­to­problems­that­before­seemed­insoluble.­And­by­
“complex situations” we include the professional problems of diplomats, 
executives, social scientists, life scientists, physical scientists, attorneys, 
designers—whether the problem situation exists for twenty minutes or 
twenty­years.­(1962,­1)
Engelbart­was­a­pioneer­of­graphic­user­interfaces­and­network­technologies,­
inventor­of­the­computer­mouse­and­founder­of­the­Augmentation­Research­
Center at Stanford University. The methodology called bootstrapping was the 
guiding principle of his research laboratory and aimed to establish a recursive 
improvement in the interaction between human intelligence and computer 
design­(the­term­has­also­been­adopted­in the discourse on­artificial­intel-
ligence to describe a hypothetical system which learns how to improve itself 
recursively, that is by observing itself learning; as yet such a system has not 
been­successfully­designed).­Engelbart’s vision was eminently political and 
progressive:­Any­form­of­augmentation­of­individual­intelligence­would­imme-
diately result in an augmentation of the collective and political intelligence 
of­humankind.­Despite­the­fact­that­Engelbart­does­not­account­for­pos-
sible risks, social frictions, and cognitive traumas due to the introduction of 
augmented intelligence technologies, his combined technological and political 
definition­can­be­useful­to­draw­a­conceptual­map­of­augmented­intelligence.
Conceptual Axes of Augmentation
The­conceptual­field­of­augmented­intelligence­can­be­illustrated­along­two­
main­axes:­a­technological­axis­(that­describes­the­degree­of­complexity­
from traditional mnemo-techniques to the most sophisticated knowledge 
machines)­and­a­political­axis­(that­describes the scale of intellectual augmen-
tation­from­the­individual­to­a­social­dimension).
 – Technological axis.­Any­technique­of­external­memory­(such­as­the­alphabet­
or­numbers)­has­always­represented­an­extension­of­human­cognition.­
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McLuhan­(1962)­underlined­how­innovations­such­as­the­printing­press­and­
electronic media have caused a further expansion of our senses on a global 
scale,­affecting­cognitive­organization­and,­therefore,­social­organization.­
According­to­McLuhan,­it­is­possible­to­periodize­the­history­of­augmented­
intelligence in four epistemic periods according to the medium of cognitive 
augmentation: sign­(alphabet,­numbers,­symbolic­forms),­information­(radio,­
TV,­communication­networks),­algorithm­(data­mining,­computer­modeling,­
simulation­and­forecasting),­and­artificial intelligence­(expert­systems­and­
self-learning­agents:­as­a­hypothetical­limit).­The­interaction­between­the­
human­mind­and­techniques­of­augmentation­is­recursive­(as­Engelbart­
would­register),­since humankind has always continued improving upon 
them.
 – Political axis. The political consequences of augmented intelligence are 
immediately manifested as soon as a large scale of interaction and com-
putation is achieved.­Indeed,­Engelbart’s­project­was­conceived­to­help­
problem solving on a global scale of complexity: The collective scale cannot 
be­severed­by­any­definition­of­augmented­intelligence.­A­vast­tradition­of­
thought has already underlined the collective intellect as an autonomous 
agent­not­necessarily­embodied­in­technological­apparatuses­(Wolfe­2010).­
See the notions of: general intellect­(Marx),­noosphere­(Teilhard­de­Chardin),­
extra-cortical organization­(Vygotsky),­world brain­(Wells),­cultural capital 
(Bourdieu),­mass intellectuality­(Virno),­collective intelligence (Levy).­Across­
this­tradition,­“the­autonomy­of­the­general­intellect”­(Virno­1996)­has­been­
proposed by autonomist Marxism as the novel political composition emerg-
ing­out­of­post-Fordism.­The­project­of­such­a­political singularity mirrors 
perfectly the a-political model of technological singularity.
The­combination­(and­antagonism)­of­the­technological­and­political­axes­
describes­a­trajectory­toward­augmented­social­intelligence.­According­to­this 
definition,­however,­political­conflicts,­on­one­side,­and­the­computational­
aporias, on the other, go unresolved.­Deleuze­and­Guattari's notion of the 
machinic­(1972,­1980)—also inspired by the idea of mechanology by Simondon 
(1958)—was­a­similar­attempt­to­describe,­in­conjunction,­the­technological­
and political composition of society without falling either into fatalism or into 
utopianism.­Among­the­notions­of­augmentation,­moreover,­it­is­worth­recall-
ing­their­concepts­of­machinic­surplus­value­and­code­surplus­value­(Deleuze­
and­Guattari­1972,­232–237).
Criticism and Limits
Any­optimistic­endorsement­of­new­technologies­for­human­augmenta-
tion­regularly­encounters­different­forms­of­criticism.­“Artificial­intelligence­
winters,” for instance, are those periods of reduced funding and fall of 
institutional­interest,­also­due­to­public­skepticism.­A­first­example­of­popular­
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criticism directed toward augmented intelligence in the modern age would 
be­the­Venetian­editor­Hieronimo­Squarciafico.­After­working­for­years­with­
Aldus­Manuntius’s pioneering press, he stated in an aphorism, an “abundance 
of­books­makes­men­less­studious”­(Lowry­1979:­31).­The­essay­“The­Question­
Concerning­Technology”­by­Heidegger­(1954)­is­considered­a­main­reference­
for­technological­critique­in­continental­philosophy.­Heidegger­influenced­
a­specific­tradition­of­technoskepticism:­Stiegler­(2010),­for­instance,­has­
developed the idea that any external mnemo-technique produces a general 
grammatization and, therefore, a proletarization of the collective mind with 
a consequent loss of knowledge and savoir-vivre.­Berardi­(2009)­has­repeat-
edly­remarked­upon­the­de-erotization­of­the­collective­body­produced­by­
digital technologies and the regime of contemporary semio-capitalism. The 
physical and temporal limits of human cognition when interacting with a 
pervasive mediascape is generally addressed by the debate on the attention 
economy­(Davenport­and­Beck­2001).­The­discipline­of­neuropedagogy­has­
been acclaimed as a response to widespread techniques of cognitive enhance-
ment­and­a­pervasive­mediascape­(Metzinger­2009).­Specifically­dedicated­to­
the impact of the Internet on quality of reading, learning, and memory, the 
controversial­essay­“Is­Google­Making­Us­Stupid?”­by­Carr­is­also­relevant­in­
this­context.­The­thesis­of­the­nefarious­effect­of­digital­technologies­on­the­
human brain has been contested by neuroscientists. Carr’s political analysis, 
interestingly,­aligns­him­with­the­continental­philosophers­just­mentioned:­
“What Taylor did for the work of the hand, Google is doing for the work of the 
mind”­(Carr­2008).­A­more­consistent­and­less­fatalistic­critique­of­the­relation­
between digital technologies and human knowledge addresses the primacy of 
sensation­and­embodiment­(Hansen­2013)­and­the­role­of­the­“nonconscious”­
in­distributed­cognition­(Hayes­2014).­In­neomaterialist­philosophy,­it­is­femi-
nism, in particular, that has underlined how the extended or augmented mind 
is­always­embodied­and­situated­(Braidotti,­Grosz,­Haraway).
Augmented Futures
Along­the­lineage­of­French­technovitalism,­yet­turned­into­a­neo-reactionary­
vision,­Land­(2011)­has­propagated­the­idea­of­capitalism­itself­as­a­form­of­
alien and autonomous intelligence. The recent “Manifesto­for­an­Acceleration-
ist Politics”­(Srnicek­and­Williams­2013)­has­responded­to­this­fatalist­scenario­
by proposing to challenge such a level of complexity and abstraction: The idea 
is to repurpose capitalism’s­infrastructures­of­computation­(usually­controlled­
by­corporations­and­oligopolies)­to­augment­collective­political­intelligence.­
The­Cybersyn­project­sponsored­by­the­Chilean­government­in­1971­set out to 
control the national economy via a supercomputer;­this is usually mentioned 
as­a­first­rudimentary­example­of­such­revolutionary cybernetics­(Dyer-Withe-
ford­2013).­More­recently,­Negarestani­(2014)­has­advocated­for a functional 
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linearity­between­the­philosophy­of­reason,­the­political­project­of­social­intel-
ligence, and the design of the next computational machine, where the logical 
distinction­between­augmented­intelligence­and­artificial­intelligence­would­
no­longer­make­any­sense.­The­definition­of­augmented­intelligence,­however,­
will always be bound to an empirical foundation that is useful to sound out the 
consistency of any political or technological dream to come.
Acknowledgments: This keyword is part of the Critical Keywords for the Digital Humanities 
project, a series to be published by meson press 2016 that was realized with Leuphana Uni-
versity of Lüneburg. Available at: http://cdckeywords.leuphana.com/augmented_intelligence
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